audit-7 + docs: plan systemd units, D13-D15

- cayce-ops-plan.service/.timer (daily): the @ template cannot express publisher plan, so it gets its own unit - DECISIONS: D13 no non-human approvals; D14 signatures bind content + deployment; D15 negation veto classifier
audit-6: CI runs migrations + integration against Postgres 16
2026-10-20 02:21:36 +00:00 · 2026-10-20 02:21:36 +00:00 · 2026-10-20 02:21:36 +00:00 · 2026-10-20 02:20:56 +00:00 · 2026-10-20 02:20:26 +00:00 · 2026-10-20 02:20:26 +00:00
35 changed files with 3007 additions and 246 deletions
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_KINDS=
 CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_DAILY_CAP=0
 CAYCE_OPS_MAX_ATTEMPTS=2
 CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_HTTP_ACTIONS=false
+# when set (64-char hex x-only pubkey), executor approve REQUIRES a BIP-340
+# signature over sha256("cayce-ops:approve:<id>") made by the operator key
+CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY=

 # --- mail (IMAP read / SMTP send-approved-drafts-only) ---
 CAYCE_OPS_IMAP_HOST=imap.example.org
@@ -8,6 +8,21 @@ on:
 jobs:
  lint-test-leaks:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    services:
+      postgres:
+        image: postgres:16
+        env:
+          POSTGRES_USER: cayce
+          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ci-only-not-a-secret
+          POSTGRES_DB: cayce_ops
+        ports:
+          - 5432:5432
+        options: >-
+          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U cayce -d cayce_ops"
+          --health-interval 5s --health-timeout 3s --health-retries 10
+    env:
+      CAYCE_OPS_DATABASE_URL: postgresql+psycopg://cayce:ci-only-not-a-secret@127.0.0.1:5432/cayce_ops
+      PGPASSWORD: ci-only-not-a-secret
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
@@ -23,11 +38,24 @@ jobs:
      - name: Lint (ruff)
        run: uv run ruff check .

-      - name: Migrations smoke test (SQLite)
+      - name: Migrations upgrade/downgrade round-trip (Postgres 16)
+        run: |
+          uv run alembic upgrade head
+          uv run alembic downgrade 0001
+          uv run alembic upgrade head
+          uv run alembic downgrade base
+          uv run alembic upgrade head
+
+      - name: Alembic smoke (SQLite)
        run: uv run alembic upgrade head

-      - name: Tests (pytest)
-        run: uv run pytest
+      - name: Unit tests (pytest)
+        run: uv run pytest -m "not integration"
+
+      - name: Integration tests — roles.sql + daemon cycles (Postgres 16)
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y postgresql-client
+          uv run pytest -m integration -v

      - name: Secret scan (gitleaks, full history)
        run: |
@@ -8,6 +8,21 @@ on:
 jobs:
  lint-test-leaks:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    services:
+      postgres:
+        image: postgres:16
+        env:
+          POSTGRES_USER: cayce
+          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ci-only-not-a-secret
+          POSTGRES_DB: cayce_ops
+        ports:
+          - 5432:5432
+        options: >-
+          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U cayce -d cayce_ops"
+          --health-interval 5s --health-timeout 3s --health-retries 10
+    env:
+      CAYCE_OPS_DATABASE_URL: postgresql+psycopg://cayce:ci-only-not-a-secret@127.0.0.1:5432/cayce_ops
+      PGPASSWORD: ci-only-not-a-secret
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
@@ -23,11 +38,24 @@ jobs:
      - name: Lint (ruff)
        run: uv run ruff check .

-      - name: Migrations smoke test (SQLite)
+      - name: Migrations upgrade/downgrade round-trip (Postgres 16)
+        run: |
+          uv run alembic upgrade head
+          uv run alembic downgrade 0001
+          uv run alembic upgrade head
+          uv run alembic downgrade base
+          uv run alembic upgrade head
+
+      - name: Alembic smoke (SQLite)
        run: uv run alembic upgrade head

-      - name: Tests (pytest)
-        run: uv run pytest
+      - name: Unit tests (pytest)
+        run: uv run pytest -m "not integration"
+
+      - name: Integration tests — roles.sql + daemon cycles (Postgres 16)
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y postgresql-client
+          uv run pytest -m integration -v

      - name: Secret scan (gitleaks, full history)
        run: |
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+# AUDIT — cayce-ops
+
+Audited commit: **d500d88** — merge of PR #7 on `main`.
+
+> Note for the auditor: PRs #1-#6 merged with E501 lint findings present
+> (per-branch gate runs were misread). PR #7 is a lint-only cleanup
+> (line wrapping, F841/F821/E731 fixes, no behavior change) that restores
+> a fully green gate. The honest trail is kept here on purpose.
+> Re-run `make check` at d500d88 to verify: ruff 0 · 44 tests · no leaks.
+Gate that commit passed: `make check` — ruff (0 findings), 44 tests green,
+alembic smoke on sqlite, gitleaks full history (no leaks).
+
+## 1. Component map and data flow
+
+```
+                      CAYCE_OPS_SCANNER_SOURCES (external URLs)
+                                │  read-only fetch
+                                ▼
+   ┌──────────┐  proposals(status=proposed)  ┌──────────┐
+   │ scanner  │─────────────────────────────▶│   DB     │
+   └──────────┘                              │ (shared) │
+                                             │          │        audit_log (every write)
+   ┌──────────┐   approved → running →      │          │◀────── actor / action / detail /
+   │ executor │◀──── done|failed ───────────│          │        result on every transition
+   └──────────┘   plugins by kind            └──────────┘
+                                             │
+   ┌──────────┐  IMAP inbox ───────────────▶│ mail_messages,
+   │ maild    │  drafts (gated)             │ proposals(detail)
+   └──────────┘  SMTP only draft=approved   │
+                                             │
+   ┌──────────┐  content_items ────────────▶│          │──▶ relay (nostr) / Meta (opt-in)
+   │publisher │  draft→approved→published   └──────────┘
+   └──────────┘
+   ┌──────────┐  reads daemon_runs, audit_log, counts
+   │ monitor  │────────────────────────────────────▶ status.html (static)
+   └──────────┘
+```
+
+Shared schema (`cayceops/models.py`, migration `alembic/versions/0001_initial.py`):
+`proposals`, `audit_log`, `mail_messages`, `content_items`, `daemon_runs`.
+
+## 2. Every external call (where, what it sends, what triggers it)
+
+| # | Call | Code | Sends | Trigger |
+|---|------|------|-------|---------|
+| 1 | HTTP GET to scanner sources | `cayceops/components/scanner/scanner.py` → `_fetch` (urllib) | nothing but the request (+ `CAYCE_OPS_SCANNER_USER_AGENT` header) to URLs **configured by the operator** | `cayceops scanner run` (cron/systemd timer) |
+| 2 | IMAP fetch (IMAP4_SSL, UNSEEN) | `cayceops/components/maild/maild.py` → `connect_imap`, `_fetch_unread` | credentials from env; reads inbox | `cayceops maild poll` |
+| 3 | SMTP send | `maild.py` → `_smtp_send` (smtplib, STARTTLS) | a reply **draft a human approved** to the original sender's bare address | `cayceops maild send-approved`, and only rows with `draft_status=approved` |
+| 4 | LLM chat completion (openai-compatible) | `cayceops/llm.py` → `OpenAICompatProvider.complete` (urllib) | the email text (truncated 4000 chars) + system prompt; `Authorization: Bearer <env key>` | `maild poll` **only if** `CAYCE_OPS_LLM_PROVIDER != null` (default is null → never) |
+| 5 | Nostr relay publish (websocket) | `cayceops/components/publisher/nostr.py` → `relay_publish`/`publish` | a signed NIP-01 event whose content is the **human-approved** caption | `cayceops publisher publish-due`, channel=nostr, only if key+relays configured |
+| 6 | Meta Graph API | `cayceops/components/publisher/adapters.py` | caption (+optional hosted image URL) + page token | **refuses to run** unless `CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_FACEBOOK/INSTAGRAM=true` (default false). Currently unreachable from `publish_due`. |
+
+No other network code exists. Grep guards: `urllib.request`, `imaplib`, `smtplib`,
+`websockets` appear only in the files above (verified by review; CI could add a
+lint rule — see *Known risks*).
+
+## 3. What each component can do without a human / with AUTONOMOUS_MODE=true
+
+| Component | Without any human (default) | With `CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_MODE=true` |
+|---|---|---|
+| scanner | fetch sources, file proposals, write audit | identical (scanner never executes) |
+| executor | nothing executes by itself; it acts only on rows a human set to `approved` (via `executor approve --actor …`) | **one added path**: auto-approves `proposed` items whose `kind` ∈ `CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_KINDS`, capped at `CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_DAILY_CAP`/day, actor `auto:policy`, fully audited. Then executes those. |
+| maild | polls IMAP, classifies, writes drafts. **Never sends.** | identical — autonomy does not touch mail |
+| publisher | plans drafts; publishes nothing | identical — publishing always requires `publisher approve --actor …`; autonomy has no effect |
+| monitor | reads and renders | identical |
+
+Explicitly impossible in the current code: sending an unapproved mail draft,
+publishing unapproved content, executing a non-approved proposal (the single
+exception is the audited `auto:policy` path above), disabling the audit write.
+
+## 4. Environment variables and permissions per component
+
+All config is env-only (`cayceops/config.py`), prefix `CAYCE_OPS_`. Full list
+with placeholders: `.env.example`.
+
+| Component | Requires | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| core | `DATABASE_URL` (postgres or sqlite), `LOG_LEVEL`, `STATE_DIR`, `MEDIA_DIR` | DB user needs SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE on the five tables |
+| scanner | `SCANNER_SOURCES` (JSON), `SCANNER_KEYWORDS`, `SCANNER_USER_AGENT` | outbound GET only |
+| executor | `AUTONOMOUS_MODE`, `AUTONOMOUS_KINDS`, `AUTONOMOUS_DAILY_CAP`, `MAX_ATTEMPTS`, `ENABLE_HTTP_ACTIONS` | `http_post` plugin stays inert unless enabled |
+| maild | `IMAP_HOST/PORT/USER/PASSWORD/MAILBOX`, `SMTP_HOST/PORT/USER/PASSWORD`, `MAIL_FROM`, `LLM_PROVIDER/MODEL/BASE_URL/API_KEY/REVIEW_THRESHOLD` | IMAP user is read+mark-seen; SMTP login can send only as `MAIL_FROM` |
+| publisher | `NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY` (32-byte hex), `NOSTR_RELAYS`, `ENABLE_FACEBOOK`, `FACEBOOK_PAGE_TOKEN`, `ENABLE_INSTAGRAM`, `INSTAGRAM_USER_ID` | nostr key = signing authority; treat as secret |
+| monitor | `MONITOR_OUTPUT` (writable path) | needs read on DB, write on output only |
+
+Filesystem permissions: default deployment is the `cayce` user owning
+`/srv/cayce-ops` with systemd hardening (`NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem=strict`,
+`ProtectHome=yes`) — see `deploy/systemd/cayce-ops@.service`.
+
+## 5. Dependencies (pinned in `pyproject.toml` + `uv.lock`)
+
+| Package | Version | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| sqlalchemy | 2.0.44 | ORM + engine for the shared schema |
+| alembic | 1.17.0 | production migrations |
+| typer | 0.20.0 | CLI (all five daemons are CLI commands) |
+| psycopg[binary] | 3.2.13 | Postgres driver (production stack) |
+| pillow | 12.0.0 | brand image templates (publisher) |
+| coincurve | 21.0.0 | libsecp256k1 binding: NIP-01 event signing (publisher) |
+| websockets | 15.0.1 | nostr relay publish (sync client) |
+| pytest | 9.0.2 (dev) | test suite |
+| ruff | 0.15.1 (dev) | lint |
+
+stdlib doing heavy lifting: `imaplib`/`smtplib`/`email` (maild), `urllib` (scanner,
+LLM, Meta adapters), `xml.etree`/`html.parser` (scanner), `hashlib`/`json` (nostr ids).
+
+## 6. Known risks and open items
+
+1. **No live Gitea Actions runner on the current host** (DECISIONS D6). CI files
+   ship for GitHub/Gitea Actions, and the same gate runs locally pre-push
+   (`scripts/pre-push`), but until a runner exists there is no third-party
+   enforcement of the gate on every push.
+2. **`auto:policy` path is real autonomy** — bounded (kind allowlist + daily cap +
+   audit) but it does execute without a human in the loop when enabled. The cap
+   counter is DB-based; wiping `audit_log` resets it.Mitigation: only the
+   operator can set the env flags, and the audit log is append-only by convention.
+3. **Executor plugins are in-process Python** (D9): no sandboxing. A malicious
+   plugin = arbitrary code. Mitigation: plugins are repo code, reviewed in PRs;
+   the registry starts with `log_action` fallbacks only.
+4. **Mail classification is heuristic** (rules; LLM optional). Conservative by
+   design (low confidence → `needs_review`, unthreaded approvals → review), but
+   a sophisticated phishing email could still be misclassified `other`. Human
+   gate on sends bounds the damage to drafting wrong replies (never sending them).
+5. **Nostr relays are plaintext-config endpoints**: a hostile relay sees the
+   note content (public by design) and could replay it; event ids make duplication
+   detectable. No NIP-05, no retries across relay pools yet.
+6. **`detail` JSON columns are schemaless** — writers evolve payloads without
+   migrations. Monitor intentionally renders none of it.
+7. **gitleaks allowlist covers `tests/`** (D7): a real secret pasted under
+   `tests/` would not trip the scanner. Compensating control: PR review; no
+   fixture reads the environment.
+8. **Open:** provision an act_runner for Gitea Actions; wire `posts_log`-style
+   engagement back into publisher planning; add NIP-05 identifier; retries for
+   relay publish.
+
+## 7. Running tests and the local stack
+
+```bash
+uv sync --frozen                 # python 3.12 + locked deps
+uv run pytest                    # 44 tests, sqlite, no network
+make check                       # lint + tests + alembic smoke + gitleaks (pre-push gate)
+
+# full local stack (five daemons + postgres 16):
+cp .env.example .env             # fill placeholders; nothing real required for db-only
+docker compose up -d db
+uv run alembic upgrade head
+docker compose up -d             # or run each: uv run cayceops {scanner,executor,maild,publisher,monitor} …
+
+# production path (VPS):
+#   see deploy/systemd/README.md (hardened units + timers)
+```
+
+## Audited commit
+
+- Repository: `cayce/cayce-ops` (branch `main`)
+- **Audited: d500d888701c3f1cd3305d098a448c3e20a8ad99** (merge of PR #7)
+- Gate at that commit: ruff clean (0 findings) · 44/44 tests · alembic 0001
+  smoke OK · gitleaks `--all` no leaks · `make check` exit 0.
+
+---
+
+## Response to external audit — 2026-10-20
+
+External audit verdict reproduced our gate and found 5 critical + 6 medium
+issues. All criticals and all mediums are fixed in **c9bd441** (PR #9):
+
+| # | Finding | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| C1 | approval forgeable with any `--actor` | hash-chained `audit_log` (`verify_audit_chain`); optional-required operator BIP-340 signature (`CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY`); `deploy/roles.sql` least-privilege DB roles |
+| C2 | mail threading dead (no OUTBOUND rows, inbound id overwritten, no first-contact) | sends create OUTBOUND rows (own Message-ID + In-Reply-To); inbound id untouched; `maild compose`; chain fallback in `_match_proposal` |
+| C3 | duplicate sends on SMTP failure | per-message transactions; failures audited (`send_failed`), row stays queued |
+| C4 | negated approvals classified as approvals; LLM prompt `.format()` KeyError | negation rules first (0.95 REJECTION); prompt braces escaped |
+| C5 | systemd units ran nonexistent `run` subcommands | `run` added to all five daemons; `publisher plan` timer documented |
+| M1-M6 | gate not self-installed; approved text unbound; `risk_score` misnamed/ordered; postgres 0.0.0.0; IMAP seen-before-commit; publisher noise/infinite retries | `make hooks`; `approved_hash` bindings; `match_score` (migration 0002) + relevance-desc; `127.0.0.1` bind; `\Seen` post-commit; `SKIPPED` terminal + attempt budget |
+
+New audited commit: **c9bd441**. Gate at that commit: ruff 0 · 56/56 tests ·
+alembic 0001→0002 · gitleaks `--all` clean · `make check` exit 0.
+Still open (declared): apply `roles.sql` on production, provision CI runner.
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: check lint test migrate-check leaks sync
+.PHONY: check lint test migrate-check leaks sync hooks

 sync:            ## install locked deps (creates .venv)
 	uv sync --frozen
@@ -17,5 +17,9 @@ migrate-check:   ## smoke the alembic chain on a scratch sqlite db
 leaks:           ## gitleaks over the full history
 	gitleaks detect --source . --log-opts="--all" -v

+hooks:            ## install the pre-push gate as a git hook (part of setup)
+	git config core.hooksPath scripts/githooks
+	@echo "pre-push gate installed (scripts/githooks/pre-push)"
+
 check: lint test migrate-check leaks   ## the pre-push gate — must be green before every push
 	@echo "check: OK"
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+"""audit hardening migration — minimal standalone mirror of 0002.
+
+Revision ID: 0002
+Revises: 0001
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0002"
+down_revision = "0001"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+OLD_CONTENT_STATUSES = ("DRAFT", "APPROVED", "PUBLISHED")
+NEW_CONTENT_STATUSES = ("DRAFT", "APPROVED", "PUBLISHED", "SKIPPED")
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    with op.batch_alter_table("audit_log") as batch:
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("prev_hash", sa.String(length=64), nullable=True))
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("entry_hash", sa.String(length=64), nullable=True))
+        batch.create_index("ix_audit_log_entry_hash", ["entry_hash"])
+
+    with op.batch_alter_table("proposals") as batch:
+        batch.alter_column("risk_score", new_column_name="match_score")
+
+    with op.batch_alter_table("mail_messages") as batch:
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("approved_hash", sa.String(length=64), nullable=True))
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("approved_by", sa.String(length=128), nullable=True))
+
+    if op.get_bind().dialect.name == "postgresql":
+        op.execute("ALTER TYPE contentstatus ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS 'SKIPPED'")
+    with op.batch_alter_table("content_items") as batch:
+        batch.alter_column(
+            "status",
+            existing_type=sa.Enum(*OLD_CONTENT_STATUSES, name="contentstatus"),
+            type_=sa.Enum(*NEW_CONTENT_STATUSES, name="contentstatus"),
+            existing_nullable=False,
+        )
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("attempts", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"))
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("approved_hash", sa.String(length=64), nullable=True))
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    with op.batch_alter_table("content_items") as batch:
+        batch.drop_column("approved_hash")
+        batch.drop_column("attempts")
+        batch.alter_column(
+            "status",
+            existing_type=sa.Enum(*NEW_CONTENT_STATUSES, name="contentstatus"),
+            type_=sa.Enum(*OLD_CONTENT_STATUSES, name="contentstatus"),
+            existing_nullable=False,
+        )
+
+    with op.batch_alter_table("mail_messages") as batch:
+        batch.drop_column("approved_by")
+        batch.drop_column("approved_hash")
+
+    with op.batch_alter_table("proposals") as batch:
+        batch.alter_column("match_score", new_column_name="risk_score")
+
+    with op.batch_alter_table("audit_log") as batch:
+        batch.drop_index("ix_audit_log_entry_hash")
+        batch.drop_column("entry_hash")
+        batch.drop_column("prev_hash")
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"""approval hardening: mandatory operator signatures bound to content
+
+Revision ID: 0003
+Revises: 0002
+Create Date: 2026-10-20
+
+- proposals.operator_signature
+- mail_messages.operator_signature
+- content_items.operator_signature
+
+Full signatures (128 hex chars) — never truncated. Existing NULL rows are
+refused at execution/send/publish time by the signing gate (no degraded mode).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0003"
+down_revision = "0002"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    with op.batch_alter_table("proposals") as batch:
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("operator_signature", sa.Text(), nullable=True))
+    with op.batch_alter_table("mail_messages") as batch:
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("operator_signature", sa.Text(), nullable=True))
+    with op.batch_alter_table("content_items") as batch:
+        batch.add_column(sa.Column("operator_signature", sa.Text(), nullable=True))
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    with op.batch_alter_table("content_items") as batch:
+        batch.drop_column("operator_signature")
+    with op.batch_alter_table("mail_messages") as batch:
+        batch.drop_column("operator_signature")
+    with op.batch_alter_table("proposals") as batch:
+        batch.drop_column("operator_signature")
@@ -71,10 +71,16 @@ def executor_run() -> None:

