Files
cayce-ops/cayceops/components/publisher/nostr.py
T
cayce a282aedb94 lint: wrap long lines (E501), fix F841/F821/E731 — make check fully green
All 32 findings resolved: regex literals kept single-line with noqa
(pattern IS the reviewed artifact), HTML rows string-concatenated for
line length, walrus tuple in BIP-340 verify split into named generator,
unused pytest import dropped. No behavior changes; 44/44 tests pass.
Full-gate discipline restored: ruff exit 0.
2026-10-19 22:03:53 +00:00

177 lines
6.3 KiB
Python

"""Minimal Nostr client: NIP-01 kind-1 notes (build, sign, verify, publish).
Implemented in-repo (DECISIONS D4) so every byte of the signing path is
auditable: event id = sha256 of the canonical NIP-01 serialization; signature =
BIP-340 Schnorr over the id. Keys are 32-byte hex. Relays are plain env config.
Publishing is fire-and-wait: open a websocket per relay, send the EVENT, wait
for the OK frame (or timeout), and return the per-relay results.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
from typing import Any
from coincurve import PrivateKey, PublicKey
KIND_NOTE = 1
def normalize_key(private_key_hex: str) -> bytes:
"""Accept 64-char hex (with or without 0x). Anything else is a config error."""
key = private_key_hex.strip().lower().removeprefix("0x")
if len(key) != 64 or not all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in key):
raise ValueError("CAYCE_OPS_NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY must be 64-char hex (32 bytes)")
return bytes.fromhex(key)
def pubkey_from_secret(secret: bytes) -> str:
return PublicKey.from_secret(secret).format().hex()[2:]
def build_event(
secret: bytes,
content: str,
tags: list[list[str]] | None = None,
created_at: int | None = None,
kind: int = KIND_NOTE,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build and sign a NIP-01 event. Deterministic given the same inputs."""
created_at = int(created_at if created_at is not None else __import__("time").time())
pubkey = pubkey_from_secret(secret)
serialized = json.dumps(
[0, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags or [], content],
separators=(",", ":"), # canonical NIP-01 form
ensure_ascii=False,
)
event_id = hashlib.sha256(serialized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
# zero aux randomness -> fully deterministic signatures (BIP-340 permits it;
# verification is unaffected either way)
signature = (
PrivateKey(secret)
.sign_schnorr(bytes.fromhex(event_id), aux_randomness=b"\x00" * 32)
.hex()
)
return {
"pubkey": pubkey,
"created_at": created_at,
"kind": kind,
"tags": tags or [],
"content": content,
"id": event_id,
"sig": signature,
}
def _schnorr_verify(sig32: bytes, msg32: bytes, xonly_pub32: bytes) -> bool:
"""BIP-340 reference verification (pure Python, public domain spec code).
Signing runs in coincurve (libsecp256k1); verification is pure Python so
the auditor can read every step without CFFI indirection.
"""
P = 2**256 - 2**32 - 977
N = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141
def tag_hash(tag: str, msg: bytes) -> bytes:
t = hashlib.sha256(tag.encode()).digest()
return hashlib.sha256(t + t + msg).digest()
def lift_x(b: int):
if b >= P:
return None
y_sq = (pow(b, 3, P) + 7) % P
y = pow(y_sq, (P + 1) // 4, P)
if pow(y, 2, P) != y_sq:
return None
return (b, y if y % 2 == 0 else P - y)
def point_add(p1, p2):
if p1 is None:
return p2
if p2 is None:
return p1
if p1[0] == p2[0] and p1[1] != p2[1]:
return None
if p1 == p2:
lam = (3 * p1[0] * p1[0] * pow(2 * p1[1], P - 2, P)) % P
else:
lam = ((p2[1] - p1[1]) * pow(p2[0] - p1[0], P - 2, P)) % P
x3 = (lam * lam - p1[0] - p2[0]) % P
return (x3, (lam * (p1[0] - x3) - p1[1]) % P)
def point_mul(p, scalar):
acc = None
for i in range(256):
if (scalar >> i) & 1:
acc = point_add(acc, p)
p = point_add(p, p)
return acc
if len(sig32) != 64 or len(msg32) != 32 or len(xonly_pub32) != 32:
return False
r = int.from_bytes(sig32[:32], "big")
s = int.from_bytes(sig32[32:], "big")
if not (0 <= r < P and 0 <= s < N):
return False
pub_point = lift_x(int.from_bytes(xonly_pub32, "big"))
if pub_point is None:
return False
e = int.from_bytes(tag_hash("BIP0340/challenge", sig32[:32] + xonly_pub32 + msg32), "big") % N
generator = (
0x79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798, # Gx
0x483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8, # Gy
)
r_point = point_add(
point_mul(generator, s),
point_mul(pub_point, (N - e) % N),
)
if r_point is None or r_point[1] % 2 != 0:
return False
return r_point[0] == r
def verify_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""Recompute the id and verify the Schnorr signature against the pubkey."""
serialized = json.dumps(
[0, event["pubkey"], event["created_at"], event["kind"], event["tags"], event["content"]],
separators=(",", ":"),
ensure_ascii=False,
)
if hashlib.sha256(serialized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest() != event["id"]:
return False
# 33-byte compressed point (02-prefixed x-only)
compressed = PublicKey(bytes.fromhex("02" + event["pubkey"])).format()
return _schnorr_verify(
bytes.fromhex(event["sig"]), bytes.fromhex(event["id"]), compressed[1:]
)
def relay_publish(relay_url: str, event: dict[str, Any], timeout: float = 10.0) -> str:
"""Publish one event to one relay; return the relay's OK message."""
from websockets.sync.client import connect
with connect(relay_url, close_timeout=timeout) as ws:
ws.send(json.dumps(["EVENT", event]))
reply = json.loads(ws.recv(timeout=timeout))
if not (isinstance(reply, list) and len(reply) >= 3 and reply[0] == "OK" and reply[2] is True):
raise RuntimeError(f"relay {relay_url} rejected event: {str(reply)[:200]}")
return str(reply[1])
def publish(
relays: list[str], event: dict[str, Any], timeout: float = 10.0
) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
"""Publish to every relay; report per-relay outcome (never raises unless all fail)."""
results = []
for relay in relays:
try:
relay_publish(relay, event, timeout)
results.append({"relay": relay, "ok": "true"})
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — per-relay isolation
results.append({"relay": relay, "ok": "false", "error": str(exc)[:200]})
if relays and all(r["ok"] == "false" for r in results):
raise RuntimeError(f"all relays failed: {results}")
return results