# Architectural decisions

Each entry: decision, why, and what it costs us. Newest last.

## D1 — uv + uv.lock as the lockfile
`uv` manages the pinned interpreter (3.12) and produces `uv.lock`. CI installs
with `uv sync --frozen`; nothing runs against unpinned trees.
*Cost:* contributors need uv (single static binary).

## D2 — Tests on SQLite; migrations authoritative for Postgres
Tests run on file-backed SQLite via `metadata.create_all` (fast, no service
dependency). The Alembic chain is the production schema path; `make
migrate-check` (CI job) smoke-runs `alembic upgrade head` on SQLite.
*Cost:* Postgres-specific features (e.g. JSONB, partial indexes) stay unused —
the schema uses portable `sa.JSON` instead.

## D3 — LLM behind an in-repo provider interface; null by default
`cayceops.llm.LLMProvider` is the only seam. `null` provider raises — components
fall back to deterministic rules. `openai-compat` uses stdlib `urllib` against
any OpenAI-shaped endpoint; no SDK dependency.
*Cost:* no retries/streaming/tool-calls — acceptable for classification and
draft drafting. Add providers by implementing `complete()`.

## D4 — Nostr client implemented in-repo (coincurve + websockets)
NIP-01 event build/sign/publish is ~150 auditable lines vs. a black-box SDK.
Keys accepted as 32-byte hex only. Relays are plain env config; publish is
fire-and-wait with a timeout; the event id is stored as `post_ref`.
*Cost:* no NIP-05, no retries across relay pools — fine for kind-1 notes.

## D5 — AUTONOMOUS_MODE semantics (the only non-human approval path)
Default **false**: only human-approved proposals execute, only
human-approved drafts are sendable/publishable.
**true** adds exactly one capability: the executor may auto-approve
`proposed` items whose `kind` is in `CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_KINDS`, up to
`CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_DAILY_CAP` per day, recording actor `auto:policy` in the
audit log. Everything else still requires a human. Auto-approval never touches
mail drafts or content items.
*Cost:* two code paths; both audited; the autonomous one is off by default and
cap-bounded.

## D6 — CI workflow files ship now; enforcement gate is `make check` until a runner exists
`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` (Gitea Actions) and `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
(identical) run ruff, alembic smoke, pytest, gitleaks on every PR/push. The
current host runs no Gitea Actions runner, so until one is provisioned the
same gate is enforced locally: `scripts/pre-push` runs `make check` (lint +
tests + migration smoke + full-history secret scan) before every push, and the
audited commit hash in `AUDIT.md` is the one that passed it.
*Cost:* CI results are deferred on the current host; the gate itself is
identical to CI.

## D7 — gitleaks allowlist for test fixtures
`tests/` contains invented data (fake Nostr key, fake merchant mail). It is
allowlisted in `.gitleaks.toml` so the history scan stays signal-only.
*Cost:* a real secret committed under `tests/` would not trip the scanner —
compensating control: fixtures are reviewed in PRs, and no fixture ever reads
the environment.

## D8 — Proposal history kept when retiring the grant text
The repo began as a grant proposal; the retirement commit replaces it with the
project README (no grant references in the tree). The old commits stay — the
audit story ("this started as X, the operator mandated Y, here is the diff") is
more honest than a rewritten birth.
*Cost:* `git log` still shows the word "OpenSats" in old messages. The tree and
README carry none.

## D9 — Executor plugins are in-process registrations
An action plugin is a Python function registered in
`cayceops.components.executor.plugins.REGISTRY`, mapped by proposal `kind`.
`http_post` exists but is inert unless `CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_HTTP_ACTIONS=true`.
*Cost:* no sandboxing of plugins — plugins are repo code, reviewed like
everything else.