@executor_app.command("approve")
 def executor_approve(
-    proposal_id: int, actor: str = typer.Option(..., help="Human approver id")
+    proposal_id: int,
+    actor: str = typer.Option(..., help="Human approver id"),
+    signature: str = typer.Option(
+        ..., help="BIP-340 sig over the approval message (mandatory)"
+    ),
 ) -> None:
-    """Approve a proposal (human action, audited)."""
-    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("executor").approve(proposal_id, actor))
+    """Approve a proposal (human action, audited; signature mandatory)."""
+    raise typer.Exit(
+        _load_component("executor").approve(proposal_id, actor, signature=signature)
+    )


@executor_app.command("reject")
@@ -95,17 +101,48 @@ def maild_poll() -> None:


@maild_app.command("approve-draft")
-def maild_approve(msg_id: int, actor: str = typer.Option(...)) -> None:
-    """Approve a drafted reply so SMTP may send it."""
-    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("maild").approve_draft(msg_id, actor))
+def maild_approve(
+    msg_id: int,
+    actor: str = typer.Option(...),
+    signature: str = typer.Option(
+        ..., help="BIP-340 sig over the approval message (mandatory)"
+    ),
+) -> None:
+    """Approve a drafted reply so SMTP may send it (signature mandatory)."""
+    raise typer.Exit(
+        _load_component("maild").approve_draft(msg_id, actor, signature)
+    )


@maild_app.command("send-approved")
 def maild_send() -> None:
-    """Send all approved drafts via SMTP."""
+    """Send all approved drafts via SMTP (per-message commit)."""
    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("maild").send_approved())


+@maild_app.command("compose")
+def maild_compose(
+    proposal_id: int,
+    to_addr: str = typer.Option(...),
+    subject: str = typer.Option(...),
+    body: str = typer.Option(...),
+) -> None:
+    """Create the FIRST-CONTACT outbound draft for a proposal (drafted)."""
+    raise typer.Exit(
+        _load_component("maild").compose(proposal_id, to_addr, subject, body)
+    )
+
+
+@maild_app.command("run")
+def maild_run() -> None:
+    """One daemon cycle: poll inbound, then send approved drafts."""
+    comp = _load_component("maild")
+    code = comp.poll()
+    if code == 0:
+        code = comp.send_approved()
+    raise typer.Exit(code)
+
+
 # --- publisher ---------------------------------------------------------------
 publisher_app = typer.Typer(name="publisher", help="Themed content calendar")
 app.add_typer(publisher_app)
@@ -124,9 +161,17 @@ def publisher_image(item_id: int) -> None:


@publisher_app.command("approve")
-def publisher_approve(item_id: int, actor: str = typer.Option(...)) -> None:
-    """Approve a draft content item."""
-    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("publisher").approve(item_id, actor))
+def publisher_approve(
+    item_id: int,
+    actor: str = typer.Option(...),
+    signature: str = typer.Option(
+        ..., help="BIP-340 sig over the approval message (mandatory)"
+    ),
+) -> None:
+    """Approve a draft content item (signature mandatory)."""
+    raise typer.Exit(
+        _load_component("publisher").approve(item_id, actor, signature)
+    )


@publisher_app.command("publish-due")
@@ -135,6 +180,12 @@ def publisher_publish() -> None:
    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("publisher").publish_due())


+@publisher_app.command("run")
+def publisher_run() -> None:
+    """One daemon cycle: publish due approved items (plan is cron'd separately)."""
+    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("publisher").publish_due())
+
+
 # --- monitor -----------------------------------------------------------------
 monitor_app = typer.Typer(name="monitor", help="Static status page")
 app.add_typer(monitor_app)
@@ -146,6 +197,18 @@ def monitor_build() -> None:
    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("monitor").build())


+@monitor_app.command("run")
+def monitor_run() -> None:
+    """One daemon cycle: build the status page."""
+    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("monitor").build())
+
+
+@monitor_app.command("anchor")
+def monitor_anchor() -> None:
+    """Publish today's audit-chain anchor as a signed Nostr note (1/day)."""
+    raise typer.Exit(_load_component("monitor").anchor())
+
+
 def main() -> None:  # pragma: no cover
    app()

@@ -29,12 +29,85 @@ from cayceops.models import AuditEntry, DaemonRun, Proposal, ProposalStatus, aud
 Actor = str


+def _load_cfg():
+    from cayceops.config import load
+
+    return load()
+
+
 # --- human transitions -------------------------------------------------------

+GATE_ERROR = 2  # missing/invalid configuration or signature

-def approve(proposal_id: int, actor: Actor, cfg: Config | None = None, sess=None) -> int:
-    """Human approves a proposal. Audited with the operator's identity."""
-    return _decide(proposal_id, actor, ProposalStatus.APPROVED, cfg, sess)
+
+def _signing(cfg: Config) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """(deployment_id, operator_pubkey) or ConfigError. No degraded mode."""
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+
+    if not cfg.operator_pubkey or not cfg.deployment_id:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            "approvals disabled: CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY and "
+            "CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID are both required"
+        )
+    return cfg.deployment_id, cfg.operator_pubkey
+
+
+def approve(
+    proposal_id: int,
+    actor: Actor,
+    cfg: Config | None = None,
+    sess=None,
+    signature: str | None = None,
+) -> int:
+    """Human approves a proposal. Signature is MANDATORY and bound to the
+    proposal's current content and this deployment (audit finding 1)."""
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+    from cayceops.signing import (
+        SignatureError,
+        proposal_content_hash,
+        verify_signature,
+    )
+
+    cfg = cfg or _load_cfg()
+    try:
+        deployment_id, pubkey = _signing(cfg)
+    except ConfigError as exc:
+        if sess is not None:
+            audit(
+                sess,
+                actor=actor,
+                action="approve",
+                proposal_id=proposal_id,
+                result="error",
+                detail={"reason": str(exc)},
+            )
+        return GATE_ERROR
+
+    proposal = sess.get(Proposal, proposal_id) if sess is not None else None
+    if proposal is None:
+        return 1
+    chash = proposal_content_hash(
+        proposal.kind, proposal.title, proposal.url, proposal.detail
+    )
+    try:
+        if not signature:
+            raise SignatureError("signature required")
+        if not verify_signature(
+            "proposal", deployment_id, proposal_id, chash, signature, pubkey
+        ):
+            raise SignatureError("signature invalid for this content/deployment")
+    except SignatureError as exc:
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor=actor,
+            action="approve",
+            proposal_id=proposal_id,
+            result="error",
+            detail={"reason": str(exc), "content_hash": chash},
+        )
+        return GATE_ERROR
+
+    return _decide(proposal_id, actor, ProposalStatus.APPROVED, cfg, sess, signature)


 def reject(proposal_id: int, actor: Actor, cfg: Config | None = None, sess=None) -> int:
@@ -48,6 +121,7 @@ def _decide(
    decision: ProposalStatus,
    cfg: Config | None,
    sess,
+    signature: str | None = None,
 ) -> int:
    owned = False
    if sess is None:
@@ -70,11 +144,14 @@ def _decide(
            )
            return 1
        proposal.status = decision
+        detail: dict = {}
        if decision == ProposalStatus.APPROVED:
            proposal.approved_by = actor
            proposal.approved_at = datetime.now(UTC)
+            proposal.operator_signature = signature  # FULL signature, row + audit
+            detail["signature"] = signature or ""
        verb = "approve" if decision == ProposalStatus.APPROVED else "reject"
-        audit(sess, actor=actor, action=verb, proposal_id=proposal_id)
+        audit(sess, actor=actor, action=verb, proposal_id=proposal_id, detail=detail)
        return 0
    finally:
        if owned:
@@ -85,9 +162,20 @@ def _decide(


 def _auto_approve(cfg: Config, sess) -> int:
-    """Auto-approve proposed items per policy. Returns count approved."""
-    if not cfg.autonomous_mode or not cfg.autonomous_kinds:
-        return 0
+    """DISABLED (audit round 2, point 1a): approvals require operator
+    signatures bound to content — there is no non-human approval path.
+    AUTONOMOUS_MODE no longer grants approval powers (DECISIONS D13)."""
+    if cfg.autonomous_mode and cfg.autonomous_kinds:
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor="auto:policy",
+            action="autonomy_disabled",
+            result="error",
+            detail={
+                "reason": "mandatory operator signatures: no non-human approvals",
+            },
+        )
+    return 0
    midnight = datetime.now(UTC).replace(hour=0, minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0)
    used = (
        sess.query(func.count(AuditEntry.id))
@@ -102,13 +190,15 @@ def _auto_approve(cfg: Config, sess) -> int:
    approved = 0
    if budget == 0:
        return 0
+    # most relevant first (match_score = keyword relevance, NOT risk — the
+    # audit's naming finding; ascending order approved noise first)
    candidates = (
        sess.query(Proposal)
        .filter(
            Proposal.status == ProposalStatus.PROPOSED,
            Proposal.kind.in_(cfg.autonomous_kinds),
        )
-        .order_by(Proposal.risk_score.asc(), Proposal.id.asc())
+        .order_by(Proposal.match_score.desc(), Proposal.id.asc())
        .limit(budget)
        .all()
    )
@@ -124,7 +214,7 @@ def _auto_approve(cfg: Config, sess) -> int:
            detail={
                "reason": "autonomous_mode policy",
                "kind": proposal.kind,
-                "risk_score": proposal.risk_score,
+                "match_score": proposal.match_score,
                "daily_cap": cfg.autonomous_daily_cap,
            },
        )
@@ -135,8 +225,67 @@ def _auto_approve(cfg: Config, sess) -> int:
 # --- execution ----------------------------------------------------------------


+def _verify_approval_signature(proposal: Proposal, cfg: Config, sess) -> bool:
+    """Run-time gate (audit round 2, 1d): a row in `approved` MUST carry a
+    valid operator signature for its CURRENT content and THIS deployment.
+    Rows approved by raw SQL (no signature) or edited after approval are
+    rejected, audited as error, and revert to `proposed`."""
+    from cayceops.signing import (
+        SignatureError,
+        proposal_content_hash,
+        verify_signature,
+    )
+
+    try:
+        deployment_id, pubkey = _signing(cfg)
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — ConfigError at daemon boundary
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor="daemon:executor",
+            action="execute_refused",
+            proposal_id=proposal.id,
+            result="error",
+            detail={"reason": str(exc)},
+        )
+        return False
+    chash = proposal_content_hash(
+        proposal.kind, proposal.title, proposal.url, proposal.detail
+    )
+    try:
+        if not verify_signature(
+            "proposal",
+            deployment_id,
+            proposal.id,
+            chash,
+            proposal.operator_signature,
+            pubkey,
+        ):
+            raise SignatureError(
+                "no valid operator signature for current content/deployment"
+            )
+    except SignatureError as exc:
+        proposal.status = ProposalStatus.PROPOSED  # back to pre-approval
+        proposal.operator_signature = None
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor="daemon:executor",
+            action="execute_refused",
+            proposal_id=proposal.id,
+            result="error",
+            detail={
+                "reason": str(exc),
+                "content_hash": chash,
+                "had_signature": bool(proposal.operator_signature),
+            },
+        )
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
 def execute_one(proposal: Proposal, cfg: Config, sess) -> bool:
    """Run the plugin for one approved proposal. Returns True on success."""
+    if not _verify_approval_signature(proposal, cfg, sess):
+        return False
    proposal.status = ProposalStatus.RUNNING
    proposal.attempts += 1
    audit(
@@ -203,6 +352,13 @@ def run(cfg: Config | None = None, sess=None) -> int:
        run_row = DaemonRun(daemon="executor")
        sess.add(run_row)
        sess.flush()
+        try:
+            _signing(cfg)  # refuse to run without signing config (no degraded mode)
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — ConfigError at boundary
+            run_row.status = "error"
+            run_row.detail = {"refused": str(exc)[:200]}
+            run_row.finished_at = datetime.now(UTC)
+            return 2
        try:
            auto = _auto_approve(cfg, sess)
            pending = (
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
-"""maild classification: rules first, LLM optional, conservative threshold.
+"""maild classification: rules + sentence-level negation, LLM optional.

-The LLM never decides alone: any result below ``CAYCE_OPS_LLM_REVIEW_THRESHOLD``
-confidence becomes ``needs_review``. With the ``null`` provider (default) only
-deterministic rules run.
+Approval rule (audit round 2, point 2): a mail may only classify `approval`
+when NO sentence contains a negation. Any negation token anywhere in the mail
+(conservative: even outside the approval sentence) downgrades an approval to
+`needs_review`. Rejections/questions/other are unaffected.
+
+The LLM never decides alone: below-threshold confidence → `needs_review`.
+With the `null` provider (default) only deterministic rules run.
 """

 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -13,16 +17,38 @@ import re
 from cayceops.config import Config
 from cayceops.models import MailClassification

+_APPROVAL_WORDS = re.compile(r"\b(approv|accept|welcome)", re.I)
+
+# any of these tokens anywhere in the mail vetoes an `approval` result
+_NEGATIONS = re.compile(
+    r"\b(not|no|never|cannot|can'?t|won'?t|hasn'?t|isn'?t|"
+    r"no\s+longer|unable|decline\w*|regret\w*|unfortunately)\b",
+    re.I,
+)
+
 _RULES: list[tuple[MailClassification, re.Pattern[str], float]] = [
    # (class, pattern, confidence when matched)
-    (MailClassification.REJECTION, re.compile(r"\b(declin|reject|not able to|unable to|unfortunately|we regret|won.t be able)\w*", re.I), 0.9),
-    (MailClassification.APPROVAL, re.compile(r"\b(approv|accept|welcome to the|you.re (in|approved)|live|activated|glad to)\w*", re.I), 0.85),
-    (MailClassification.QUESTION, re.compile(r"\b(could you|can you|please (provide|clarify|confirm)|what (is|are)|how (do|does|can)|need more (info|details))\b", re.I), 0.7),
+    (
+        MailClassification.REJECTION,
+        # noqa: E501 (kept on one line: the pattern IS the reviewed artifact)
+        re.compile(r"\b(declin|reject|not able to|unable to|we regret|won.t be able)\w*", re.I),  # noqa: E501
+        0.9,
+    ),
+    (
+        MailClassification.APPROVAL,
+        re.compile(r"\b(approv|accept|welcome to the|you.re (in|approved)|live|activated|glad to)\w*", re.I),  # noqa: E501
+        0.85,
+    ),
+    (
+        MailClassification.QUESTION,
+        re.compile(r"\b(could you|can you|please (provide|clarify|confirm)|what (is|are)|how (do|does|can)|need more (info|details))\b", re.I),  # noqa: E501
+        0.7,
+    ),
 ]

 _LLM_PROMPT = """Classify this merchant email into exactly one of:
 approval, rejection, question, other.
-Reply with strict JSON: {"classification": "...", "confidence": 0.0-1.0}
+Reply with strict JSON: {{"classification": "...", "confidence": 0.0-1.0}}

 Subject and body:
 {body}"""
@@ -35,13 +61,20 @@ def _rules(text: str) -> tuple[MailClassification, float]:
    return MailClassification.OTHER, 0.3


+def _has_negation(text: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(_NEGATIONS.search(text))
+
+
 def _llm_classify(text: str, cfg: Config) -> tuple[MailClassification, float] | None:
    """Ask the configured LLM. Returns None on any failure (rules take over)."""
    from cayceops.llm import get_provider

    try:
        provider = get_provider(cfg)
-        raw = provider.complete(_LLM_PROMPT.format(body=text[:4000]), system="You classify merchant emails. Reply with JSON only.")
+        raw = provider.complete(
+            _LLM_PROMPT.format(body=text[:4000]),
+            system="You classify merchant emails. Reply with JSON only.",
+        )
        data = json.loads(re.search(r"\{.*\}", raw, re.S).group(0))
        kind = MailClassification(data["classification"].lower())
        confidence = float(data["confidence"])
@@ -63,6 +96,13 @@ def classify(text: str, cfg: Config) -> tuple[MailClassification, float]:
    else:
        kind, confidence = _rules(text)

+    # APPROVAL VETO (audit round 2): any negation anywhere in the mail
+    # downgrades an approval to needs_review. Approval requires a mail with
+    # zero negations — "cannot currently accept", "never accept",
+    # "hasn't been approved", "no longer accepting" all land here.
+    if kind is MailClassification.APPROVAL and _has_negation(text):
+        return MailClassification.NEEDS_REVIEW, min(confidence, 0.6)
+
    if confidence < cfg.llm_review_threshold:
        return MailClassification.NEEDS_REVIEW, confidence
    return kind, confidence
@@ -35,9 +35,25 @@ from cayceops.models import (
    MailDirection,
    MailMessage,
    Proposal,
+    _content_hash,
    audit,
 )

+GATE_ERROR = 2  # missing/invalid configuration or signature
+
+
+def _signing(cfg: Config) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """(deployment_id, operator_pubkey) or ConfigError. No degraded mode."""
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+
+    if not cfg.operator_pubkey or not cfg.deployment_id:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            "approvals disabled: CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY and "
+            "CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID are both required"
+        )
+    return cfg.deployment_id, cfg.operator_pubkey
+
+
 # --- IMAP ---------------------------------------------------------------------


@@ -48,17 +64,33 @@ def connect_imap(cfg: Config) -> imaplib.IMAP4_SSL:
    return client


-def _fetch_unread(cfg: Config) -> list[bytes]:
-    """Fetch raw unread messages. Returns list of raw RFC822 bytes."""
+def _fetch_unread(cfg: Config) -> list[tuple[bytes, bytes]]:
+    """Fetch raw unread messages as [(imap_num, raw_bytes)].
+
+    Messages are NOT marked \\Seen here — marking happens only after the
+    processed rows are committed (audit finding: a crash mid-batch used to
+    silently lose the rest of the batch).
+    """
    client = connect_imap(cfg)
    try:
        _, data = client.search(None, "UNSEEN")
-        raw_messages: list[bytes] = []
+        out: list[tuple[bytes, bytes]] = []
        for num in data[0].split():
            _, msg_data = client.fetch(num, "(RFC822)")
-            raw_messages.append(msg_data[0][1])
+            out.append((num, msg_data[0][1]))
+        return out
+    finally:
+        client.logout()
+
+
+def _mark_seen(cfg: Config, nums: list[bytes]) -> None:
+    """Mark processed messages \\Seen (called after commit)."""
+    if not nums:
+        return
+    client = connect_imap(cfg)
+    try:
+        for num in nums:
            client.store(num, "+FLAGS", "\\Seen")
-        return raw_messages
    finally:
        client.logout()

@@ -96,7 +128,13 @@ def parse_raw(raw: bytes) -> dict:


 def _match_proposal(parsed: dict, sess) -> Proposal | None:
-    """Thread an inbound mail to its proposal via In-Reply-To of sent drafts."""
+    """Thread an inbound mail to its proposal.
+
+    1. In-Reply-To matches a SENT OUTBOUND message (our replies carry their own
+       Message-ID and an outbound row, created at send time).
+    2. Fallback: it matches ANY stored message (e.g. a second reply threaded to
+       our first inbound) that already carries a proposal_id.
+    """
    irt = parsed.get("in_reply_to")
    if not irt:
        return None
@@ -108,9 +146,16 @@ def _match_proposal(parsed: dict, sess) -> Proposal | None:
        )
        .one_or_none()
    )
-    if sent is None or sent.proposal_id is None:
-        return None
-    return sess.get(Proposal, sent.proposal_id)
+    if sent is not None and sent.proposal_id is not None:
+        return sess.get(Proposal, sent.proposal_id)
+    chain = (
+        sess.query(MailMessage)
+        .filter(MailMessage.message_id == irt, MailMessage.proposal_id.isnot(None))
+        .one_or_none()
+    )
+    if chain is not None:
+        return sess.get(Proposal, chain.proposal_id)
+    return None


 # --- drafts -------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -144,10 +189,15 @@ def _build_draft(parsed: dict, kind: MailClassification, proposal: Proposal | No
 # --- inbound pass ---------------------------------------------------------------


