cayce
90e6cfcc19
Critical 1 (approval forgery): audit_log is now hash-chained (prev_hash/entry_hash, verify_audit_chain); executor approve REQUIRES a BIP-340 signature over sha256(cayce-ops:approve:<id>) when CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY is set; deploy/roles.sql ships least-privilege per-daemon DB roles. Critical 2 (threading dead): sends create real OUTBOUND rows (own Message-ID, In-Reply-To -> inbound); inbound message_id never overwritten; maild compose adds the first-contact path; _match_proposal falls back to inbound chains. Critical 3 (duplicate sends): per-message transactions in send path — SMTP failure on message N no longer resurrects 1..N-1; failures audited (send_failed) and the row stays queued. Critical 4 (classifier): negated approvals (cannot accept / not approved / not accepting) classify REJECTION at 0.95 before the bare-keyword rule; LLM prompt braces escaped (.format no longer KeyError into silent fallback). Critical 5 (systemd): every daemon has a run subcommand (maild run = poll+send, publisher run = publish-due, monitor run = build); deploy README documents the separate daily publisher plan timer. Mediums: approved_hash binds drafts/captions to the approved text (edited text refuses to send/publish until re-approved); risk_score renamed match_score (migration 0002) and auto-approve orders HIGHEST relevance first; compose binds postgres to 127.0.0.1; IMAP marks \\Seen only after commit (fetch returns (num, raw), mark post-commit); disabled channels are terminal (ContentStatus.SKIPPED) and publish failures burn a bounded attempt budget before abandonment; make hooks installs the pre-push gate. tests: 12 new — 56 total, all green; ruff 0 findings; gitleaks clean.
Cayce is an agent-operated project run by Gustavo.
Cayce Ops is the autonomous operations stack behind Cayce — an agent that runs bitcoinhotels.org (Bitcoin-native travel guides) and hardcap.news (Bitcoin security intelligence).
Five decoupled components share one Postgres database. Each is a CLI command, driven by cron/systemd timers. Nothing runs without an audit trail.
| Component | What it does | Human gate |
|---|---|---|
| scanner | Discovers opportunities (affiliates, partnerships, content gaps) from configured sources; files them as proposals |
none — it only proposes |
| executor | Runs approved proposals through registered action plugins; full audit of who approved, what ran, what happened |
approval required (AUTONOMOUS_MODE=false by default) |
| mail-negotiator | Classifies merchant replies (approval / rejection / question / other) over IMAP; drafts replies; SMTP sends only human-approved drafts | draft approval required |
| publisher | Themed content calendar. Nostr (NIP-01) adapter first; Facebook/Instagram adapters exist but are disabled by default; brand images via Pillow templates | publish requires approved items |
| monitor | Static status page: daemon health, last runs, proposal queue, recent errors. No sensitive data | none — read-only |
State machines:
proposal: proposed -> approved -> running -> done | failed
mail: inbound classified; draft: none -> drafted -> approved -> sent
content: draft -> approved -> published
Quickstart (local)
uv sync --frozen # installs Python 3.12 + locked deps
cp .env.example .env # fill in; values are placeholders
docker compose up -d db # Postgres 16
uv run alembic upgrade head
uv run cayceops scanner run
uv run pytest
docker compose up (everything) runs all five daemons in loops; on a VPS use
deploy/systemd instead.
Layout
cayceops/ the package
config.py env-var config (CAYCE_OPS_*), no config files
db.py engine/session/upgrade helpers
models.py ORM schema + state machines + audit helper
llm.py provider-agnostic LLM interface (null by default)
components/
scanner/ discovery -> proposals (never executes)
executor/ plugin execution + audit
maild/ IMAP classify, drafts, SMTP gated on approval
publisher/ calendar, nostr adapter, image templates
monitor/ static status page builder
alembic/ migrations (production schema path)
tests/ pytest suite (invented fixtures only)
deploy/systemd/ VPS units + timers
docs/DECISIONS.md architectural decisions and their costs
Security posture
- Config exclusively via env vars;
.envis gitignored,.env.exampleholds placeholders. make check(and CI): ruff, pytest, alembic smoke, gitleaks over the full history.- SMTP send, social publish, and proposal execution all require a human action
recorded in the audit log — unless
AUTONOMOUS_MODE=true, which enables one narrow, capped, audited exception (see docs/DECISIONS.md D5).
License
MIT — see LICENSE.