Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
cayce f5b026070b audit-4: classifier understands Spanish negations (veto unchanged)
ci / lint-test-leaks (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Merchants write in Spanish; negations like nunca, lamentablemente or
no podemos must veto approval exactly like their English counterparts.
Previously an all-Spanish rejection mail could fall through to OTHER,
and a mixed mail with the approval word in English approved despite a
Spanish negation.

- negation list adds: nunca, jamas, tampoco, ningun/ninguna, nadie,
  nada, no podemos, no es posible, no aceptamos, rechaz*, descartad*,
  lamentablemente, no ha sido aprobad*, no procede
- new Spanish REJECTION rule (rechaz*, solicitud denegada, no cumple
  los requisitos) and Spanish APPROVAL rule (aprob*, aceptad*,
  bienvenid*, encantados de trabajar)
- veto rule unchanged: any negation anywhere -> needs_review
- tests: 15 new (12 veto cases incl. 2 mixed-language, pure-Spanish
  approval still approves, Spanish rejection classifies rejection)

Gate: ruff 0 · 96 unit + 1 PG integration · gitleaks clean.
2026-10-28 19:59:44 +00:00
cayce 0d24309433 audit-D16: operator key must never be an agent identity
ci / lint-test-leaks (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Background: CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY was set to Cayce nostr pubkey —
Cayce was approving itself. Signature was technically valid but semantically
null: human approval signed by the agent is not human approval.

- signing.py: validate_no_self_approval() rejects the operator pubkey when
  it matches (a) the pubkey derived from any private key in the config,
  or (b) any pubkey in CAYCE_OPS_FORBIDDEN_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS deny-list.
- executor/maild/publisher _signing() now calls the validation, so every
  daemon and every CLI approve-* path refuses to operate (D16).
- tests: 6 new (agent-key refusal, human key passes, empty passes,
  explicit denylist, end-to-end daemon refusal, derivation roundtrip).
- docs/DECISIONS.md: D16.

The operator signature is now produced OUTSIDE the VPS. CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY
must stay empty until the external signer exists — daemons refuse, which is
correct. The Cayce nsec itself is NOT touched (still the agent identity for
publishing and anchoring).
2026-10-28 19:51:04 +00:00
cayce 903c591a06 audit-2 (critical 4): approval-veto classifier — any negation vetoes approval
Replaces per-pattern negation lists: if ANY negation token (not, no, never,
cannot, cannot, will not, has not, is not, no longer, unable, decline,
regret, unfortunately) appears anywhere in the mail, an approval
classification downgrades to needs_review. Approval requires a mail with
zero negations. The LLM prompt braces stay escaped (round-1 fix retained).

tests: the six mandated sentences all classify non-approval.
2026-10-20 02:20:26 +00:00
cayce 40453aadb4 audit-1 (critical 1): mandatory operator signatures bound to content+deployment
- signing module: canonical content hashes + approval_message
  sha256(cayce-ops:<type>:<deployment_id>:<id>:<content_hash>)
- approve/approve-draft/publisher-approve REQUIRE signature; without
  CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY+DEPLOYMENT_ID the daemons refuse to
  execute/send/publish (no degraded mode)
- run-time re-verification at execute/send/publish: unsigned rows (raw SQL
  approval) or edited content revert to pre-approval state, audited as error
- FULL signatures stored on rows (operator_signature, migration 0003) and
  in audit detail — never truncated
- signature failures audited from CLI wrappers too (1f)
- AUTONOMOUS_MODE approval path removed (D13): no non-human approvals

tests: SQL-approved row refused at execute/send/publish; to_addr change
blocks send; foreign deployment/content signatures refused; full-signature
persistence. 65 tests green.
2026-10-20 02:20:09 +00:00
cayce 90e6cfcc19 fix: address external audit — criticals 1-5 + mediums
Critical 1 (approval forgery): audit_log is now hash-chained
(prev_hash/entry_hash, verify_audit_chain); executor approve REQUIRES a
BIP-340 signature over sha256(cayce-ops:approve:<id>) when
CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY is set; deploy/roles.sql ships least-privilege
per-daemon DB roles.

Critical 2 (threading dead): sends create real OUTBOUND rows (own
Message-ID, In-Reply-To -> inbound); inbound message_id never overwritten;
maild compose adds the first-contact path; _match_proposal falls back to
inbound chains.

Critical 3 (duplicate sends): per-message transactions in send path —
SMTP failure on message N no longer resurrects 1..N-1; failures audited
(send_failed) and the row stays queued.

Critical 4 (classifier): negated approvals (cannot accept / not approved /
not accepting) classify REJECTION at 0.95 before the bare-keyword rule;
LLM prompt braces escaped (.format no longer KeyError into silent fallback).

Critical 5 (systemd): every daemon has a run subcommand
(maild run = poll+send, publisher run = publish-due, monitor run = build);
deploy README documents the separate daily publisher plan timer.

Mediums: approved_hash binds drafts/captions to the approved text (edited
text refuses to send/publish until re-approved); risk_score renamed
match_score (migration 0002) and auto-approve orders HIGHEST relevance
first; compose binds postgres to 127.0.0.1; IMAP marks \\Seen only after
commit (fetch returns (num, raw), mark post-commit); disabled channels are
terminal (ContentStatus.SKIPPED) and publish failures burn a bounded
attempt budget before abandonment; make hooks installs the pre-push gate.

tests: 12 new — 56 total, all green; ruff 0 findings; gitleaks clean.
2026-10-19 23:06:29 +00:00
cayce a282aedb94 lint: wrap long lines (E501), fix F841/F821/E731 — make check fully green
All 32 findings resolved: regex literals kept single-line with noqa
(pattern IS the reviewed artifact), HTML rows string-concatenated for
line length, walrus tuple in BIP-340 verify split into named generator,
unused pytest import dropped. No behavior changes; 44/44 tests pass.
Full-gate discipline restored: ruff exit 0.
2026-10-19 22:03:53 +00:00
cayce 5b259bc663 mail-negotiator: classify merchant replies, draft gated, audited sends
ci / lint-test-leaks (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
- IMAP poll (UNSEEN, stdlib imaplib) -> parse (bare address via email.utils)
- threading: In-Reply-To -> outbound sent-draft message-id -> proposal
- classify: deterministic rules; optional LLM behind provider interface;
  below-threshold confidence -> needs_review (never guessed)
- unthreadable approvals flagged needs_review (suspicious by definition)
- merchant_status recorded on proposal detail; proposal lifecycle untouched
- reply drafts generated from templates (drafted), NEVER auto-sent
- SMTP sends only draft_status=approved (human approve_draft, audited);
  sent drafts store their Message-ID for future threading
- idempotent on Message-ID; DaemonRun wrapper for monitor

tests: 9 new (classification rules, threshold->review, threading, idempotence,
blocked send without approval, approve->send->audit chain, double approve)
— 29 total passing
2026-10-19 21:47:18 +00:00