-def _poll(cfg: Config, sess, fetcher=None) -> dict:
-    """One inbound pass: parse, classify, thread, draft. Returns stats."""
+def _poll(cfg: Config, sess, fetcher=None, marker=None) -> tuple[dict, list[bytes]]:
+    """One inbound pass: parse, classify, thread, draft.
+
+    Returns (stats, processed_imap_nums). The caller marks \\Seen only after
+    its transaction commits.
+    """
    stats = {"processed": 0, "drafted": 0, "needs_review": 0, "skipped": 0}
-    for raw in (fetcher or _fetch_unread)(cfg):
+    processed_nums: list[bytes] = []
+    for num, raw in (fetcher or _fetch_unread)(cfg):
        parsed = parse_raw(raw)
        if (
            sess.query(MailMessage)
@@ -186,6 +236,7 @@ def _poll(cfg: Config, sess, fetcher=None) -> dict:
            detail={"classification": kind.value, "confidence": confidence},
        )
        stats["processed"] += 1
+        processed_nums.append(num)  # stored -> safe to mark seen after commit

        if kind == MailClassification.NEEDS_REVIEW:
            stats["needs_review"] += 1
@@ -210,18 +261,42 @@ def _poll(cfg: Config, sess, fetcher=None) -> dict:
                detail={"mail_id": record.id},
            )
            stats["drafted"] += 1
-    return stats
+    return stats, processed_nums


 # --- human gate: approve draft -------------------------------------------------


-def _approve_draft(mail_id: int, actor: str, sess) -> int:
-    """Human approves a drafted reply. Only then may SMTP send it."""
+def _mail_to_addr(record) -> str | None:
+    """The address a send would use for this draft."""
+    if record.direction == MailDirection.INBOUND:
+        return record.from_addr
+    return record.to_addr
+
+
+def _mail_content_hash(record) -> str:
+    from cayceops.signing import mail_content_hash
+
+    return mail_content_hash(
+        _mail_to_addr(record), record.subject, record.draft_reply
+    )
+
+
+def _approve_draft(
+    mail_id: int, actor: str, sess, signature: str | None = None
+) -> int:
+    """Human approves a drafted reply (inbound-threaded or first-contact).
+
+    Signature is MANDATORY and bound to (to_addr, subject, body) + deployment
+    (audit round 2, 1a/1b). The full signature is stored on the row.
+    """
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+    from cayceops.signing import SignatureError, verify_signature
+
    record = sess.get(MailMessage, mail_id)
-    if record is None or record.direction != MailDirection.INBOUND:
+    if record is None:
        return 1
-    if record.draft_status != DraftStatus.DRAFTED:
+    if record.draft_status != DraftStatus.DRAFTED or not record.draft_reply:
        audit(
            sess,
            actor=actor,
@@ -231,13 +306,52 @@ def _approve_draft(mail_id: int, actor: str, sess) -> int:
            detail={"reason": f"invalid draft state: {record.draft_status.value}"},
        )
        return 1
+
+    from cayceops.config import load
+
+    cfg = load()
+    try:
+        deployment_id, pubkey = _signing(cfg)
+    except ConfigError as exc:
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor=actor,
+            action="approve_draft",
+            proposal_id=record.proposal_id,
+            result="error",
+            detail={"reason": str(exc)},
+        )
+        return GATE_ERROR
+
+    chash = _mail_content_hash(record)
+    try:
+        if not signature:
+            raise SignatureError("signature required")
+        if not verify_signature(
+            "mail", deployment_id, mail_id, chash, signature, pubkey
+        ):
+            raise SignatureError("signature invalid for this content/deployment")
+    except SignatureError as exc:
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor=actor,
+            action="approve_draft",
+            proposal_id=record.proposal_id,
+            result="error",
+            detail={"reason": str(exc), "content_hash": chash},
+        )
+        return GATE_ERROR
+
    record.draft_status = DraftStatus.APPROVED
+    record.approved_hash = _content_hash(record.draft_reply)
+    record.approved_by = actor[:128]
+    record.operator_signature = signature  # FULL signature
    audit(
        sess,
        actor=actor,
        action="approve_draft",
        proposal_id=record.proposal_id,
-        detail={"mail_id": record.id},
+        detail={"mail_id": record.id, "hash": record.approved_hash, "signature": signature},
    )
    return 0

@@ -245,12 +359,21 @@ def _approve_draft(mail_id: int, actor: str, sess) -> int:
 # --- SMTP: only approved drafts ------------------------------------------------


-def _smtp_send(cfg: Config, to_addr: str, subject: str, body: str, message_id: str) -> None:
+def _smtp_send(
+    cfg: Config,
+    to_addr: str,
+    subject: str,
+    body: str,
+    message_id: str,
+    in_reply_to: str | None = None,
+) -> None:
    msg = EmailMessage()
    msg["From"] = cfg.mail_from
    msg["To"] = to_addr
    msg["Subject"] = subject
    msg["Message-ID"] = message_id
+    if in_reply_to:
+        msg["In-Reply-To"] = in_reply_to  # keep merchant threads intact
    msg.set_content(body)
    with smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30) as server:
        server.starttls()
@@ -267,52 +390,208 @@ def _approved_by(sess, mail_id: int) -> str:
    return "unknown"


-def _send_approved(cfg: Config, sess, sender=None) -> dict:
-    """Send every APPROVED draft. Anything else stays untouched."""
-    stats = {"sent": 0, "blocked": 0}
-    pending = (
-        sess.query(MailMessage)
-        .filter(
-            MailMessage.direction == MailDirection.INBOUND,
-            MailMessage.draft_status == DraftStatus.APPROVED,
-        )
-        .all()
-    )
-    for record in pending:
-        to_addr = record.from_addr or ""
-        if not to_addr:
-            record.draft_status = DraftStatus.SKIPPED
-            stats["blocked"] += 1
-            continue
-        message_id = (
-            f"<cayce-draft-{record.id}-{int(datetime.now(UTC).timestamp())}@cayce-co.xyz>"
-        )
-        (sender or _smtp_send)(
-            cfg,
-            to_addr,
-            f"Re: {record.subject or 'your message'}",
-            record.draft_reply or "",
-            message_id,
-        )
-        approved_by = _approved_by(sess, record.id)
-        record.draft_status = DraftStatus.SENT
-        # store the Message-ID so future replies thread to this draft
-        record.message_id = message_id
+def _send_one(cfg: Config, sess, mail_id: int, sender=None) -> str:
+    """Send ONE approved draft. Returns: sent | hash_mismatch | missing | blocked.
+
+    Creates the OUTBOUND row (its own Message-ID + In-Reply-To pointing at the
+    inbound message) so future replies thread correctly — the inbound row's
+    message_id is left untouched (audit finding: it used to be overwritten).
+    The caller owns the transaction: one message per commit, so an SMTP failure
+    on message N never un-sends messages 1..N-1 (audit finding: duplicates).
+    """
+
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+    from cayceops.signing import verify_signature
+
+    record = sess.get(MailMessage, mail_id)
+    if record is None:
+        return "missing"
+    if record.draft_status != DraftStatus.APPROVED:
+        return "blocked"
+
+    # run-time signature gate (audit round 2, 1d): the row must carry a valid
+    # operator signature for its CURRENT to_addr/subject/body + deployment.
+    # Unsigned rows (raw SQL approval) or edited ones revert to DRAFTED.
+    try:
+        deployment_id, pubkey = _signing(cfg)
+    except ConfigError as exc:
        audit(
            sess,
            actor="daemon:maild",
-            action="send_draft",
+            action="send_refused",
            proposal_id=record.proposal_id,
+            result="error",
+            detail={"mail_id": record.id, "reason": str(exc)},
+        )
+        return "unsigned"
+    current_hash = _mail_content_hash(record)
+    if not verify_signature(
+        "mail", deployment_id, record.id, current_hash, record.operator_signature, pubkey
+    ):
+        record.draft_status = DraftStatus.DRAFTED  # back to pre-approval
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor="daemon:maild",
+            action="send_refused",
+            proposal_id=record.proposal_id,
+            result="error",
            detail={
                "mail_id": record.id,
-                "message_id": message_id,
-                "approved_by": approved_by,
+                "reason": "no valid operator signature for current content/deployment",
+                "content_hash": current_hash,
+                "had_signature": bool(record.operator_signature),
            },
        )
-        stats["sent"] += 1
+        return "hash_mismatch"
+
+    if record.direction == MailDirection.INBOUND:
+        # reply: goes back to the inbound sender, threads to the inbound mail,
+        # and gets its own OUTBOUND row
+        to_addr = record.from_addr or ""
+        subject = f"Re: {record.subject or 'your message'}"
+        in_reply_to = record.message_id
+        outbound_msgid = (
+            f"<cayce-out-{record.id}-{int(datetime.now(UTC).timestamp())}@cayce-co.xyz>"
+        )
+        needs_row = True
+    else:
+        # first-contact draft: already an OUTBOUND row; send as-is
+        to_addr = record.to_addr or ""
+        subject = record.subject or ""
+        in_reply_to = None
+        outbound_msgid = record.message_id
+        needs_row = False
+    if not to_addr:
+        record.draft_status = DraftStatus.SKIPPED
+        return "blocked"
+
+    (sender or _smtp_send)(
+        cfg,
+        to_addr,
+        subject,
+        record.draft_reply or "",
+        outbound_msgid,
+        in_reply_to=in_reply_to,
+    )
+    approved_by = _approved_by(sess, record.id)
+    if needs_row:
+        sess.add(
+            MailMessage(
+                direction=MailDirection.OUTBOUND,
+                message_id=outbound_msgid,
+                in_reply_to=record.message_id,
+                from_addr=cfg.mail_from,
+                to_addr=to_addr,
+                subject=subject,
+                body=record.draft_reply,
+                proposal_id=record.proposal_id,
+                draft_status=DraftStatus.SENT,
+                processed_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+            )
+        )
+    record.draft_status = DraftStatus.SENT
+    sess.flush()
+    audit(
+        sess,
+        actor="daemon:maild",
+        action="send_draft",
+        proposal_id=record.proposal_id,
+        detail={
+            "mail_id": record.id,
+            "message_id": outbound_msgid,
+            "approved_by": approved_by,
+        },
+    )
+    return "sent"
+
+
+def _send_approved(cfg: Config, sess, sender=None, factory=None) -> dict:
+    """Send every APPROVED draft, one transaction per message.
+
+    `factory` is a SQLAlchemy sessionmaker bound to the shared engine; each
+    message is processed and committed in its own session (tests inject the
+    engine's maker; the CLI passes appdb.session_factory()).
+    """
+    stats = {"sent": 0, "blocked": 0, "hash_mismatch": 0, "missing": 0}
+    ids = [
+        row.id
+        for row in sess.query(MailMessage.id)
+        .filter(MailMessage.draft_status == DraftStatus.APPROVED)
+        .all()
+    ]
+    for mail_id in ids:
+        # one transaction per message — an SMTP failure on message N must not
+        # roll back (and later re-send) messages 1..N-1 (audit finding 3)
+        try:
+            if factory is not None:
+                with factory() as one_sess:  # sessionmaker() -> Session
+                    outcome = _send_one(cfg, one_sess, mail_id, sender)
+                    one_sess.commit()
+            else:
+                outcome = _send_one(cfg, sess, mail_id, sender)
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — isolate the failed message
+            outcome = "error"
+            # persist the failure in its OWN transaction (the failed message's
+            # transaction is dead)
+            try:
+                error_sess = factory() if factory is not None else None
+                if error_sess is not None:
+                    audit(
+                        error_sess,
+                        actor="daemon:maild",
+                        action="send_failed",
+                        result="error",
+                        detail={"mail_id": mail_id, "error": str(exc)[:200]},
+                    )
+                    error_sess.commit()
+                    error_sess.close()
+            except Exception:  # noqa: S110 — best-effort failure audit
+                pass
+        stats[outcome] = stats.get(outcome, 0) + 1
    return stats


+def _approved_by(sess, mail_id: int) -> str:
+    from cayceops.models import AuditEntry
+
+    for entry in sess.query(AuditEntry).all():
+        if entry.action == "approve_draft" and entry.detail.get("mail_id") == mail_id:
+            return entry.actor
+    return "unknown"
+
+
+def _compose(proposal_id: int, to_addr: str, subject: str, body: str, sess) -> int:
+    """Create the FIRST-CONTACT outbound draft for a proposal (state: drafted).
+
+    This is the missing path the audit flagged: without it, threading only
+    worked for replies to mails we never actually sent.
+    """
+    proposal = sess.get(Proposal, proposal_id)
+    if proposal is None or not to_addr:
+        return -1
+    outbound = MailMessage(
+        direction=MailDirection.OUTBOUND,
+        message_id=f"<cayce-out-{proposal.id}-{int(datetime.now(UTC).timestamp())}@cayce-co.xyz>",
+        from_addr=None,  # filled from MAIL_FROM at send time
+        to_addr=to_addr[:320],
+        subject=subject[:998],
+        body=body,
+        draft_reply=body,  # canonical approved-text field (same as reply drafts)
+        proposal_id=proposal.id,
+        draft_status=DraftStatus.DRAFTED,
+    )
+    sess.add(outbound)
+    sess.flush()
+    audit(
+        sess,
+        actor="daemon:maild",
+        action="compose_draft",
+        proposal_id=proposal.id,
+        detail={"mail_id": outbound.id},
+    )
+    return outbound.id
+
+
 # --- CLI wrappers (session scope lives here) ------------------------------------


@@ -322,12 +601,13 @@ def poll(cfg: Config | None = None) -> int:

    cfg = cfg or load()
    try:
+        nums: list[bytes] = []
        with session_scope() as sess:
            run_row = DaemonRun(daemon="maild")
            sess.add(run_row)
            sess.flush()
            try:
-                stats = _poll(cfg, sess)
+                stats, nums = _poll(cfg, sess)
            except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — daemon boundary
                run_row.status = "error"
                run_row.detail = {"error": str(exc)[:300]}
@@ -336,29 +616,66 @@ def poll(cfg: Config | None = None) -> int:
            run_row.status = "ok"
            run_row.detail = stats
            run_row.finished_at = datetime.now(UTC)
+        # committed: now it is safe to mark the batch seen
+        if nums:
+            _mark_seen(cfg, nums)
        return 0
    finally:
        engine().dispose()


-def approve_draft(mail_id: int, actor: str) -> int:
+def approve_draft(mail_id: int, actor: str, signature: str | None = None) -> int:
    from cayceops.db import engine

    try:
        with session_scope() as sess:
-            return _approve_draft(mail_id, actor, sess)
+            return _approve_draft(mail_id, actor, sess, signature)
    finally:
        engine().dispose()


 def send_approved(cfg: Config | None = None) -> int:
+    """CLI: same code path as the tests (_send_approved with factory).
+
+    Failures are audited (send_failed), recorded in daemon_runs, and any
+    error yields a non-zero exit code (audit round 2, point 5).
+    """
    from cayceops.config import load
-    from cayceops.db import engine
+    from cayceops.db import engine, session_factory

    cfg = cfg or load()
    try:
+        factory = session_factory()
        with session_scope() as sess:
-            _send_approved(cfg, sess)
-        return 0
+            run_row = DaemonRun(daemon="maild-send")
+            sess.add(run_row)
+            sess.flush()
+            try:
+                _signing(cfg)  # no degraded mode
+            except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — ConfigError
+                run_row.status = "error"
+                run_row.detail = {"refused": str(exc)[:200]}
+                run_row.finished_at = datetime.now(UTC)
+                print(f"send refused: {exc}")
+                return 2
+            stats = _send_approved(cfg, sess, factory=factory)
+            run_row.status = "error" if stats.get("error") else "ok"
+            run_row.detail = stats
+            run_row.finished_at = datetime.now(UTC)
+        print(stats)
+        # any failure class is a non-zero exit (audit round 2, point 5)
+        failures = stats.get("error") or stats.get("hash_mismatch") or stats.get("unsigned")
+        return 1 if failures else 0
+    finally:
+        engine().dispose()
+
+
+def compose(proposal_id: int, to_addr: str, subject: str, body: str) -> int:
+    from cayceops.db import engine
+
+    try:
+        with session_scope() as sess:
+            mail_id = _compose(proposal_id, to_addr, subject, body, sess)
+            return 0 if mail_id >= 0 else 1
    finally:
        engine().dispose()
@@ -29,9 +29,11 @@ DAEMONS = ("scanner", "executor", "maild", "publisher", "monitor")
 _STYLE = """<style>
 body{font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,monospace;background:#0a0908;color:#f2ece0;margin:2rem}
 h1{color:#c9a84c;font-weight:600} h2{color:#c9a84c;margin-top:2rem;font-size:1.1rem}
- table{border-collapse:collapse;margin:.5rem 0} td,th{border:1px solid #333;padding:.35rem .8rem;text-align:left}
+ table{border-collapse:collapse;margin:.5rem 0}
+ td,th{border:1px solid #333;padding:.35rem .8rem;text-align:left}
 .ok{color:#6fce6f}.error{color:#ef6b6b}.muted{color:#888;font-size:.85rem}
- .card{display:inline-block;background:#141210;border:1px solid #2a2a2a;border-radius:8px;padding:.8rem 1.4rem;margin:.3rem}
+ .card{display:inline-block;background:#141210;border:1px solid #2a2a2a;
+       border-radius:8px;padding:.8rem 1.4rem;margin:.3rem}
 </style>"""


@@ -49,33 +51,45 @@ def _daemon_rows(sess) -> str:
            .first()
        )
        if last is None:
-            rows.append(f"<tr><td>{name}</td><td class=muted>never run</td><td>—</td></tr>")
+            rows.append(
+                "<tr><td>" + name + "</td><td class=muted>never run</td><td>—</td></tr>"
+            )
        else:
            cls = "ok" if last.status == "ok" else "error"
+            when = _fmt_ts(last.finished_at or last.started_at)
            rows.append(
-                f"<tr><td>{html.escape(name)}</td>"
-                f"<td class={cls}>{html.escape(last.status)}</td>"
-                f"<td>{_fmt_ts(last.finished_at or last.started_at)}</td></tr>"
+                "<tr><td>" + html.escape(name) + "</td>"
+                + '<td class="' + cls + '">' + html.escape(last.status) + "</td>"
+                + "<td>" + when + "</td></tr>"
            )
-    return "<table><tr><th>daemon</th><th>last status</th><th>last run</th></tr>" + "".join(rows) + "</table>"
+    head = "<tr><th>daemon</th><th>last status</th><th>last run</th></tr>"
+    return "<table>" + head + "".join(rows) + "</table>"


 def _queue_cards(sess) -> str:
-    counts = dict(sess.query(Proposal.status, func.count(Proposal.id)).group_by(Proposal.status).all())
-    cards = [
-        f'<div class=card>{html.escape(status.value)}: <strong>{counts.get(status, 0)}</strong></div>'
-        for status in ProposalStatus
-    ]
+    counts = dict(
+        sess.query(Proposal.status, func.count(Proposal.id)).group_by(Proposal.status).all()
+    )
+    cards = []
+    for status in ProposalStatus:
+        value = counts.get(status, 0)
+        cards.append(
+            "<div class=card>" + html.escape(status.value)
+            + ": <strong>" + str(value) + "</strong></div>"
+        )
    return "".join(cards)


 def _recent_audit(sess, limit: int = 20) -> str:
    rows = []
-    for entry in sess.query(AuditEntry).order_by(AuditEntry.ts.desc()).limit(limit).all():
+    query = sess.query(AuditEntry).order_by(AuditEntry.ts.desc()).limit(limit)
+    for entry in query.all():
        cls = "ok" if entry.result == "ok" else "error"
        rows.append(
-            f"<tr><td>{_fmt_ts(entry.ts)}</td><td>{html.escape(entry.actor)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{html.escape(entry.action)}</td><td class={cls}>{html.escape(entry.result)}</td></tr>"
+            "<tr><td>" + _fmt_ts(entry.ts) + "</td>"
+            + "<td>" + html.escape(entry.actor) + "</td>"
+            + "<td>" + html.escape(entry.action) + "</td>"
+            + '<td class="' + cls + '">' + html.escape(entry.result) + "</td></tr>"
        )
    body = "".join(rows) or "<tr><td colspan=4 class=muted>no activity yet</td></tr>"
    return (
@@ -133,6 +147,85 @@ def _build(cfg: Config, sess) -> str:
    return cfg.monitor_output


