4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
cayce	0d24309433	audit-D16: operator key must never be an agent identity ... Background: CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY was set to Cayce nostr pubkey — Cayce was approving itself. Signature was technically valid but semantically null: human approval signed by the agent is not human approval. - signing.py: validate_no_self_approval() rejects the operator pubkey when it matches (a) the pubkey derived from any private key in the config, or (b) any pubkey in CAYCE_OPS_FORBIDDEN_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS deny-list. - executor/maild/publisher _signing() now calls the validation, so every daemon and every CLI approve-* path refuses to operate (D16). - tests: 6 new (agent-key refusal, human key passes, empty passes, explicit denylist, end-to-end daemon refusal, derivation roundtrip). - docs/DECISIONS.md: D16. The operator signature is now produced OUTSIDE the VPS. CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY must stay empty until the external signer exists — daemons refuse, which is correct. The Cayce nsec itself is NOT touched (still the agent identity for publishing and anchoring).	2026-10-28 19:51:04 +00:00
cayce	3bde785261	audit-7 + docs: plan systemd units, D13-D15 ... - cayce-ops-plan.service/.timer (daily): the @ template cannot express publisher plan, so it gets its own unit - DECISIONS: D13 no non-human approvals; D14 signatures bind content + deployment; D15 negation veto classifier	2026-10-20 02:21:36 +00:00
cayce	90e6cfcc19	fix: address external audit — criticals 1-5 + mediums ... Critical 1 (approval forgery): audit_log is now hash-chained (prev_hash/entry_hash, verify_audit_chain); executor approve REQUIRES a BIP-340 signature over sha256(cayce-ops:approve:<id>) when CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY is set; deploy/roles.sql ships least-privilege per-daemon DB roles. Critical 2 (threading dead): sends create real OUTBOUND rows (own Message-ID, In-Reply-To -> inbound); inbound message_id never overwritten; maild compose adds the first-contact path; _match_proposal falls back to inbound chains. Critical 3 (duplicate sends): per-message transactions in send path — SMTP failure on message N no longer resurrects 1..N-1; failures audited (send_failed) and the row stays queued. Critical 4 (classifier): negated approvals (cannot accept / not approved / not accepting) classify REJECTION at 0.95 before the bare-keyword rule; LLM prompt braces escaped (.format no longer KeyError into silent fallback). Critical 5 (systemd): every daemon has a run subcommand (maild run = poll+send, publisher run = publish-due, monitor run = build); deploy README documents the separate daily publisher plan timer. Mediums: approved_hash binds drafts/captions to the approved text (edited text refuses to send/publish until re-approved); risk_score renamed match_score (migration 0002) and auto-approve orders HIGHEST relevance first; compose binds postgres to 127.0.0.1; IMAP marks \\Seen only after commit (fetch returns (num, raw), mark post-commit); disabled channels are terminal (ContentStatus.SKIPPED) and publish failures burn a bounded attempt budget before abandonment; make hooks installs the pre-push gate. tests: 12 new — 56 total, all green; ruff 0 findings; gitleaks clean.	2026-10-19 23:06:29 +00:00
cayce	34a5f331ac	skeleton: package, schema, config, CLI, alembic, CI, deploy, docs ... - cayceops core: env-only config (CAYCE_OPS_*), engine/session, ORM models with state machines (proposal/mail/content) and audited writes - provider-agnostic LLM interface (null provider default, stdlib openai-compat) - Typer CLI with lazy component loading (scanner/executor/maild/publisher/monitor) - alembic 0001 initial schema; sqlite-portable JSON columns - tests: 7 passing on throwaway sqlite; fixtures invented, never real data - ci: ruff + alembic smoke + pytest + gitleaks(full history) in .gitea/workflows + .github/workflows; local gate = make check - deploy: docker-compose (postgres 16) + hardened systemd units/timers - docs: DECISIONS D1-D9; README project (grant text retired)	2026-10-19 21:35:50 +00:00