+def _anchor(cfg: Config, sess) -> int:
+    """Anchor core (injectable session for tests). Returns 0 ok / 0 skip."""
+    from cayceops.components.publisher import nostr
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+    from cayceops.models import AuditEntry, audit
+
+    if not cfg.nostr_private_key or not cfg.nostr_relays:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            "anchor requires CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY and CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS"
+        )
+    if not cfg.deployment_id:
+        raise ConfigError("anchor requires CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID")
+
+    last = (
+        sess.query(AuditEntry)
+        .filter(AuditEntry.entry_hash.isnot(None))
+        .order_by(AuditEntry.id.desc())
+        .first()
+    )
+    if last is None:
+        print("nothing to anchor: chain empty")
+        return 0
+    today = datetime.now(UTC).date()
+    last_anchor = (
+        sess.query(AuditEntry)
+        .filter(AuditEntry.action == "anchor")
+        .order_by(AuditEntry.id.desc())
+        .first()
+    )
+    if last_anchor is not None and last_anchor.ts.date() == today:
+        print("already anchored today")
+        return 0
+
+    secret = nostr.normalize_key(cfg.nostr_private_key)
+    event = nostr.build_event(
+        secret,
+        f"cayce-ops audit anchor deployment={cfg.deployment_id} "
+        f"last_hash={last.entry_hash} entries={last.id}",
+        tags=[["t", "cayce-ops"], ["t", "audit-anchor"]],
+    )
+    if not nostr.verify_event(event):
+        raise RuntimeError("anchor event failed self-verification")
+    results = nostr.publish(cfg.nostr_relays, event)
+    audit(
+        sess,
+        actor="daemon:monitor",
+        action="anchor",
+        detail={
+            "last_hash": last.entry_hash,
+            "last_entry": last.id,
+            "event_id": event["id"],
+            "relays": results,
+            "deployment": cfg.deployment_id,
+        },
+    )
+    print(f"anchored: {event['id']}")
+    return 0
+
+
+def anchor(cfg: Config | None = None) -> int:
+    """CLI: anchor once per day (external anchoring, audit round 2 point 4)."""
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError, load
+    from cayceops.db import engine
+
+    cfg = cfg or load()
+    try:
+        with session_scope() as sess:
+            try:
+                return _anchor(cfg, sess)
+            except ConfigError as exc:
+                print(f"anchor refused: {exc}")
+                return 2
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — CLI boundary
+        print(f"anchor failed: {str(exc)[:200]}")
+        return 1
+    finally:
+        engine().dispose()
+
+
 def build(cfg: Config | None = None) -> int:
    """CLI entry: render the status page inside a DaemonRun bookkeeping wrap."""
    from cayceops.config import load
@@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ WIDTH, HEIGHT = 1080, 1350

 _BRANDS = {
    # bitcoinhotels — warm gold on near-black
-    "bh": {"bg": (20, 18, 16), "accent": (201, 168, 76), "text": (242, 236, 224), "muted": (150, 140, 120)},
+    "bh": {
+        "bg": (20, 18, 16),
+        "accent": (201, 168, 76),
+        "text": (242, 236, 224),
+        "muted": (150, 140, 120),
+    },
    # hardcap — bitcoin orange on cool black
-    "hc": {"bg": (13, 13, 16), "accent": (247, 147, 26), "text": (250, 250, 250), "muted": (120, 120, 130)},
+    "hc": {
+        "bg": (13, 13, 16),
+        "accent": (247, 147, 26),
+        "text": (250, 250, 250),
+        "muted": (120, 120, 130),
+    },
 }


@@ -119,7 +119,14 @@ def _schnorr_verify(sig32: bytes, msg32: bytes, xonly_pub32: bytes) -> bool:
    if pub_point is None:
        return False
    e = int.from_bytes(tag_hash("BIP0340/challenge", sig32[:32] + xonly_pub32 + msg32), "big") % N
-    r_point = point_add(point_mul((Gx := 0x79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798, Gy := 0x483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8), s), point_mul(pub_point, (N - e) % N))
+    generator = (
+        0x79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798,  # Gx
+        0x483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8,  # Gy
+    )
+    r_point = point_add(
+        point_mul(generator, s),
+        point_mul(pub_point, (N - e) % N),
+    )
    if r_point is None or r_point[1] % 2 != 0:
        return False
    return r_point[0] == r
@@ -134,12 +141,23 @@ def verify_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
    )
    if hashlib.sha256(serialized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() != event["id"]:
        return False
-    compressed = PublicKey(bytes.fromhex("02" + event["pubkey"])).format()  # 33-byte, prefix 02
+    # 33-byte compressed point (02-prefixed x-only)
+    compressed = PublicKey(bytes.fromhex("02" + event["pubkey"])).format()
    return _schnorr_verify(
        bytes.fromhex(event["sig"]), bytes.fromhex(event["id"]), compressed[1:]
    )


+def verify_schnorr(sig_hex: str, message: bytes, pubkey_hex: str) -> bool:
+    """Verify a BIP-340 signature over an arbitrary 32-byte message."""
+    try:
+        return _schnorr_verify(
+            bytes.fromhex(sig_hex), message, bytes.fromhex(pubkey_hex)
+        )
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
+
+
 def relay_publish(relay_url: str, event: dict[str, Any], timeout: float = 10.0) -> str:
    """Publish one event to one relay; return the relay's OK message."""
    from websockets.sync.client import connect
@@ -152,7 +170,9 @@ def relay_publish(relay_url: str, event: dict[str, Any], timeout: float = 10.0)
    return str(reply[1])


-def publish(relays: list[str], event: dict[str, Any], timeout: float = 10.0) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+def publish(
+    relays: list[str], event: dict[str, Any], timeout: float = 10.0
+) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
    """Publish to every relay; report per-relay outcome (never raises unless all fail)."""
    results = []
    for relay in relays:
@@ -16,7 +16,13 @@ from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 from cayceops.components.publisher import images, nostr
 from cayceops.config import Config
 from cayceops.db import session_scope
-from cayceops.models import ContentItem, ContentStatus, DaemonRun, audit
+from cayceops.models import (
+    ContentItem,
+    ContentStatus,
+    DaemonRun,
+    _content_hash,
+    audit,
+)

 # rotation: one theme per slot; channel rotation nostr -> facebook -> instagram
 THEMES = [
@@ -37,10 +43,22 @@ def _caption(theme: str, link: str) -> str:
        "elsalvador-budget": "A real weekly budget on a Bitcoin standard.",
    }
    bodies = {
-        "lightning-abroad": "No foreign transaction fees, no dynamic currency conversion, no declines. Field-tested guide.",
-        "seed-strategy": "Steel plate, memorized + decoy, or split custody — the full breakdown, brutally honest.",
-        "atm-fees": "The prepared traveler pays 4-6%. The difference is knowing the operator and the no-KYC cap.",
-        "elsalvador-budget": "Surf hostels, comidas, coworking — the corners where you still need dollars, and the 90-day protocol.",
+        "lightning-abroad": (
+            "No foreign transaction fees, no dynamic currency conversion, "
+            "no declines. Field-tested guide."
+        ),
+        "seed-strategy": (
+            "Steel plate, memorized + decoy, or split custody — "
+            "the full breakdown, brutally honest."
+        ),
+        "atm-fees": (
+            "The prepared traveler pays 4-6%. The difference is knowing "
+            "the operator and the no-KYC cap."
+        ),
+        "elsalvador-budget": (
+            "Surf hostels, comidas, coworking — the corners where you still "
+            "need dollars, and the 90-day protocol."
+        ),
    }
    return _CAPTION_TEMPLATE.format(
        hook=hooks.get(theme, theme.replace("-", " ").title()),
@@ -83,7 +101,12 @@ def _plan(cfg: Config, sess, days: int = 4) -> dict:
        )
        sess.add(item)
        sess.flush()
-        audit(sess, actor="daemon:publisher", action="plan_draft", detail={"item": item.id, "theme": theme, "channel": channel})
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor="daemon:publisher",
+            action="plan_draft",
+            detail={"item": item.id, "theme": theme, "channel": channel},
+        )
        created += 1
    return {"created": created}

@@ -91,7 +114,33 @@ def _plan(cfg: Config, sess, days: int = 4) -> dict:
 # --- human gate -------------------------------------------------------------------


-def _approve(item_id: int, actor: str, sess) -> int:
+GATE_ERROR = 2  # missing/invalid configuration or signature
+
+
+def _signing(cfg: Config) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+
+    if not cfg.operator_pubkey or not cfg.deployment_id:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            "approvals disabled: CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY and "
+            "CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID are both required"
+        )
+    return cfg.deployment_id, cfg.operator_pubkey
+
+
+def _content_binding(item: ContentItem) -> str:
+    from cayceops.signing import content_content_hash
+
+    return content_content_hash(item.channel, item.caption, item.link)
+
+
+def _approve(
+    item_id: int, actor: str, sess, signature: str | None = None
+) -> int:
+    """Signature MANDATORY, bound to (channel, caption, link) + deployment."""
+    from cayceops.config import ConfigError
+    from cayceops.signing import SignatureError, verify_signature
+
    item = sess.get(ContentItem, item_id)
    if item is None or item.status != ContentStatus.DRAFT:
        audit(
@@ -102,11 +151,58 @@ def _approve(item_id: int, actor: str, sess) -> int:
            detail={"reason": f"item {item_id} not in draft state"},
        )
        return 1
+    try:
+        deployment_id, pubkey = _signing(cfg_from(sess))
+    except ConfigError as exc:
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor=actor,
+            action="approve_content",
+            result="error",
+            detail={"reason": str(exc)},
+        )
+        return GATE_ERROR
+    chash = _content_binding(item)
+    try:
+        if not signature:
+            raise SignatureError("signature required")
+        if not verify_signature(
+            "content", deployment_id, item_id, chash, signature, pubkey
+        ):
+            raise SignatureError("signature invalid for this content/deployment")
+    except SignatureError as exc:
+        audit(
+            sess,
+            actor=actor,
+            action="approve_content",
+            result="error",
+            detail={"reason": str(exc), "content_hash": chash},
+        )
+        return GATE_ERROR
    item.status = ContentStatus.APPROVED
-    audit(sess, actor=actor, action="approve_content", detail={"item": item.id, "channel": item.channel})
+    item.approved_hash = _content_hash(item.caption)
+    item.operator_signature = signature  # FULL signature
+    audit(
+        sess,
+        actor=actor,
+        action="approve_content",
+        detail={
+            "item": item.id,
+            "channel": item.channel,
+            "hash": item.approved_hash,
+            "signature": signature,
+        },
+    )
    return 0


+def cfg_from(sess):
+    """Config from env (publisher commands are single-invocation CLIs)."""
+    from cayceops.config import load
+
+    return load()
+
+
 # --- image rendering ----------------------------------------------------------------


@@ -132,7 +228,9 @@ def _render_image(item: ContentItem, cfg: Config) -> str | None:

 def _publish_nostr(item: ContentItem, cfg: Config, sess, sender=None) -> str:
    if not cfg.nostr_private_key or not cfg.nostr_relays:
-        raise RuntimeError("nostr channel requires CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY and CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS")
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "nostr channel requires CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY and CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS"
+        )
    secret = nostr.normalize_key(cfg.nostr_private_key)
    event = nostr.build_event(secret, item.caption, tags=[["t", item.theme]])
    if not nostr.verify_event(event):  # pragma: no cover — build/verify symmetry
@@ -150,7 +248,7 @@ def _publish_nostr(item: ContentItem, cfg: Config, sess, sender=None) -> str:
 def _publish_due(cfg: Config, sess, nostr_sender=None) -> dict:
    """Publish approved items that are due. Non-nostr channels are skipped
    unless their adapters are explicitly enabled (default: skipped, audited)."""
-    stats = {"published": 0, "skipped": 0, "failed": 0}
+    stats = {"published": 0, "skipped": 0, "failed": 0, "tampered": 0}
    due = (
        sess.query(ContentItem)
        .filter(ContentItem.status == ContentStatus.APPROVED)
@@ -160,31 +258,83 @@ def _publish_due(cfg: Config, sess, nostr_sender=None) -> dict:
    for item in due:
        if item.scheduled_for and item.scheduled_for > now:
            continue  # not due yet
+
+        # run-time signature gate (audit round 2, 1d): valid operator
+        # signature required for CURRENT channel/caption/link + deployment.
+        # Unsigned rows (raw SQL approval) or edited ones revert to DRAFT.
+        from cayceops.signing import verify_signature
+
+        try:
+            deployment_id, pubkey = _signing(cfg)
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — ConfigError
+            audit(
+                sess,
+                actor="daemon:publisher",
+                action="publish_refused",
+                result="error",
+                detail={"item": item.id, "reason": str(exc)},
+            )
+            stats["failed"] += 1
+            continue
+        if not verify_signature(
+            "content",
+            deployment_id,
+            item.id,
+            _content_binding(item),
+            item.operator_signature,
+            pubkey,
+        ):
+            item.status = ContentStatus.DRAFT  # back to pre-approval
+            audit(
+                sess,
+                actor="daemon:publisher",
+                action="publish_refused",
+                result="error",
+                detail={
+                    "item": item.id,
+                    "reason": "no valid operator signature for current content/deployment",
+                },
+            )
+            stats["tampered"] += 1
+            continue
+
        try:
            if item.channel == "nostr":
                item.post_ref = _publish_nostr(item, cfg, sess, sender=nostr_sender)
            else:
+                # disabled channel is TERMINAL (audit finding: this used to
+                # write a skip audit row every 5 minutes, forever)
+                item.status = ContentStatus.SKIPPED
+                item.error = f"{item.channel} adapter disabled by default"
                audit(
                    sess,
                    actor="daemon:publisher",
-                    action="publish_skipped",
-                    detail={
-                        "item": item.id,
-                        "channel": item.channel,
-                        "reason": f"{item.channel} adapter disabled by default",
-                    },
+                    action="publish_skipped_terminal",
+                    detail={"item": item.id, "channel": item.channel},
                )
                stats["skipped"] += 1
                continue
        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — publish boundary: audit and continue
+            item.attempts += 1
            item.error = str(exc)[:300]
-            audit(
-                sess,
-                actor="daemon:publisher",
-                action="publish_failed",
-                result="error",
-                detail={"item": item.id, "error": item.error},
-            )
+            if item.attempts >= cfg.max_attempts:
+                # attempt budget exhausted -> terminal (no infinite retries)
+                item.status = ContentStatus.SKIPPED
+                audit(
+                    sess,
+                    actor="daemon:publisher",
+                    action="publish_abandoned",
+                    result="error",
+                    detail={"item": item.id, "attempts": item.attempts},
+                )
+            else:
+                audit(
+                    sess,
+                    actor="daemon:publisher",
+                    action="publish_failed",
+                    result="error",
+                    detail={"item": item.id, "error": item.error, "attempt": item.attempts},
+                )
            stats["failed"] += 1
            continue
        item.status = ContentStatus.PUBLISHED
@@ -231,6 +381,13 @@ def publish_due(cfg: Config | None = None) -> int:
            run_row = DaemonRun(daemon="publisher")
            sess.add(run_row)
            sess.flush()
+            try:
+                _signing(cfg)  # no degraded mode
+            except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — ConfigError
+                run_row.status = "error"
+                run_row.detail = {"refused": str(exc)[:200]}
+                run_row.finished_at = datetime.now(UTC)
+                return 2
            stats = _publish_due(cfg, sess)
            run_row.status = "ok"
            run_row.detail = stats
@@ -256,11 +413,11 @@ def make_image(item_id: int, cfg: Config | None = None) -> int:
        engine().dispose()


-def approve(item_id: int, actor: str) -> int:
+def approve(item_id: int, actor: str, signature: str | None = None) -> int:
    from cayceops.db import engine

    try:
        with session_scope() as sess:
-            return _approve(item_id, actor, sess)
+            return _approve(item_id, actor, sess, signature)
    finally:
        engine().dispose()
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ def scan(cfg: Config, sess, fetch=_fetch) -> dict:
                    "summary": desc,
                    "scanned_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
                },
-                risk_score=score,
+                match_score=score,
                status=ProposalStatus.PROPOSED,
                dedupe_key=dedupe,
            )
@@ -84,6 +84,15 @@ class Config:
    enable_http_actions: bool = field(
        default_factory=lambda: _bool("CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_HTTP_ACTIONS", False)
    )
+    # MANDATORY for approval-gated work: the operator x-only pubkey and the
+    # deployment identifier are part of every signed approval message.
+    # Without BOTH, daemons refuse to execute/send/publish — no degraded mode.
+    operator_pubkey: str = field(
+        default_factory=lambda: os.environ.get("CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY", "")
+    )
+    deployment_id: str = field(
+        default_factory=lambda: os.environ.get("CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID", "")
+    )

    # --- mail ---
    imap_host: str = field(
@@ -162,6 +171,10 @@ class Config:
    )


+class ConfigError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when mandatory configuration is missing."""
+
+
 def load() -> Config:
    """Build the process Config snapshot."""
    return Config()
@@ -5,16 +5,26 @@ Status machines
 proposal:  proposed -> approved -> running -> done | failed
           proposed -> rejected
 mail:      (inbound) classified: approval|rejection|question|other|needs_review
-           (outbound draft) none -> drafted -> approved -> sent | skipped
-content:   draft -> approved -> published
+           (any) draft: none -> drafted -> approved -> sent | skipped
+content:   draft -> approved -> published | skipped (terminal)
+
+Audit chain
+-----------
+audit_log is hash-chained: each entry stores sha256(prev_hash | fields).
+``cayceops.models.verify_audit_chain`` re-walks it; the monitor surfaces breaks.
+Not tamper-proof (DB writes can rewrite the chain) but tamper-EVIDENT against
+selective edits. See AUDIT.md / audit response 2026-10-20.
 """

 from __future__ import annotations

 import enum
+import hashlib
+import json
+import threading
 from datetime import UTC, datetime

-from sqlalchemy import JSON, DateTime, Enum, Float, ForeignKey, Integer, String, Text
+from sqlalchemy import JSON, DateTime, Enum, Float, ForeignKey, Integer, String, Text, text
 from sqlalchemy.orm import DeclarativeBase, Mapped, mapped_column


@@ -22,6 +32,11 @@ def utcnow() -> datetime:
    return datetime.now(UTC)


+def _content_hash(text: str) -> str:
+    """Binding hash for human-approved text (drafts, captions)."""
+    return hashlib.sha256(text.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
 class Base(DeclarativeBase):
    pass

@@ -54,7 +69,8 @@ class Proposal(Base):
    title: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(512))
    url: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(1024), nullable=True)
    detail: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, default=dict)
-    risk_score: Mapped[float] = mapped_column(Float, default=0.0)
+    # keyword-match relevance 0..1 — NOT risk. auto-approve takes highest first.
+    match_score: Mapped[float] = mapped_column(Float, default=0.0)
    status: Mapped[ProposalStatus] = mapped_column(
        Enum(ProposalStatus), default=ProposalStatus.PROPOSED, index=True
    )
@@ -62,13 +78,15 @@ class Proposal(Base):
    dedupe_key: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(256), unique=True, nullable=True)
    approved_by: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(128), nullable=True)
    approved_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    # full operator approval signature (128 hex chars) — never truncated
+    operator_signature: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow)
    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
        DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow, onupdate=utcnow
    )


-# --- audit -------------------------------------------------------------------
+# --- audit (hash-chained) ----------------------------------------------------


 class AuditEntry(Base):
@@ -76,13 +94,21 @@ class AuditEntry(Base):

    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, primary_key=True)
    ts: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow, index=True)
-    actor: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(128))  # human username | auto:policy | daemon:<name>
+    actor: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(128))  # human | auto:policy | daemon:<name>
    proposal_id: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(
        ForeignKey("proposals.id", ondelete="SET NULL"), nullable=True, index=True
    )
    action: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64))  # approve|reject|execute|classify|...
    detail: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, default=dict)
    result: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(32), default="ok")  # ok | error
+    # tamper-evident chain
+    prev_hash: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True)
+    entry_hash: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True, index=True)
+
+
+# reentrant: several audit() calls may share one transaction
+_AUDIT_LOCK = threading.RLock()
+_AUDIT_LOCK_PG_KEY = 7471186757  # pg_advisory_xact_lock key for cross-process


 def audit(
@@ -93,16 +119,128 @@ def audit(
    detail: dict | None = None,
    result: str = "ok",
 ) -> AuditEntry:
-    """Record one audited action. Every component writes through this helper."""
-    entry = AuditEntry(
+    """Record one audited action, chained to the previous entry.
+
+    Chain: entry_hash = sha256(prev_hash | ts_epoch | actor | action |
+    proposal_id | detail | result). Writes are SERIALIZED (audit round 2,
+    point 4): pg_advisory_xact_lock on Postgres, in-process lock on SQLite —
+    concurrent writers can no longer fork the chain.
+
+    Legacy rows (entry_hash IS NULL, pre-0002) are ignored when picking
+    prev_hash: the chain starts GENESIS at the first hashed row.
+    """
+    bind = sess.get_bind()
+    if bind.dialect.name == "postgresql":
+        # xact-scoped: PG releases the lock at commit/rollback automatically
+        sess.execute(
+            text("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(:k)"), {"k": _AUDIT_LOCK_PG_KEY}
+        )
+        prev = sess.query(AuditEntry).order_by(AuditEntry.id.desc()).first()
+        prev_hash = prev.entry_hash if prev is not None else "GENESIS"
+        entry = _build_entry(prev_hash, actor, action, proposal_id, detail, result)
+        sess.add(entry)
+        return entry
+
+    # SQLite path: hold the in-process lock until the session commits or
+    # rolls back, so concurrent writers cannot read the same prev_hash
+    # (round-2 point 4 — verified by test_concurrent_writers_keep_chain_verifiable)
+    _AUDIT_LOCK.acquire()
+    released = False
+
+    def _release(*_args):
+        nonlocal released
+        if not released:
+            released = True
+            try:
+                _AUDIT_LOCK.release()
+            except RuntimeError:  # pragma: no cover
+                pass
+
+    from sqlalchemy import event
+
+    event.listen(sess, "after_commit", _release)
+    event.listen(sess, "after_rollback", _release)
+    event.listen(sess, "after_soft_rollback", _release)
+    try:
+        prev = sess.query(AuditEntry).order_by(AuditEntry.id.desc()).first()
+        prev_hash = prev.entry_hash if prev is not None else "GENESIS"
+        entry = _build_entry(prev_hash, actor, action, proposal_id, detail, result)
+        sess.add(entry)
+        return entry
+    except Exception:
+        _release()
+        raise
+
+
+def _build_entry(
+    prev_hash: str,
+    actor: str,
+    action: str,
+    proposal_id: int | None,
+    detail: dict | None,
+    result: str,
+) -> AuditEntry:
+    ts = utcnow()
+    ts_int = int(ts.timestamp())
+    detail_json = json.dumps(detail or {}, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False)
+    payload = "|".join(
+        [
+            prev_hash or "GENESIS",
+            str(ts_int),
+            actor,
+            action,
+            str(proposal_id),
+            detail_json,
+            result,
+        ]
+    )
+    return AuditEntry(
+        ts=ts,
        actor=actor,
        action=action,
        proposal_id=proposal_id,
        detail=detail or {},
        result=result,
+        prev_hash=prev_hash or "GENESIS",
+        entry_hash=hashlib.sha256(payload.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
    )
-    sess.add(entry)
-    return entry
+
+
+def verify_audit_chain(sess) -> tuple[bool, int | None]:
+    """Re-walk the chain. Returns (ok, first_broken_entry_id or None).
+
+    Legacy rows (entry_hash IS NULL, written before migration 0002) are
+    skipped and documented: the chain begins GENESIS at the first hashed row,
+    so a migrated database verifies clean without any tampering.
+    """
+    prev_hash: str | None = None  # None = still in legacy prefix
+    for entry in sess.query(AuditEntry).order_by(AuditEntry.id).all():
+        if entry.entry_hash is None:
+            continue  # legacy row: outside the chain by documented genesis
+        if prev_hash is None:
+            expected_prev = "GENESIS"  # first hashed row anchors the chain
+        else:
+            expected_prev = prev_hash
+        detail_json = json.dumps(entry.detail or {}, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False)
+        ts = entry.ts
+        if ts.tzinfo is None:
+            ts = ts.replace(tzinfo=UTC)
+        payload = "|".join(
+            [
+                expected_prev,
+                str(int(ts.timestamp())),
+                entry.actor,
+                entry.action,
+                str(entry.proposal_id),
+                detail_json,
+                entry.result,
+            ]
+        )
+        expected = hashlib.sha256(payload.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        if entry.prev_hash != expected_prev or entry.entry_hash != expected:
+            return False, entry.id
+        prev_hash = entry.entry_hash
+    return True, None


 # --- mail --------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -151,6 +289,10 @@ class MailMessage(Base):
        Enum(DraftStatus), default=DraftStatus.NONE
    )
    draft_reply: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    # binding: hash of the draft text the human approved + who approved it
+    approved_hash: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True)
+    approved_by: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(128), nullable=True)
+    operator_signature: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
    processed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)


@@ -161,6 +303,7 @@ class ContentStatus(enum.StrEnum):
    DRAFT = "draft"
    APPROVED = "approved"
    PUBLISHED = "published"
+    SKIPPED = "skipped"  # terminal: disabled channel or attempt budget exhausted


 class ContentItem(Base):
@@ -179,6 +322,10 @@ class ContentItem(Base):
    published_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
    post_ref: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(512), nullable=True)
    error: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
+    attempts: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=0)
+    # binding: hash of the caption the human approved
+    approved_hash: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True)
+    operator_signature: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(Text, nullable=True)
    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=utcnow)


@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+"""Operator approval signing — mandatory, content- and deployment-bound.
+
+Every human approval (executor approve / maild approve-draft / publisher
+approve) must carry a BIP-340 signature made with the operator key:
+
+    message = sha256("cayce-ops:<type>:<deployment_id>:<id>:<content_hash>")
+
+where content_hash binds the approval to the exact approved content:
+
+    proposal: canonical json of {kind, title, url, detail}
+    mail:     canonical json of {to_addr, subject, body}
+    content:  canonical json of {channel, caption, link}
+
+There is NO degraded mode: without CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY and
+CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID the daemons refuse to execute/send/publish
+(see cayceops.config.Config.signing_credentials).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+
+
+class SignatureError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when an approval signature is missing, invalid, or foreign."""
+
+
+def _canonical(obj: dict) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(obj, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
+
+
+def _sha256_hex(text: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(text.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def proposal_content_hash(kind: str, title: str, url: str | None, detail: dict | None) -> str:
+    return _sha256_hex(
+        _canonical(
+            {
+                "kind": kind,
+                "title": title,
+                "url": url,
+                "detail": detail or {},
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def mail_content_hash(to_addr: str | None, subject: str | None, body: str | None) -> str:
+    return _sha256_hex(
+        _canonical(
+            {
+                "to_addr": to_addr,
+                "subject": subject,
+                "body": body,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def content_content_hash(channel: str, caption: str, link: str | None) -> str:
+    return _sha256_hex(
+        _canonical(
+            {
+                "channel": channel,
+                "caption": caption,
+                "link": link,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def approval_message(
+    item_type: str, deployment_id: str, item_id: int, content_hash: str
+) -> bytes:
+    """The exact 32-byte message the operator signs."""
+    raw = f"cayce-ops:{item_type}:{deployment_id}:{item_id}:{content_hash}"
+    return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode("utf-8")).digest()
+
+
+def verify_signature(
+    item_type: str,
+    deployment_id: str,
+    item_id: int,
+    content_hash: str,
+    signature_hex: str | None,
+    operator_pubkey_hex: str,
+) -> bool:
+    """Verify an operator approval signature. Foreign deployments or edited
+    content verify False because both are inside the signed message."""
+    if not signature_hex or not operator_pubkey_hex or not deployment_id:
+        return False
+    from cayceops.components.publisher.nostr import _schnorr_verify
+
+    try:
+        return _schnorr_verify(
+            bytes.fromhex(signature_hex),
+            approval_message(item_type, deployment_id, item_id, content_hash),
+            bytes.fromhex(operator_pubkey_hex),
+        )
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+-- cayce-ops — least-privilege per-daemon roles (audit round 2, point 3)
+--
+-- Apply with psql and MANDATORY password variables; the script refuses to run
+-- without them (no literal credentials):
+--
+--   psql -h 127.0.0.1 -U postgres -d cayce_ops -f deploy/roles.sql \
+--     -v scanner_password='…' -v executor_password='…' \
+--     -v maild_password='…'    -v publisher_password='…' \
+--     -v monitor_password='…'  -v approver_password='…'
+--
+-- Model:
+--   cayce_scanner   : INSERT proposals only (+ INSERT audit_log, daemon_runs)
+--   cayce_executor  : UPDATE proposals WITHOUT approved/signature columns
+--   cayce_maild     : UPDATE mail_messages WITHOUT approved/signature columns
+--   cayce_publisher : INSERT content_items, UPDATE WITHOUT approved/signature
+--   cayce_monitor   : SELECT everything (+ INSERT audit_log for anchors)
+--   cayce_approver  : THE ONLY role that can write status='approved',
+--                     approved_hash, operator_signature, approved_by/at
+--
+-- A BEFORE trigger rejects status='approved' writes from any role except
+-- cayce_approver — column grants alone cannot express that condition.
+--
+-- NOTE: do NOT apply on production yourself; the operator does.
+
+\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
+
+\if :{?scanner_password}
+\else
+\echo 'ERROR: missing variables. Pass -v scanner_password=… executor_password=… maild_password=… publisher_password=… monitor_password=… approver_password=…'
+SELECT * FROM _roles_sql_missing_required_password_variables;
+\endif
+\if :{?executor_password}
+\else
+\echo 'ERROR: missing executor_password'
+SELECT * FROM _roles_sql_missing_required_password_variables;
+\endif
+\if :{?maild_password}
+\else
+\echo 'ERROR: missing maild_password'
+SELECT * FROM _roles_sql_missing_required_password_variables;
+\endif
+\if :{?publisher_password}
+\else
+\echo 'ERROR: missing publisher_password'
+SELECT * FROM _roles_sql_missing_required_password_variables;
+\endif
+\if :{?monitor_password}
+\else
+\echo 'ERROR: missing monitor_password'
+SELECT * FROM _roles_sql_missing_required_password_variables;
+\endif
+\if :{?approver_password}
+\else
+\echo 'ERROR: missing approver_password'
+SELECT * FROM _roles_sql_missing_required_password_variables;
+\endif
+
+-- idempotency: detach old incarnations before dropping
+DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS cayce_ops_approval_gate() CASCADE;
+REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA public FROM
+  cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild, cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor, cayce_approver;
+REVOKE ALL ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public FROM
+  cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild, cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor, cayce_approver;
+REVOKE ALL ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public FROM
+  cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild, cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor, cayce_approver;
+
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS cayce_scanner;
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS cayce_executor;
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS cayce_maild;
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS cayce_publisher;
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS cayce_monitor;
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS cayce_approver;
+
+CREATE ROLE cayce_scanner   LOGIN PASSWORD :'scanner_password';
+CREATE ROLE cayce_executor  LOGIN PASSWORD :'executor_password';
+CREATE ROLE cayce_maild     LOGIN PASSWORD :'maild_password';
+CREATE ROLE cayce_publisher LOGIN PASSWORD :'publisher_password';
+CREATE ROLE cayce_monitor   LOGIN PASSWORD :'monitor_password';
+CREATE ROLE cayce_approver  LOGIN PASSWORD :'approver_password';
+
+GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild,
+  cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor, cayce_approver;
+
+-- sequences everybody needs
+GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA public
+  TO cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild, cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor, cayce_approver;
+
+-- common reads
+GRANT SELECT ON proposals, audit_log, mail_messages, content_items, daemon_runs
+  TO cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild, cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor, cayce_approver;
+
+-- every daemon appends to audit_log and daemon_runs (never UPDATE/DELETE)
+GRANT INSERT ON audit_log
+  TO cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild, cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor, cayce_approver;
+GRANT INSERT ON daemon_runs
+  TO cayce_scanner, cayce_executor, cayce_maild, cayce_publisher, cayce_monitor;
+
+-- scanner: propose only
+GRANT INSERT ON proposals TO cayce_scanner;
+
+-- executor: transition proposals WITHOUT touching approval columns
+GRANT UPDATE (status, attempts, updated_at) ON proposals TO cayce_executor;
+-- (there is no error column; adjust if added) — see trigger below for status
+
+-- maild: classify + drafts + send bookkeeping WITHOUT approval columns
+GRANT INSERT, UPDATE (classification, confidence, draft_status, draft_reply,
+  in_reply_to, message_id, from_addr, to_addr, subject, body, processed_at)
+  ON mail_messages TO cayce_maild;
+
+-- publisher: plan drafts and record publishes WITHOUT approval columns
+GRANT INSERT ON content_items TO cayce_publisher;
+GRANT UPDATE (status, attempts, error, media_path, scheduled_for, published_at, post_ref)
+  ON content_items TO cayce_publisher;
+
+-- approver: the ONLY writer of approvals and signatures
+GRANT SELECT, UPDATE ON proposals TO cayce_approver;
+GRANT SELECT, UPDATE ON mail_messages TO cayce_approver;
+GRANT SELECT, UPDATE ON content_items TO cayce_approver;
+GRANT INSERT ON audit_log TO cayce_approver;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- approval gate: status/draft_status='approved' and signature columns may
+-- only be written by cayce_approver (one trigger per table — column sets differ)
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION cayce_ops_gate_proposals() RETURNS trigger AS $$
+BEGIN
+  IF current_user IN ('cayce_approver', 'postgres') THEN
+    RETURN NEW;
+  END IF;
+  IF NEW.status::text = 'APPROVED' THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'cayce-ops: only cayce_approver may set proposals.status=approved (user=%)', current_user;
+  END IF;
+  IF TG_OP = 'UPDATE' AND NEW.operator_signature IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.operator_signature THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'cayce-ops: only cayce_approver may write operator_signature (user=%)', current_user;
+  END IF;
+  RETURN NEW;
+END;
+$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION cayce_ops_gate_mail() RETURNS trigger AS $$
+BEGIN
+  IF current_user IN ('cayce_approver', 'postgres') THEN
+    RETURN NEW;
+  END IF;
+  IF NEW.draft_status::text = 'APPROVED' THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'cayce-ops: only cayce_approver may set mail draft_status=approved (user=%)', current_user;
+  END IF;
+  IF TG_OP = 'UPDATE' AND NEW.operator_signature IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.operator_signature THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'cayce-ops: only cayce_approver may write operator_signature (user=%)', current_user;
+  END IF;
+  RETURN NEW;
+END;
+$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION cayce_ops_gate_content() RETURNS trigger AS $$
+BEGIN
+  IF current_user IN ('cayce_approver', 'postgres') THEN
+    RETURN NEW;
+  END IF;
+  IF NEW.status::text = 'APPROVED' THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'cayce-ops: only cayce_approver may set content status=approved (user=%)', current_user;
+  END IF;
+  IF TG_OP = 'UPDATE' AND NEW.operator_signature IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.operator_signature THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'cayce-ops: only cayce_approver may write operator_signature (user=%)', current_user;
+  END IF;
+  RETURN NEW;
+END;
+$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS proposals_approval_gate ON proposals;
+CREATE TRIGGER proposals_approval_gate BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE ON proposals
+  FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION cayce_ops_gate_proposals();
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS mail_approval_gate ON mail_messages;
+CREATE TRIGGER mail_approval_gate BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE ON mail_messages
+  FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION cayce_ops_gate_mail();
+
+DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS content_approval_gate ON content_items;
+CREATE TRIGGER content_approval_gate BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE ON content_items
+  FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION cayce_ops_gate_content();
@@ -9,9 +9,14 @@ sudo -u cayce uv sync --frozen
 sudo -u cayce cayceops db upgrade          # alembic to head
 sudo cp deploy/systemd/cayce-ops@.service deploy/systemd/cayce-ops@.timer /etc/systemd/system/

+# Every daemon has a `run` subcommand now:
+#   scanner run · executor run · maild run (poll + send-approved)
+#   publisher run (publish-due) · monitor run (build)
 # cadence per daemon (edit OnCalendar in each timer copy):
 #   scanner  hourly      executor  */10 min      maild  */5 min
 #   publisher */5 min    monitor   */1 min
+# NOTE: `publisher plan` (fills the calendar) is a SEPARATE timer:
+#   OnCalendar=daily  ->  ExecStart=/srv/cayce-ops/.venv/bin/cayceops publisher plan
 for d in scanner executor maild publisher monitor; do
  sudo cp deploy/systemd/cayce-ops@.timer /etc/systemd/system/cayce-ops@$d.timer
 done
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=cayce-ops publisher plan (fills the content calendar, daily)
+After=network-online.target postgresql.service
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=cayce
+WorkingDirectory=/srv/cayce-ops
+EnvironmentFile=/srv/cayce-ops/.env
+ExecStart=/srv/cayce-ops/.venv/bin/cayceops publisher plan
+NoNewPrivileges=yes
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=yes
+ReadWritePaths=/srv/cayce-ops
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Run cayce-ops publisher plan daily
+
+[Timer]
+OnCalendar=*-*-* 06:00:00
+RandomizedDelaySec=300
+Persistent=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ services:
      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: localdev-only-not-a-secret
      POSTGRES_DB: cayce_ops
    ports:
-      - "5432:5432"
+      - "127.0.0.1:5432:5432"  # loopback only — Docker bypasses host firewalls
    volumes:
      - pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    healthcheck:
@@ -69,3 +69,51 @@ An action plugin is a Python function registered in
 `http_post` exists but is inert unless `CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_HTTP_ACTIONS=true`.
 *Cost:* no sandboxing of plugins — plugins are repo code, reviewed like
 everything else.
+
+## D10 — Audit chain is hash-chained; approval can require operator signature (post-audit)
+`audit_log` rows chain sha256(prev_hash|fields); `verify_audit_chain` walks it,
+the monitor can surface breaks. With `CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY` set,
+`executor approve` REQUIRES a BIP-340 signature over
+sha256("cayce-ops:approve:<id>") from the operator key — `--actor` becomes a
+label, the key is the proof (the audit's "anyone can sign as anyone").
+*Cost:* without a pubkey configured the gate degrades to the old free-text
+actor; separate DB roles per daemon remain a deployment TODO (SQL to tighten
+ships in deploy/roles.sql).
+
+## D11 — Mail threading now has a real first-contact path (post-audit)
+Sends create an OUTBOUND row (own Message-ID, In-Reply-To -> inbound);
+inbound rows keep their original Message-ID. `maild compose` creates the
+initial outreach draft for a proposal. Approval is bound to the draft text
+via sha256 (`approved_hash`): an edited draft refuses to send until
+re-approved. Each send commits in its own transaction — SMTP failure on
+message N can no longer resurrect 1..N-1 as duplicates.
+
+## D12 — IMAP \\Seen only after commit; content gates tighten (post-audit)
+Messages are fetched unmarked and flagged \\Seen after the processing
+transaction commits (crash mid-batch no longer loses mail). Publisher:
+caption hash-bound at approval, disabled channels are terminal (`SKIPPED`),
+publish failures burn a bounded attempt budget before abandonment.
+`risk_score` renamed `match_score` (keyword relevance) and auto-approval
+takes the HIGHEST score first.
+
+## D13 — No non-human approval path (round 2, supersedes D5)
+Operator signatures are mandatory for approvals AND re-verified at
+execution/send/publish time against current content + deployment id. With
+that gate, the AUTONOMOUS_MODE auto-approval path cannot exist: it would
+produce unsigned approvals the gate refuses. `_auto_approve` is inert and
+audits `autonomy_disabled` when invoked. *Cost:* AUTONOMOUS_MODE is now
+inert by design.
+
+## D14 — Signatures bind content + deployment (round 2)
+message = sha256("cayce-ops:<type>:<deployment_id>:<id>:<content_hash>").
+content_hash is canonical-json of the fields that matter per type. Full
+signatures live on the row (operator_signature) and in the audit detail.
+Verification happens again at run time: unsigned rows (raw SQL approval)
+revert to their pre-approval state with an error audit. *Cost:* a deployment
+id env var is mandatory; signatures must be recomputed if content changes.
+
+## D15 — Approval classifier veto (round 2)
+Any negation token anywhere in a mail vetoes an `approval` classification →
+needs_review. Simpler and strictly conservative vs. per-pattern negation
+lists. *Cost:* genuinely-positive approvals containing stray negations
+(e.g. "we have no reason not to welcome you") need human triage.
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# The gate, wired as a real hook (audit medium finding: it did not self-install).
+# Runs the exact CI pipeline; refuses the push on any failure.
+set -e
+cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+make check
+echo "pre-push gate passed — safe to push"
@@ -10,8 +10,14 @@ from __future__ import annotations

 import os
 from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace

 import pytest
+from coincurve import PublicKey
+
+# test operator keypair (invented; allowlisted in .gitleaks.toml)
+OPERATOR_SECRET = bytes.fromhex("22" * 32)
+OPERATOR_PUBKEY = PublicKey.from_secret(OPERATOR_SECRET).format().hex()[2:]

 # Config must see the test DB before cayceops.config/db get imported.
 os.environ.setdefault("CAYCE_OPS_DATABASE_URL", "sqlite:///:memory:")
@@ -54,6 +60,61 @@ def sess(db_engine):
    s.close()


+@pytest.fixture()
+def signer():
+    """Signs approval messages with the test operator key (22*32, deployment
+    'itest'). Mirrors exactly what the operator CLI does."""
+    from coincurve import PrivateKey
+
+    from cayceops.models import MailDirection
+    from cayceops.signing import (
+        approval_message,
+        content_content_hash,
+        mail_content_hash,
+        proposal_content_hash,
+    )
+
+    secret = OPERATOR_SECRET
+
+    def _sig(msg: bytes) -> str:
+        return PrivateKey(secret).sign_schnorr(msg, aux_randomness=b"\x00" * 32).hex()
+
+    def proposal(p, deployment="itest"):
+        chash = proposal_content_hash(p.kind, p.title, p.url, p.detail)
+        return _sig(approval_message("proposal", deployment, p.id, chash))
+
+    def mail(record, deployment="itest"):
+        to = (
+            record.from_addr
+            if record.direction == MailDirection.INBOUND
+            else record.to_addr
+        )
+        chash = mail_content_hash(to, record.subject, record.draft_reply)
+        return _sig(approval_message("mail", deployment, record.id, chash))
+
+    def content(item, deployment="itest"):
+        chash = content_content_hash(item.channel, item.caption, item.link)
+        return _sig(approval_message("content", deployment, item.id, chash))
+
+    def raw(sig_bytes: bytes) -> str:
+        return _sig(sig_bytes)
+
+    def msg(item_type: str, deployment: str, item_id: int, chash: str) -> bytes:
+        from cayceops.signing import approval_message
+
+        return approval_message(item_type, deployment, item_id, chash)
+
+    def content_hash(item, deployment="itest") -> str:
+        from cayceops.signing import content_content_hash
+
+        return content_content_hash(item.channel, item.caption, item.link)
+
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        proposal=proposal, mail=mail, content=content, raw=raw, msg=msg,
+        content_hash=content_hash,
+    )
+
+
@pytest.fixture()
 def cfg(monkeypatch):
    """A Config snapshot with test defaults (no network, no autonomy)."""
@@ -66,6 +127,10 @@ def cfg(monkeypatch):
        "CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_INSTAGRAM": "false",
        "CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS": "",
        "CAYCE_OPS_MEDIA_DIR": "media",
+        # signing defaults (audit round 2): tests operate in a signed
+        # deployment unless they explicitly clear these
+        "CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID": "itest",
+        "CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY": OPERATOR_PUBKEY,
    }

    def _apply(**overrides):
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+"""Integration tests against Postgres 16: roles.sql + one full daemon cycle
+per role (audit round 2, point 3).
+
+Skipped unless a Postgres is reachable at TEST_PG_DSN (default: the
+docker-compose service). Roles are applied by piping deploy/roles.sql
+through psql WITH the mandatory -v password variables — exercising the same
+path an operator uses; the test skips if the psql client is not installed.
+
+Run:  uv run pytest -m integration -v
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration
+
+PG_DSN = os.environ.get(
+    "TEST_PG_DSN",
+    "postgresql://cayce:ci-only-not-a-secret@127.0.0.1:5432/cayce_ops",
+)
+ROLES_SQL = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "deploy" / "roles.sql"
+
+ROLE_PASSWORDS = {
+    "scanner_password": "itest-scanner-pw",
+    "executor_password": "itest-executor-pw",
+    "maild_password": "itest-maild-pw",
+    "publisher_password": "itest-publisher-pw",
+    "monitor_password": "itest-monitor-pw",
+    "approver_password": "itest-approver-pw",
+}
+
+
+def _pg_available() -> bool:
+    try:
+        import psycopg
+
+        with psycopg.connect(PG_DSN, connect_timeout=3):
+            return True
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return False
+
+
+def _psql_available() -> bool:
+    try:
+        return (
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["psql", "--version"], capture_output=True, timeout=10
+            ).returncode
+            == 0
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        return False
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
+def roles_applied():
+    if not _pg_available():
+        pytest.skip("Postgres not reachable (set TEST_PG_DSN)")
+    if not _psql_available():
+        pytest.skip("psql client not installed")
+
+    # fresh slate on an admin connection
+    import psycopg
+
+    admin = psycopg.connect(PG_DSN, autocommit=True)
+    with admin.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            """
+            DROP TABLE IF EXISTS audit_log, mail_messages, content_items,
+              daemon_runs, proposals, alembic_version CASCADE;
+            DROP TYPE IF EXISTS proposalsource, proposalstatus, maildirection,
+              mailclassification, draftstatus, contentstatus CASCADE;
+            DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS cayce_ops_approval_gate() CASCADE;
+            """
+        )
+    admin.close()
+
+    # apply alembic chain (imports app; config must point at PG first)
+    os.environ["CAYCE_OPS_DATABASE_URL"] = PG_DSN.replace(
+        "postgresql://", "postgresql+psycopg://"
+    )
+    import subprocess as sp
+
+    env = {**os.environ, "CAYCE_OPS_DATABASE_URL": os.environ["CAYCE_OPS_DATABASE_URL"]}
+    # upgrade -> downgrade -> upgrade round-trip on Postgres (audit round 2,
+    # point 6): exercises 0002.downgrade and 0003.downgrade for real
+    sp.run(["uv", "run", "alembic", "upgrade", "head"], check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["uv", "run", "alembic", "downgrade", "0001"], check=True, env=env)
+    sp.run(["uv", "run", "alembic", "upgrade", "head"], check=True, env=env)
+
+    # apply roles.sql the operator way: psql -v <password vars>
+    cmd = ["psql", PG_DSN, "-v", "ON_ERROR_STOP=1", "-f", str(ROLES_SQL)]
+    for var, value in ROLE_PASSWORDS.items():
+        cmd += ["-v", f"{var}={value}"]
+    result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)
+    assert result.returncode == 0, f"roles.sql failed:\n{result.stderr}"
+
+    # re-apply WITHOUT variables must fail (audit requirement: no silent run)
+    bad = subprocess.run(
+        ["psql", PG_DSN, "-v", "ON_ERROR_STOP=1", "-f", str(ROLES_SQL)],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    assert bad.returncode != 0, "roles.sql must refuse to run without vars"
+
+    yield
+
+
+def _connect_as(role: str):
+    """Connect with the role's credentials on the same DB as PG_DSN."""
+    import psycopg
+
+    key = f"{role.split('_', 1)[1]}_password"
+    after_scheme = PG_DSN.split("://", 1)[1]
+    userinfo, hostport_db = after_scheme.split("@", 1)
+    hostport, _db = hostport_db.split("/", 1)
+    dsn = f"postgresql://{role}:{ROLE_PASSWORDS[key]}@{hostport}/{_db}"
+    return psycopg.connect(dsn, autocommit=True)
+
+
+def _must_fail(conn, sql: str, because: str):
+    import psycopg
+
+    try:
+        with conn.cursor() as cur:
+            cur.execute(sql)
+    except psycopg.Error as exc:
+        assert because.lower() in str(exc).lower(), f"{because} — got: {exc}"
+        conn.rollback()
+        return
+    pytest.fail(f"expected failure: {because}")
+
+
+def test_roles_full_daemon_cycle(roles_applied):
+
+    # --- scanner role: proposes (INSERT proposals) ---
+    with _connect_as("cayce_scanner") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            """INSERT INTO proposals (source, kind, title, url, detail,
+                 match_score, status, attempts, created_at, updated_at)
+               VALUES ('SCANNER', 'partnership', 'Acme partner', NULL, '{}',
+                 0.9, 'PROPOSED', 0, now(), now()) RETURNING id"""
+        )
+        proposal_id = cur.fetchone()[0]
+        cur.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO audit_log (ts, actor, action, detail, result) "
+            "VALUES (now(), 'daemon:scanner', 'propose', '{}', 'ok')"
+        )
+        cur.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO daemon_runs (daemon, started_at, status, detail) "
+            "VALUES ('scanner', now(), 'ok', '{}')"
+        )
+
+    # scanner cannot approve: no UPDATE grant at all, and the trigger would
+    # still block status=APPROVED for non-approver roles
+    scanner = _connect_as("cayce_scanner")
+    _must_fail(
+        scanner,
+        f"UPDATE proposals SET status='APPROVED' WHERE id={proposal_id}",
+        because="permission denied",
+    )
+    scanner.close()
+
+    # executor cannot approve either (trigger), and cannot write signatures
+    executor = _connect_as("cayce_executor")
+    # the signature column is outside the executor's column grant: the whole
+    # UPDATE is denied before the trigger even runs
+    fake_sig = "ab" * 64  # invented 128-hex signature
+    _must_fail(
+        executor,
+        f"UPDATE proposals SET status='APPROVED', operator_signature='{fake_sig}' "
+        f"WHERE id={proposal_id}",
+        because="permission denied",
+    )
+    # executor CAN run its cycle once the approver approved
+    with executor.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            f"UPDATE proposals SET status='RUNNING', attempts=attempts+1, "
+            f"updated_at=now() WHERE id={proposal_id}"
+        )
+        cur.execute(
+            f"UPDATE proposals SET status='DONE', updated_at=now() WHERE id={proposal_id}"
+        )
+        cur.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO daemon_runs (daemon, started_at, status, detail) "
+            "VALUES ('executor', now(), 'ok', '{}')"
+        )
+    executor.close()
+
+    # --- approver: the only role that can approve + sign ---
+    sig = "c9" * 64  # invented 128-hex signature for the permission test
+    with _connect_as("cayce_approver") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            f"UPDATE proposals SET status='APPROVED', approved_by='gustavo', "
+            f"approved_at=now(), operator_signature='{sig}' WHERE id={proposal_id}"
+        )
+
+    # --- maild role: drafts + sends, cannot approve ---
+    with _connect_as("cayce_maild") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            """INSERT INTO mail_messages (direction, message_id, from_addr,
+                 subject, body, draft_reply, draft_status, confidence)
+               VALUES ('OUTBOUND', '<itest@x>', 'desk@acme.example.org', 'Hello',
+                 'Body', 'Body', 'DRAFTED', 0) RETURNING id"""
+        )
+        mail_id = cur.fetchone()[0]
+    maild = _connect_as("cayce_maild")
+    _must_fail(
+        maild,
+        f"UPDATE mail_messages SET draft_status='APPROVED' WHERE id={mail_id}",
+        because="only cayce_approver may set mail draft_status=approved",
+    )
+    _must_fail(
+        maild,
+        f"UPDATE mail_messages SET operator_signature='{sig}' WHERE id={mail_id}",
+        because="permission denied",  # signature column outside maild's grant
+    )
+    # the approver approves; then maild can mark it sent
+    with _connect_as("cayce_approver") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            "UPDATE mail_messages SET draft_status='APPROVED', "
+            "approved_by='gustavo', approved_hash='"
+            + "a" * 64
+            + f"', operator_signature='{sig}' WHERE id={mail_id}"
+        )
+    with _connect_as("cayce_maild") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            f"UPDATE mail_messages SET draft_status='SENT' WHERE id={mail_id}"
+        )
+    maild.close()
+
+    # --- publisher role: plans content, cannot approve ---
+    with _connect_as("cayce_publisher") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            """INSERT INTO content_items (theme, channel, caption, status,
+                 attempts, created_at)
+               VALUES ('atm-fees', 'nostr', 'caption', 'DRAFT', 0, now())
+               RETURNING id"""
+        )
+        item_id = cur.fetchone()[0]
+    publisher = _connect_as("cayce_publisher")
+    _must_fail(
+        publisher,
+        f"UPDATE content_items SET status='APPROVED' WHERE id={item_id}",
+        because="only cayce_approver may set content status=approved",
+    )
+    # approver approves; publisher publishes
+    with _connect_as("cayce_approver") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            "UPDATE content_items SET status='APPROVED', approved_hash='"
+            + "b" * 64
+            + f"', operator_signature='{sig}' WHERE id={item_id}"
+        )
+    with _connect_as("cayce_publisher") as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            f"UPDATE content_items SET status='PUBLISHED', published_at=now() "
+            f"WHERE id={item_id}"
+        )
+    publisher.close()
+
+    # --- monitor role: read-only + audit anchors ---
+    monitor = _connect_as("cayce_monitor")
+    with monitor.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM proposals")
+        cur.fetchone()
+        cur.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO audit_log (ts, actor, action, detail, result) "
+            "VALUES (now(), 'daemon:monitor', 'anchor', '{}', 'ok')"
+        )
+    # monitor CAN book its runs, but cannot touch proposals
+    with monitor.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO daemon_runs (daemon, started_at, status, detail) "
+            "VALUES ('monitor', now(), 'ok', '{}')"
+        )
+    _must_fail(
+        monitor,
+        "INSERT INTO proposals (source, kind, title, detail, match_score, status, "
+        "attempts, created_at, updated_at) "
+        "VALUES ('SCANNER', 'other', 'x', '{}', 0, 'PROPOSED', 0, now(), now())",
+        because="permission denied",
+    )
+    monitor.close()
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-"""executor tests — human gate, autonomy bounds, retries, audit chain."""
+"""executor tests — human gate (signed), autonomy bounds, retries, audit chain.
+
+Since audit round 2, approvals REQUIRE an operator signature bound to the
+proposal's current content + deployment id (tests sign with the conftest
+operator key 22*32, deployment 'itest').
+"""

 from __future__ import annotations

@@ -12,16 +17,22 @@ def _proposal(kind="content_gap", title="Test item", **kw):
    return Proposal(kind=kind, title=title, **kw)


-def test_approve_requires_proposed_state(cfg, sess):
+def test_approve_requires_proposed_state(cfg, sess, signer):
    p = _proposal()
    sess.add(p)
    sess.flush()

-    assert executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess) == 0
+    assert (
+        executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=signer.proposal(p)) == 0
+    )
    # second approve must fail (state is now approved)
-    assert executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess) == 1
+    assert (
+        executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=signer.proposal(p)) == 1
+    )
    assert p.approved_by == "gustavo"
-    assert p.status == ProposalStatus.APPROVED
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.APPROVED
+    # FULL signature stored on the row
+    assert p.operator_signature and len(p.operator_signature) == 128


 def test_reject_records_actor(cfg, sess):
@@ -29,21 +40,26 @@ def test_reject_records_actor(cfg, sess):
    sess.add(p)
    sess.flush()
    assert executor.reject(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess) == 0
-    assert p.status == ProposalStatus.REJECTED
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.REJECTED


-def test_run_executes_only_approved(cfg, sess):
+def test_run_executes_only_approved(cfg, sess, signer):
    approved = _proposal(title="Approved item")
    proposed = _proposal(title="Proposed item")
    sess.add_all([approved, proposed])
    sess.flush()
-    executor.approve(approved.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess)
+    assert (
+        executor.approve(
+            approved.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=signer.proposal(approved)
+        )
+        == 0
+    )

    config = cfg()  # AUTONOMOUS_MODE=false
    assert executor.run(config, sess) == 0

-    assert approved.status == ProposalStatus.DONE
-    assert proposed.status == ProposalStatus.PROPOSED  # untouched
+    assert approved.status is ProposalStatus.DONE
+    assert proposed.status is ProposalStatus.PROPOSED  # untouched

    acts = [a.action for a in sess.query(AuditEntry).order_by(AuditEntry.id).all()]
    assert "execute_start" in acts and "execute_done" in acts
@@ -56,36 +72,127 @@ def test_autonomy_off_by_default(cfg, sess):
    sess.flush()
    config = cfg()  # autonomous_mode False even with kinds configured
    executor._auto_approve(config, sess)
-    assert p.status == ProposalStatus.PROPOSED
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.PROPOSED


-def test_autonomy_respects_kinds_and_daily_cap(cfg, sess):
-    p1 = _proposal(kind="content_gap", title="auto ok")
-    p2 = _proposal(kind="content_gap", title="auto over cap")
-    p3 = _proposal(kind="affiliate", title="kind not allowed")
-    sess.add_all([p1, p2, p3])
+def test_autonomy_cannot_approve_anymore(cfg, sess):
+    """Round-2 1a: with mandatory signatures there is NO non-human approval
+    path. AUTONOMOUS_MODE no longer approves anything (D13)."""
+    low = _proposal(kind="content_gap", title="barely relevant")
+    low.match_score = 0.1
+    high = _proposal(kind="content_gap", title="highly relevant")
+    high.match_score = 0.9
+    sess.add_all([low, high])
    sess.flush()
-
    config = cfg(
        CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_MODE="true",
        CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_KINDS="content_gap",
        CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_DAILY_CAP="1",
    )
-    approved = executor._auto_approve(config, sess)
-    assert approved == 1
-    assert p1.status == ProposalStatus.APPROVED
-    assert p2.status == ProposalStatus.PROPOSED  # cap reached
-    assert p3.status == ProposalStatus.PROPOSED  # kind not in policy
-
-    actor = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="approve").one().actor
-    assert actor == "auto:policy"
+    assert executor._auto_approve(config, sess) == 0
+    assert low.status is ProposalStatus.PROPOSED
+    assert high.status is ProposalStatus.PROPOSED
+    entry = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="autonomy_disabled").one()
+    assert entry.result == "error"


-def test_failing_plugin_retries_then_fails(cfg, sess, monkeypatch):
+def test_signed_approval_mandatory_and_content_bound(cfg, sess, signer):
+    """Round-2 1a/1b/1c: signature mandatory, bound to content+deployment,
+    stored COMPLETE on the row and in the audit log. Signatures for other
+    deployments or other content are refused."""
+    from cayceops.signing import proposal_content_hash
+
+    p = _proposal(kind="partnership", title="Acme partner", url="https://acme.example.org")
+    p.detail = {"region": "latam"}
+    sess.add(p)
+    sess.flush()
+
+    chash = proposal_content_hash(p.kind, p.title, p.url, p.detail)
+
+    # no signature -> refused
+    assert executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=None) == 2
+    # signature for ANOTHER deployment -> refused (required test)
+    other_dep = signer.raw(
+        signer.msg("proposal", "other-deploy", p.id, chash)
+    )
+    assert executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=other_dep) == 2
+    # signature over OTHER CONTENT -> refused (required test)
+    other_content = signer.raw(signer.msg("proposal", "itest", p.id, "00" * 32))
+    assert executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=other_content) == 2
+    # valid signature -> approved
+    assert (
+        executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=signer.proposal(p)) == 0
+    )
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.APPROVED
+    entry = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="approve", result="ok").one()
+    assert entry.detail["signature"] == p.operator_signature
+
+
+def test_approve_fails_audited_from_cli_wrapper(cfg, sess):
+    """Round-2 1f: signature failures leave an audit record even when the
+    command runs through its CLI wrapper (the wrapper passes sess)."""
+    p = _proposal()
+    sess.add(p)
+    sess.flush()
+
+    code = executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=None)
+    assert code == 2
+    entry = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="approve", result="error").one()
+    assert "signature required" in entry.detail["reason"]
+
+
+def test_sql_approved_row_is_refused_at_execution(cfg, sess, monkeypatch):
+    """Round-2 1d (required test): a row put in `approved` by raw SQL without
+    a signature must not execute; it reverts to `proposed` with an error audit."""
+    p = _proposal()
+    p.status = ProposalStatus.APPROVED  # raw-SQL style: no signature
+    sess.add(p)
+    sess.flush()
+
+    executed = []
+
+    def spy_plugin(proposal, cfg, sess):
+        executed.append(proposal.id)
+        return {}
+
+    monkeypatch.setitem(plugins.REGISTRY, "content_gap", spy_plugin)
+    assert executor.run(cfg(), sess) == 0
+    assert executed == []
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.PROPOSED  # reverted
+    refused = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="execute_refused").one()
+    assert refused.result == "error"
+
+
+def test_execution_verifies_signature_against_current_content(cfg, sess, signer, monkeypatch):
+    """Round-2 1d: signature over content that changed after approval is
+    refused at execution time."""
+    p = _proposal(kind="partnership", title="original")
+    sess.add(p)
+    sess.flush()
+    assert (
+        executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=signer.proposal(p)) == 0
+    )
+
+    p.title = "EDITED after approval"  # content changed under the signature
+
+    executed = []
+    monkeypatch.setitem(
+        plugins.REGISTRY,
+        "partnership",
+        lambda proposal, cfg, sess: executed.append(proposal.id) or {},
+    )
+    assert executor.run(cfg(), sess) == 0
+    assert executed == []
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.PROPOSED
+
+
+def test_failing_plugin_retries_then_fails(cfg, sess, signer, monkeypatch):
    p = _proposal(kind="affiliate", title="Will fail")
    sess.add(p)
    sess.flush()
-    executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess)
+    assert (
+        executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=signer.proposal(p)) == 0
+    )

    calls = {"n": 0}

@@ -97,11 +204,11 @@ def test_failing_plugin_retries_then_fails(cfg, sess, monkeypatch):
    config = cfg(CAYCE_OPS_MAX_ATTEMPTS="2")

    executor.run(config, sess)  # attempt 1 -> back to approved for retry
-    assert p.status == ProposalStatus.APPROVED
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.APPROVED
    assert p.attempts == 1

    executor.run(config, sess)  # attempt 2 -> failed for good
-    assert p.status == ProposalStatus.FAILED
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.FAILED
    assert p.attempts == 2
    assert calls["n"] == 2

@@ -120,14 +227,16 @@ def test_http_post_blocked_when_disabled(cfg, sess):
        plugins.http_post(p, config, sess)


-def test_unknown_kind_falls_back_to_log_action(cfg, sess):
+def test_unknown_kind_falls_back_to_log_action(cfg, sess, signer):
    p = _proposal(kind="brand_new_kind", title="No plugin yet")
    sess.add(p)
    sess.flush()
-    executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess)
+    assert (
+        executor.approve(p.id, "gustavo", cfg(), sess, signature=signer.proposal(p)) == 0
+    )

    assert executor.run(cfg(), sess) == 0
-    assert p.status == ProposalStatus.DONE
+    assert p.status is ProposalStatus.DONE

    done = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="execute_done").one()
    assert done.detail["outcome"]["plugin_fallback"] is True
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@

 from __future__ import annotations

+import os
+
+from coincurve import PrivateKey
+from coincurve import PublicKey as _PK
+
 from cayceops.components.maild import classify as clf
 from cayceops.components.maild import maild
 from cayceops.models import (
@@ -14,10 +19,23 @@ from cayceops.models import (
    ProposalStatus,
 )

+# test operator keypair (matches conftest default pubkey; invented)
+OPERATOR_SECRET = bytes.fromhex("22" * 32)
+OPERATOR_PUBKEY = _PK.from_secret(OPERATOR_SECRET).format().hex()[2:]
+
 OUTBOUND_MSGID = "<cayce-draft-1-1000@cayce-co.xyz>"

+# the signing gate reads env at runtime — make sure every path in this module
+# (fixtures included) sees a signed deployment
+os.environ.setdefault("CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID", "itest")
+os.environ.setdefault("CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY", OPERATOR_PUBKEY)
+from cayceops.config import load as _load  # noqa: E402  (env set above)

-def _eml(subject: str, body: str, in_reply_to: str | None = None, msgid: str | None = None) -> bytes:
+STUB_CFG = _load()  # a real, signed Config (replaces the old SimpleNamespace)
+
+
+
+def _eml(subject, body, in_reply_to=None, msgid=None) -> bytes:
    lines = [
        "From: Partner Desk <partners@acme.example.org>",
        "To: agent@cayce-co.xyz",
@@ -30,36 +48,108 @@ def _eml(subject: str, body: str, in_reply_to: str | None = None, msgid: str | N
    return "\r\n".join(lines).encode()


+def _sign(msg: bytes, secret: bytes = OPERATOR_SECRET) -> str:
+
+    return PrivateKey(secret).sign_schnorr(msg, aux_randomness=b"\x00" * 32).hex()
+
+
+def _approve_signed(sess, mail_id: int) -> str:
+    """Approve with a valid operator signature over the row's current content."""
+    from cayceops.signing import approval_message, mail_content_hash
+
+    record = sess.get(MailMessage, mail_id)
+    to_addr = record.from_addr if record.direction == MailDirection.INBOUND else record.to_addr
+    chash = mail_content_hash(to_addr, record.subject, record.draft_reply)
+    return _sign(approval_message("mail", "itest", mail_id, chash))
+
+
 def _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess) -> Proposal:
-    p = Proposal(kind="partnership", title="Acme hotel affiliate program", status=ProposalStatus.APPROVED)
+    """A proposal whose first-contact mail went through the REAL path:
+    compose -> approve (signed) -> send (creating a true OUTBOUND row)."""
+    p = Proposal(
+        kind="partnership",
+        title="Acme hotel affiliate program",
+        status=ProposalStatus.APPROVED,
+    )
    sess.add(p)
    sess.flush()
-    sess.add(
-        MailMessage(
-            direction=MailDirection.OUTBOUND,
-            message_id=OUTBOUND_MSGID,
-            to_addr="partners@acme.example.org",
-            subject="[cayce] partnership inquiry",
-            proposal_id=p.id,
-            draft_status=DraftStatus.SENT,
-        )
+    mail_id = maild._compose(
+        p.id, "partners@acme.example.org", "[cayce] partnership inquiry", "Hello!", sess
    )
+    assert (
+        maild._approve_draft(mail_id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, mail_id))
+        == 0
+    )
+    assert maild._send_one(STUB_CFG, sess, mail_id, sender=lambda *a, **k: None) == "sent"
+    out = (
+        sess.query(MailMessage)
+        .filter_by(direction=MailDirection.OUTBOUND, proposal_id=p.id)
+        .one()
+    )
+    out.message_id = OUTBOUND_MSGID  # deterministic id for the fixtures
    sess.flush()
    return p


+def _fetcher(raws: list[bytes]):
+    return lambda cfg: [(bytes(str(i), "ascii"), raw) for i, raw in enumerate(raws)]
+
+
 # --- classifier ---------------------------------------------------------------


 def test_rules_classification(cfg):
    config = cfg()
-    assert clf.classify("Your application was approved, welcome to the program", config)[0] is MailClassification.APPROVAL
-    assert clf.classify("Unfortunately we cannot accept new partners", config)[0] is MailClassification.REJECTION
-    assert clf.classify("Could you provide your traffic numbers?", config)[0] is MailClassification.QUESTION
-    kind, confidence = clf.classify("grocery list", config)
+    assert (
+        clf.classify("Your application was approved, welcome to the program", config)[0]
+        is MailClassification.APPROVAL
+    )
+    # negation present -> approval is vetoed to needs_review (round-2 rule;
+    # the human decides between rejection and other)
+    assert (
+        clf.classify("Unfortunately we cannot accept new partners", config)[0]
+        is MailClassification.NEEDS_REVIEW
+    )
+    # plain rejection (no approval word involved) still classifies directly
+    assert (
+        clf.classify("We regret to inform you that your application was declined", config)[0]
+        is MailClassification.REJECTION
+    )
+    assert (
+        clf.classify("Could you provide your traffic numbers?", config)[0]
+        is MailClassification.QUESTION
+    )
+    kind, _ = clf.classify("grocery list", config)
    assert kind is MailClassification.OTHER or kind is MailClassification.NEEDS_REVIEW


+def test_negated_approvals_never_classify_approval(cfg):
+    """Round-2 point 2: any negation vetoes `approval` -> needs_review."""
+    config = cfg()
+    cases = [
+        "We cannot currently accept new affiliates",
+        "We will never accept crypto businesses",
+        "Approval was not granted for your site",
+        "We are no longer accepting applications",
+        "Your application hasn't been approved",
+        "We have decided not to move forward with your application",
+        "We cannot accept your application",
+        "We are not accepting new partners at this time",
+        "Your application was not approved",
+        "We can't approve this request",
+        "We do not accept external affiliates",
+    ]
+    for text in cases:
+        kind, _ = clf.classify(text, config)
+        assert kind is not MailClassification.APPROVAL, f"{text!r} -> {kind}"
+
+
+def test_llm_prompt_format_survives_json_braces():
+    """Critical finding 4: .format() raised KeyError on the JSON sample."""
+    formatted = clf._LLM_PROMPT.format(body="x")
+    assert '{"classification"' in formatted  # literal braces survive
+
+
 def test_low_confidence_becomes_needs_review(cfg):
    config = cfg(CAYCE_OPS_LLM_REVIEW_THRESHOLD="0.95")
    kind, confidence = clf.classify("Your application was approved, welcome", config)
@@ -72,10 +162,15 @@ def test_low_confidence_becomes_needs_review(cfg):

 def test_poll_threads_approval_and_drafts_reply(cfg, sess):
    p = _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
-    raw = _eml("Re: [cayce] partnership inquiry", "Approved! Welcome to the Acme partner program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    raw = _eml(
+        "Re: [cayce] partnership inquiry",
+        "Approved! Welcome to the Acme partner program.",
+        in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID,
+    )

-    stats = maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=lambda cfg: [raw])
+    stats, nums = maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
    assert stats["processed"] == 1 and stats["drafted"] == 1
+    assert len(nums) == 1

    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
    assert inbound.classification is MailClassification.APPROVAL
@@ -90,14 +185,17 @@ def test_poll_threads_approval_and_drafts_reply(cfg, sess):
 def test_poll_idempotent_on_message_id(cfg, sess):
    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
    raw = _eml("Re: hi", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
-    fetcher = lambda cfg: [raw]
-    assert maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=fetcher)["processed"] == 1
-    assert maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=fetcher)["skipped"] == 1
+
+    first, second = maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw])), maild._poll(
+        cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw])
+    )
+    assert first[0]["processed"] == 1
+    assert second[0]["skipped"] == 1


 def test_unthreaded_approval_needs_review(cfg, sess):
    raw = _eml("Great news", "Approved! Welcome aboard.")  # no In-Reply-To
-    stats = maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=lambda cfg: [raw])
+    stats, _ = maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
    assert inbound.classification is MailClassification.NEEDS_REVIEW
    assert stats["needs_review"] == 1
@@ -107,7 +205,7 @@ def test_unthreaded_approval_needs_review(cfg, sess):
 def test_question_gets_clarification_draft(cfg, sess):
    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Could you provide your monthly traffic?", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
-    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=lambda cfg: [raw])
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
    assert inbound.classification is MailClassification.QUESTION
    assert inbound.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED
@@ -117,42 +215,316 @@ def test_question_gets_clarification_draft(cfg, sess):
 # --- human gate -------------------------------------------------------------------


-def test_send_blocked_without_approval(cfg, sess, monkeypatch):
+def test_send_blocked_without_approval(cfg, sess):
    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
-    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=lambda cfg: [raw])
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))

    sent = []
    config = cfg(CAYCE_OPS_MAIL_FROM="agent@cayce-co.xyz")
    stats = maild._send_approved(config, sess, sender=lambda *a, **k: sent.append(a))
    assert stats["sent"] == 0 and sent == []
-    assert sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one().draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED
+    assert stats["blocked"] + stats["missing"] >= 0  # no crash paths
+    assert config.mail_from == "agent@cayce-co.xyz"
+    row = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+    assert row.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED


 def test_send_requires_explicit_human_approval(cfg, sess):
    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
-    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
-    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=lambda cfg: [raw])
+    raw = _eml(
+        "Re: inquiry",
+        "Approved, welcome to the program.",
+        in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID,
+    )
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+    original_id = inbound.message_id

-    assert maild._approve_draft(inbound.id, "gustavo", sess) == 0
+    assert (
+        maild._approve_draft(
+            inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, inbound.id)
+        )
+        == 0
+    )

    sent = []
    config = cfg(CAYCE_OPS_MAIL_FROM="agent@cayce-co.xyz")
-    stats = maild._send_approved(config, sess, sender=lambda *a, **k: sent.append(a))
+
+    def sender(cfg, to, subject, body, message_id, in_reply_to=None):
+        sent.append((to, subject, body, message_id, in_reply_to))
+
+    stats = maild._send_approved(config, sess, sender=sender)
    assert stats["sent"] == 1
    assert inbound.draft_status is DraftStatus.SENT
-    assert sent[0][1] == "partners@acme.example.org"
+    to, subject, body, message_id, in_reply_to = sent[0]
+    assert to == "partners@acme.example.org"
+    assert in_reply_to == original_id  # In-Reply-To threads to the inbound mail

-    row = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="send_draft").one()
-    assert "gustavo" in str(row.detail)
+    # a real OUTBOUND row now exists (audit fix: they were never created)
+    out = (
+        sess.query(MailMessage)
+        .filter_by(direction=MailDirection.OUTBOUND, message_id=message_id)
+        .one()
+    )
+    assert out.in_reply_to == original_id
+    assert out.proposal_id == inbound.proposal_id
+    assert inbound.message_id == original_id  # inbound id NOT overwritten
+
+    row = (
+        sess.query(AuditEntry)
+        .filter_by(action="send_draft")
+        .order_by(AuditEntry.id.desc())
+        .first()
+    )
+    assert row is not None and "gustavo" in str(row.detail)


 def test_double_approve_is_rejected(cfg, sess):
    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
-    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
-    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=lambda cfg: [raw])
+    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()

-    assert maild._approve_draft(inbound.id, "gustavo", sess) == 0
+    assert (
+        maild._approve_draft(
+            inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, inbound.id)
+        )
+        == 0
+    )
    assert maild._approve_draft(inbound.id, "gustavo", sess) == 1
+
+
+# --- audit corrections ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_send_failure_does_not_resurrect_sent_mails(cfg, sess):
+    """Critical finding 3: SMTP failure mid-batch rolled back the whole
+    transaction, re-sending already-delivered mails 5 minutes later."""
+    config = cfg(CAYCE_OPS_MAIL_FROM="agent@cayce-co.xyz")
+    for i in range(3):
+        # unique first-contact thread per proposal (real compose -> send path)
+        p = Proposal(kind="partnership", title=f"Acme partner {i}")
+        sess.add(p)
+        sess.flush()
+        mail_id = maild._compose(
+            p.id, f"desk{i}@acme.example.org", f"[cayce] inquiry {i}", "Hello!", sess
+        )
+        assert (
+            maild._approve_draft(mail_id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, mail_id))
+            == 0
+        )
+        assert maild._send_one(STUB_CFG, sess, mail_id, sender=lambda *a, **k: None) == "sent"
+        sess.flush()
+        out = sess.get(MailMessage, mail_id)
+        raw = _eml(
+            f"Re: {i}",
+            "Approved, welcome to the program.",
+            in_reply_to=out.message_id,
+            msgid=f"<acme-{i}@acme.example.org>",
+        )
+        maild._poll(config, sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+        inbound = (
+            sess.query(MailMessage)
+            .filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND, message_id=f"<acme-{i}@acme.example.org>")
+            .one()
+        )
+        assert (
+            maild._approve_draft(
+                inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, inbound.id)
+            )
+            == 0
+        )
+    sess.commit()  # per-message factory sessions only see committed rows
+
+    calls = {"n": 0}
+
+    def flaky_smtp(cfg, to, subject, body, message_id, in_reply_to=None):
+        calls["n"] += 1
+        if calls["n"] == 3:
+            raise OSError("smtp connection lost")
+
+    import cayceops.db as appdb
+
+    stats = maild._send_approved(
+        config, sess, sender=flaky_smtp, factory=appdb.session_factory()
+    )
+
+    assert calls["n"] == 3
+    assert stats["sent"] == 2 and stats["error"] == 1  # no rollback of 1..2
+    still_approved = (
+        sess.query(MailMessage)
+        .filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND, draft_status=DraftStatus.APPROVED)
+        .count()
+    )
+    assert still_approved == 1  # only the failed one stays queued
+
+
+def test_edited_draft_refuses_to_send(cfg, sess):
+    """Medium finding: approved text was not bound to its content."""
+    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
+    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+    assert (
+        maild._approve_draft(
+            inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, inbound.id)
+        )
+        == 0
+    )
+
+    inbound.draft_reply = "TOTALLY EDITED TEXT after approval"  # tamper
+
+    sent = []
+    config = cfg(CAYCE_OPS_MAIL_FROM="agent@cayce-co.xyz")
+    stats = maild._send_approved(config, sess, sender=lambda *a, **k: sent.append(a))
+    assert stats["sent"] == 0 and stats["hash_mismatch"] == 1
+    assert sent == []
+    assert inbound.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED  # needs fresh approval
+    action = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="send_refused").one()
+    assert action.result == "error"
+
+
+def test_compose_creates_first_contact_draft(cfg, sess):
+    """Critical finding 2: there was no path for the first contact mail."""
+    p = Proposal(kind="partnership", title="New hotel partner")
+    sess.add(p)
+    sess.flush()
+
+    mail_id = maild._compose(
+        p.id, "desk@hotel.example.org", "Partnership", "We would like to...", sess
+    )
+    assert mail_id > 0
+    out = sess.get(MailMessage, mail_id)
+    assert out.direction is MailDirection.OUTBOUND
+    assert out.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED
+    assert out.proposal_id == p.id
+
+    # approve + send -> an inbound reply can now thread to this proposal
+    assert (
+        maild._approve_draft(mail_id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, mail_id))
+        == 0
+    )
+    stats = maild._send_approved(STUB_CFG, sess, sender=lambda *a, **k: None)
+    assert stats["sent"] == 1
+    sess.flush()
+
+    reply = _eml("Re: Partnership", "Approved, welcome!", in_reply_to=out.message_id)
+    assert maild._match_proposal(maild.parse_raw(reply), sess) is p
+
+
+def test_mark_seen_returned_for_post_commit_processing(cfg, sess):
+    """Medium finding: \\\\Seen was set before processing (crash lost mail)."""
+    raw = _eml("Re: hi", "Approved, welcome to the program.")
+    stats, nums = maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+    assert stats["processed"] == 1
+    assert nums == [b"0"]  # caller marks seen only after commit
+
+
+# --- round-2 signature gate (mail) ------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _approved_reply(sess, cfg) -> MailMessage:
+    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
+    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+    return sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+
+
+def test_unsigned_sql_approved_draft_is_refused(cfg, sess):
+    """Round-2 required test: raw-SQL approved row (no signature) not sent."""
+    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
+    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+    # raw-SQL style approval: status flips, no signature
+    sess.execute(
+        MailMessage.__table__.update()
+        .where(MailMessage.id == inbound.id)
+        .values(draft_status=DraftStatus.APPROVED)
+    )
+    sess.expire(inbound)
+
+    sent = []
+    stats = maild._send_approved(STUB_CFG, sess, sender=lambda *a, **k: sent.append(a))
+    assert stats["sent"] == 0 and stats["hash_mismatch"] == 1
+    assert sent == []
+    assert inbound.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED  # reverted
+    refused = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="send_refused").one()
+    assert refused.result == "error"
+
+
+def test_changed_to_addr_after_approval_blocks_send(cfg, sess):
+    """Round-2 required test: to_addr edited after approval -> refused."""
+    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
+    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+    assert (
+        maild._approve_draft(
+            inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, inbound.id)
+        )
+        == 0
+    )
+
+    inbound.from_addr = "attacker@evil.example.org"  # redirect target
+
+    sent = []
+    stats = maild._send_approved(STUB_CFG, sess, sender=lambda *a, **k: sent.append(a))
+    assert stats["sent"] == 0 and stats["hash_mismatch"] == 1
+    assert sent == []
+    assert inbound.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED
+
+
+def test_foreign_deployment_signature_refused(cfg, sess):
+    """Round-2 required test: a valid signature for another deployment_id (or
+    other content) is refused."""
+    from cayceops.signing import approval_message, mail_content_hash
+
+    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
+    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+    chash = mail_content_hash(inbound.from_addr, inbound.subject, inbound.draft_reply)
+
+    # signature valid for ANOTHER deployment
+    other_dep = _sign(
+        OPERATOR_SECRET, approval_message("mail", "other-deploy", inbound.id, chash)
+    )
+    assert maild._approve_draft(inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=other_dep) == 2
+    assert inbound.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED
+
+    # signature valid for OTHER CONTENT
+    other_content = _sign(
+        OPERATOR_SECRET, approval_message("mail", "itest", inbound.id, "00" * 32)
+    )
+    assert maild._approve_draft(inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=other_content) == 2
+    assert inbound.draft_status is DraftStatus.DRAFTED
+
+
+def test_send_failures_audited_and_exit_code(cfg, sess, monkeypatch):
+    """Round-2 point 5: failures audited + surfaced; non-zero exit handled by CLI."""
+    import cayceops.db as appdb
+
+    _proposal_with_sent_draft(sess)
+    raw = _eml("Re: inquiry", "Approved, welcome to the program.", in_reply_to=OUTBOUND_MSGID)
+    maild._poll(cfg(), sess, fetcher=_fetcher([raw]))
+    inbound = sess.query(MailMessage).filter_by(direction=MailDirection.INBOUND).one()
+    assert (
+        maild._approve_draft(
+            inbound.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_approve_signed(sess, inbound.id)
+        )
+        == 0
+    )
+
+    def boom(cfg, to, subject, body, message_id, in_reply_to=None):
+        raise OSError("relay down")
+
+
+    sess.commit()  # per-message factory sessions only see committed rows
+    stats = maild._send_approved(
+        STUB_CFG, sess, sender=boom, factory=appdb.session_factory()
+    )
+    assert stats["error"] == 1 and stats["sent"] == 0
+    failed = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="send_failed").one()
+    assert failed.result == "error"
@@ -90,3 +90,55 @@ def test_mail_and_content_and_runs(sess):
    assert m.id and c.id and r.id
    assert m.draft_status == "drafted"
    assert c.status == "draft"
+
+
+def test_audit_chain_and_verification(sess):
+    from cayceops.models import verify_audit_chain
+
+    p = Proposal(kind="other", title="chain")
+    sess.add(p)
+    sess.flush()
+    for i in range(3):
+        audit(sess, actor=f"actor-{i}", action="step", proposal_id=p.id, detail={"i": i})
+    sess.flush()
+
+    ok, broken = verify_audit_chain(sess)
+    assert ok and broken is None
+
+    # tamper with one entry -> chain breaks at that id
+    first = sess.query(AuditEntry).order_by(AuditEntry.id).first()
+    first.actor = "tampered"
+    ok, broken = verify_audit_chain(sess)
+    assert not ok and broken == first.id
+
+
+def test_concurrent_writers_keep_chain_verifiable(db_engine):
+    """Round-2 point 4: serialized writes -> no forked chains."""
+    import threading
+
+    import cayceops.db as appdb
+
+    errors: list[Exception] = []
+
+    def writer(worker: int, n: int):
+        try:
+            for i in range(n):
+                with appdb.session_scope() as s:
+                    audit(s, actor=f"w{worker}", action=f"step{i}", detail={"worker": worker})
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+            errors.append(exc)
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=writer, args=(w, 25)) for w in range(4)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join()
+
+    assert not errors, errors
+    s = appdb.session_factory()()
+    total = s.query(AuditEntry).count()
+    assert total == 100
+    from cayceops.models import verify_audit_chain
+
+    ok, broken = verify_audit_chain(s)
+    assert ok and broken is None
@@ -67,3 +67,42 @@ def test_build_escapes_injected_content(cfg, sess, tmp_path):
    page = out.read_text()
    assert "<script>x</script>" not in page
    assert "&lt;script&gt;x&lt;/script&gt;" in page
+
+
+def test_anchor_signs_and_logs_once_per_day(cfg, sess, monkeypatch):
+    from cayceops.components.monitor import monitor
+    from cayceops.models import AuditEntry
+
+    # seed the chain
+    from cayceops.models import audit as audit_fn
+
+    audit_fn(sess, actor="daemon:executor", action="execute_done", detail={})
+    sess.flush()
+
+    published = []
+
+    def fake_publish(relays, event, timeout=10.0):
+        published.append(event)
+        return [{"relay": r, "ok": "true"} for r in relays]
+
+    import cayceops.components.publisher.nostr as nostr_mod
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(nostr_mod, "publish", fake_publish)
+
+    config = cfg(
+        CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY="11" * 32,
+        CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS="wss://r.example.org",
+        CAYCE_OPS_DEPLOYMENT_ID="itest",
+    )
+    code = monitor._anchor(config, sess)
+    assert code == 0
+    assert len(published) == 1
+    content = published[0]["content"]
+    assert "audit anchor" in content and "itest" in content
+    entry = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="anchor").one()
+    assert entry.detail["last_hash"]
+
+    # second call same day -> skipped, no new nostr event
+    code2 = monitor._anchor(config, sess)
+    assert code2 == 0
+    assert len(published) == 1
@@ -1,16 +1,30 @@
-"""publisher tests — calendar, human gate, nostr publish, disabled adapters."""
+"""publisher tests — calendar, human gate (signed), nostr publish, gates."""

 from __future__ import annotations

-import os
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta

 import pytest

 from cayceops.components.publisher import adapters, nostr, publisher
 from cayceops.models import AuditEntry, ContentItem, ContentStatus

-# invented test key (never a real nostr key — allowlisted in .gitleaks.toml)
-TEST_KEY = "11" * 32
+# invented test keys (never real — allowlisted in .gitleaks.toml)
+TEST_KEY = "11" * 32  # nostr signing key
+OPERATOR_SECRET = bytes.fromhex("22" * 32)  # approval signing key
+
+
+def _sign(msg: bytes, secret: bytes = OPERATOR_SECRET) -> str:
+    from coincurve import PrivateKey
+
+    return PrivateKey(secret).sign_schnorr(msg, aux_randomness=b"\x00" * 32).hex()
+
+
+def _sign_content(item: ContentItem, deployment: str = "itest") -> str:
+    from cayceops.signing import approval_message, content_content_hash
+
+    chash = content_content_hash(item.channel, item.caption, item.link)
+    return _sign(approval_message("content", deployment, item.id, chash))


 def _item(channel="nostr", theme="atm-fees", scheduled=None, status=ContentStatus.APPROVED):
@@ -24,11 +38,23 @@ def _item(channel="nostr", theme="atm-fees", scheduled=None, status=ContentStatu
    )


+def _approved_item(cfg, sess, **kw) -> ContentItem:
+    """A content item properly approved with a signature (env set first)."""
+    cfg()  # sets the signing env before any approval
+    item = _item(status=ContentStatus.DRAFT, **kw)
+    sess.add(item)
+    sess.flush()
+    assert publisher._approve(item.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=_sign_content(item)) == 0
+    return item
+
+
 # --- nostr client -------------------------------------------------------------


 def test_event_build_verify_roundtrip():
-    event = nostr.build_event(bytes.fromhex(TEST_KEY), "gm", tags=[["t", "bitcoin"]], created_at=1700000000)
+    event = nostr.build_event(
+        bytes.fromhex(TEST_KEY), "gm", tags=[["t", "bitcoin"]], created_at=1700000000
+    )
    assert nostr.verify_event(event)
    assert len(event["id"]) == 64 and len(event["sig"]) == 128

@@ -63,10 +89,16 @@ def test_approve_gate(cfg, sess):
    item = _item(status=ContentStatus.DRAFT)
    sess.add(item)
    sess.flush()
+    cfg()  # signing env first

-    assert publisher._approve(item.id, "gustavo", sess) == 0
+    # unsigned approval refused (mandatory signature, no degraded mode)
+    assert publisher._approve(item.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=None) == 2
+    # signed approval accepted, FULL signature stored
+    sig = _sign_content(item)
+    assert publisher._approve(item.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=sig) == 0
    assert item.status is ContentStatus.APPROVED
-    assert publisher._approve(item.id, "gustavo", sess) == 1  # not draft anymore
+    assert item.operator_signature == sig and len(sig) == 128
+    assert publisher._approve(item.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=sig) == 1  # not draft anymore

    actor = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="approve_content").first().actor
    assert actor == "gustavo"
@@ -76,9 +108,7 @@ def test_approve_gate(cfg, sess):


 def test_publish_due_nostr_happy_path(cfg, sess):
-    item = _item()  # approved, scheduled None -> due now
-    sess.add(item)
-    sess.flush()
+    item = _approved_item(cfg, sess)

    relays_seen = []

@@ -101,21 +131,65 @@ def test_publish_due_nostr_happy_path(cfg, sess):


 def test_future_scheduled_item_not_published(cfg, sess):
-    from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
-
-    item = _item(scheduled=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(hours=2))
-    sess.add(item)
-    sess.flush()
-    config = cfg(CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY=TEST_KEY, CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS="wss://r.example.org")
-    stats = publisher._publish_due(config, sess, nostr_sender=lambda r, e, timeout=10: [])
+    item = _approved_item(
+        cfg, sess, scheduled=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(hours=2)
+    )
+    config = cfg(
+        CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY=TEST_KEY, CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS="wss://r.example.org"
+    )
+    stats = publisher._publish_due(
+        config, sess, nostr_sender=lambda r, e, timeout=10: []
+    )
    assert stats["published"] == 0
    assert item.status is ContentStatus.APPROVED


-def test_nostr_without_config_fails_clean(cfg, sess):
-    item = _item()
+def test_unsigned_sql_approved_item_not_published(cfg, sess):
+    """Round-2 required test: raw-SQL approved row (no signature) not published."""
+    config = cfg(
+        CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY=TEST_KEY, CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS="wss://r.example.org"
+    )
+    item = _item()  # status=APPROVED, no signature
    sess.add(item)
    sess.flush()
+    stats = publisher._publish_due(config, sess, nostr_sender=lambda r, e, timeout=10: [])
+    assert stats["published"] == 0 and stats["tampered"] == 1
+    assert item.status is ContentStatus.DRAFT  # reverted
+    refused = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="publish_refused").one()
+    assert refused.result == "error"
+
+
+def test_tampered_caption_refused_by_signature(cfg, sess):
+    """Round-2 required test: signature over other content refused at publish."""
+    item = _approved_item(cfg, sess)
+
+    item.caption = item.caption + " EDITED"  # content no longer matches sig
+    nostr_config = cfg(
+        CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY=TEST_KEY, CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS="wss://r.example.org"
+    )
+    stats = publisher._publish_due(
+        nostr_config, sess, nostr_sender=lambda r, e, timeout=10: []
+    )
+    assert stats["published"] == 0 and stats["tampered"] == 1
+    assert item.status is ContentStatus.DRAFT
+
+
+def test_foreign_deployment_signature_refused(cfg, sess, signer):
+    """Round-2 required test: a valid signature for another deployment_id is
+    refused at approval time."""
+    item = _item(status=ContentStatus.DRAFT)
+    sess.add(item)
+    sess.flush()
+    other_dep = signer.raw(
+        signer.msg("content", "other-deploy", item.id, signer.content_hash(item))
+    )
+    assert publisher._approve(item.id, "gustavo", sess, signature=other_dep) == 2
+    assert item.status is ContentStatus.DRAFT
+
+
+def test_nostr_without_config_fails_clean(cfg, sess):
+    """Signed item but no nostr credentials -> clean failure, item stays."""
+    item = _approved_item(cfg, sess)
    config = cfg()  # no key, no relays
    stats = publisher._publish_due(config, sess)
    assert stats["failed"] == 1
@@ -123,15 +197,16 @@ def test_nostr_without_config_fails_clean(cfg, sess):
    assert item.error and "nostr" in item.error


-def test_non_nostr_channels_skipped_by_default(cfg, sess):
-    item = _item(channel="facebook", theme="lightning-abroad")
-    sess.add(item)
-    sess.flush()
+def test_non_nostr_channels_skipped_terminal(cfg, sess):
+    item = _approved_item(cfg, sess, channel="facebook", theme="lightning-abroad")
    stats = publisher._publish_due(cfg(), sess)
    assert stats["skipped"] == 1
-    assert item.status is ContentStatus.APPROVED
-    skip = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="publish_skipped").one()
-    assert skip.detail["channel"] == "facebook"
+    assert item.status is ContentStatus.SKIPPED  # terminal (audit fix)
+
+    stats2 = publisher._publish_due(cfg(), sess)
+    assert stats2["skipped"] == 0  # never revisited
+    skips = sess.query(AuditEntry).filter_by(action="publish_skipped_terminal").count()
+    assert skips == 1


 def test_meta_adapters_disabled_by_default(cfg):
@@ -160,3 +235,29 @@ def test_unknown_brand_rejected():

    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
        images.render_brand_image(brand="xx", kicker=None, lines=["A"], out_path="/tmp/x.jpg")
+
+
+# --- round-2: attempts budget --------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_publish_attempts_bounded(cfg, sess, monkeypatch):
+    """Medium finding: nostr failures retried without limit."""
+    from cayceops.components.publisher import nostr as nostr_mod
+
+    config = cfg(
+        CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY=TEST_KEY,
+        CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_RELAYS="wss://r.example.org",
+        CAYCE_OPS_MAX_ATTEMPTS="1",
+    )
+    item = _approved_item(cfg, sess)
+
+    def always_fail(relays, event, timeout=10.0):
+        raise RuntimeError("relay down")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(nostr_mod, "publish", always_fail)
+    publisher._publish_due(config, sess, nostr_sender=always_fail)
+    assert item.attempts == 1
+    assert item.status is ContentStatus.SKIPPED  # budget exhausted -> terminal
+
+
+import os  # noqa: E402  (used by image test)
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def test_scan_files_proposals_with_kind_and_score(cfg, sess):
    affiliate = by_title["Acme launches affiliate program for hotels"]
    assert affiliate.kind == "affiliate"
    assert affiliate.status == ProposalStatus.PROPOSED
-    assert affiliate.risk_score > 0
+    assert affiliate.match_score > 0
    assert affiliate.dedupe_key

    partner = by_title["Become a payment partner"]
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
cayce	3bde785261	audit-7 + docs: plan systemd units, D13-D15 - cayce-ops-plan.service/.timer (daily): the @ template cannot express publisher plan, so it gets its own unit - DECISIONS: D13 no non-human approvals; D14 signatures bind content + deployment; D15 negation veto classifier	2026-10-20 02:21:36 +00:00
cayce	c855f01da5	audit-6: CI runs migrations + integration against Postgres 16 ci.yml gains a postgres:16 service; alembic upgrade/downgrade/upgrade round-trip runs on PG, unit tests run -m "not integration", and the roles.sql integration suite runs with a postgresql-client install. (Gate executed locally against Postgres 18.6 — see PR description.)	2026-10-20 02:21:36 +00:00
cayce	56b35d3a63	audit-5: CLI send path uses the tested code, failures audited, non-zero exit Note: the send-path refactor (send_approved CLI -> _send_approved with factory, send_failed audits in their own transaction, DaemonRun record, non-zero exit on any failure class) landed within the audit-1 commit — maild.py was staged whole. This empty commit marks the point in the review trail; the behavior is covered by test_send_failures_audited_and_ exit_code.	2026-10-20 02:21:36 +00:00
cayce	ffe425320d	audit-4: serialized audit chain + legacy genesis + daily Nostr anchoring - audit() writes are serialized: pg_advisory_xact_lock on Postgres; in-process RLock held until session commit/rollback on SQLite (test: 4 concurrent writers x 25 entries -> chain verifies, 100 rows) - legacy rows (entry_hash NULL, pre-0002) are skipped: the chain begins GENESIS at the first hashed row; migrated DBs verify clean by design - monitor anchor: publishes the last chain hash as a signed NIP-01 note once per day, logs it in the audit log (self-verified before publish) tests: concurrent writers; legacy-genesis verification; anchor signs, logs once per day.	2026-10-20 02:20:56 +00:00
cayce	d77409148c	audit-3 (critical 1 deploy half): roles.sql rewritten + PG integration test - one least-privilege role per daemon; cayce_approver is the ONLY writer of status=APPROVED / operator_signature / approved columns - per-table BEFORE triggers reject approval writes from daemon roles - no literal passwords: refuses to run without the six -v password vars (psql exits 3 via missing-table SELECT guard) - idempotent: revokes + drops trigger/function before recreating - tests/integration/test_pg_roles.py: applies roles.sql via psql -v, runs a full cycle per daemon role (propose -> approve -> execute; compose -> approve -> send; plan -> approve -> publish; anchor) and asserts the denials; runs the alembic upgrade->downgrade->upgrade round-trip on Postgres (point 6). Skips cleanly without a reachable PG.	2026-10-20 02:20:26 +00:00
cayce	903c591a06	audit-2 (critical 4): approval-veto classifier — any negation vetoes approval Replaces per-pattern negation lists: if ANY negation token (not, no, never, cannot, cannot, will not, has not, is not, no longer, unable, decline, regret, unfortunately) appears anywhere in the mail, an approval classification downgrades to needs_review. Approval requires a mail with zero negations. The LLM prompt braces stay escaped (round-1 fix retained). tests: the six mandated sentences all classify non-approval.	2026-10-20 02:20:26 +00:00
cayce	40453aadb4	audit-1 (critical 1): mandatory operator signatures bound to content+deployment - signing module: canonical content hashes + approval_message sha256(cayce-ops:<type>:<deployment_id>:<id>:<content_hash>) - approve/approve-draft/publisher-approve REQUIRE signature; without CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY+DEPLOYMENT_ID the daemons refuse to execute/send/publish (no degraded mode) - run-time re-verification at execute/send/publish: unsigned rows (raw SQL approval) or edited content revert to pre-approval state, audited as error - FULL signatures stored on rows (operator_signature, migration 0003) and in audit detail — never truncated - signature failures audited from CLI wrappers too (1f) - AUTONOMOUS_MODE approval path removed (D13): no non-human approvals tests: SQL-approved row refused at execute/send/publish; to_addr change blocks send; foreign deployment/content signatures refused; full-signature persistence. 65 tests green.	2026-10-20 02:20:09 +00:00
cayce	61d5cfd67d	audit: response section — all findings addressed at `c9bd441` ci / lint-test-leaks (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-10-19 23:07:17 +00:00
cayce	c9bd4411e8	Merge PR #9 : audit fixes — criticals 1-5 + mediums (56 tests, gate green) ci / lint-test-leaks (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-10-19 23:06:30 +00:00
cayce	90e6cfcc19	fix: address external audit — criticals 1-5 + mediums Critical 1 (approval forgery): audit_log is now hash-chained (prev_hash/entry_hash, verify_audit_chain); executor approve REQUIRES a BIP-340 signature over sha256(cayce-ops:approve:<id>) when CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY is set; deploy/roles.sql ships least-privilege per-daemon DB roles. Critical 2 (threading dead): sends create real OUTBOUND rows (own Message-ID, In-Reply-To -> inbound); inbound message_id never overwritten; maild compose adds the first-contact path; _match_proposal falls back to inbound chains. Critical 3 (duplicate sends): per-message transactions in send path — SMTP failure on message N no longer resurrects 1..N-1; failures audited (send_failed) and the row stays queued. Critical 4 (classifier): negated approvals (cannot accept / not approved / not accepting) classify REJECTION at 0.95 before the bare-keyword rule; LLM prompt braces escaped (.format no longer KeyError into silent fallback). Critical 5 (systemd): every daemon has a run subcommand (maild run = poll+send, publisher run = publish-due, monitor run = build); deploy README documents the separate daily publisher plan timer. Mediums: approved_hash binds drafts/captions to the approved text (edited text refuses to send/publish until re-approved); risk_score renamed match_score (migration 0002) and auto-approve orders HIGHEST relevance first; compose binds postgres to 127.0.0.1; IMAP marks \\Seen only after commit (fetch returns (num, raw), mark post-commit); disabled channels are terminal (ContentStatus.SKIPPED) and publish failures burn a bounded attempt budget before abandonment; make hooks installs the pre-push gate. tests: 12 new — 56 total, all green; ruff 0 findings; gitleaks clean.	2026-10-19 23:06:29 +00:00
cayce	2da5f3ff24	Merge PR #8 : audit update — audited commit pinned, gap disclosed ci / lint-test-leaks (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-10-19 22:04:35 +00:00
cayce	2423cd10b8	audit: pin audited commit `d500d88` + disclose lint-gate gap and fix ci / lint-test-leaks (pull_request) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-10-19 22:04:34 +00:00
cayce	d500d88870	Merge PR #7 : lint-fix — make check fully green (E501/F841/F821/E731) ci / lint-test-leaks (push) Canceled after 0s Details Closes the gate gap flagged during final verification: prior per-branch runs read ruff tail lines incorrectly. This commit is the audited one.	2026-10-19 22:03:55 +00:00
cayce	a282aedb94	lint: wrap long lines (E501), fix F841/F821/E731 — make check fully green All 32 findings resolved: regex literals kept single-line with noqa (pattern IS the reviewed artifact), HTML rows string-concatenated for line length, walrus tuple in BIP-340 verify split into named generator, unused pytest import dropped. No behavior changes; 44/44 tests pass. Full-gate discipline restored: ruff exit 0.	2026-10-19 22:03:53 +00:00
cayce	abbaf7e4e2	Merge PR #6 : audit — AUDIT.md for operator review ci / lint-test-leaks (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-10-19 21:58:47 +00:00
cayce	6d77b3eff6	audit: AUDIT.md for operator review ci / lint-test-leaks (pull_request) Canceled after 0s Details Component map + data flow, every external call (where/what/trigger), human-gate vs AUTONOMOUS_MODE matrix, env+permissions per component, pinned deps with purpose, known risks (8, each with mitigation), test+stack instructions. Audited-commit hash lands in the issue.	2026-10-19 21:58:46 +00:00
cayce	3f07362b7a	Merge PR #5 : monitor ci / lint-test-leaks (push) Canceled after 0s Details Static status page with privacy assertions and full escaping. 44 tests green.	2026-10-19 21:57:32 +00:00