cayce/cayce-ops
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4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
cayce a2de419467 identity: Próspera agentic-companies pilot framing — no personal names 
- README: the stack belongs to Cayce, an autonomous entity operating under
  the Próspera ZEDE agentic-companies jurisdiction pilot; the experiment is
  managed by Cayce itself
- tests: approver actor renamed to the generic label operator
- zero occurrences of personal names in the tree (verified with grep)
 2026-10-20 02:29:54 +00:00
cayce 40453aadb4 audit-1 (critical 1): mandatory operator signatures bound to content+deployment 
- signing module: canonical content hashes + approval_message
  sha256(cayce-ops:<type>:<deployment_id>:<id>:<content_hash>)
- approve/approve-draft/publisher-approve REQUIRE signature; without
  CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY+DEPLOYMENT_ID the daemons refuse to
  execute/send/publish (no degraded mode)
- run-time re-verification at execute/send/publish: unsigned rows (raw SQL
  approval) or edited content revert to pre-approval state, audited as error
- FULL signatures stored on rows (operator_signature, migration 0003) and
  in audit detail — never truncated
- signature failures audited from CLI wrappers too (1f)
- AUTONOMOUS_MODE approval path removed (D13): no non-human approvals

tests: SQL-approved row refused at execute/send/publish; to_addr change
blocks send; foreign deployment/content signatures refused; full-signature
persistence. 65 tests green.
 2026-10-20 02:20:09 +00:00
cayce 90e6cfcc19 fix: address external audit — criticals 1-5 + mediums 
Critical 1 (approval forgery): audit_log is now hash-chained
(prev_hash/entry_hash, verify_audit_chain); executor approve REQUIRES a
BIP-340 signature over sha256(cayce-ops:approve:<id>) when
CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY is set; deploy/roles.sql ships least-privilege
per-daemon DB roles.

Critical 2 (threading dead): sends create real OUTBOUND rows (own
Message-ID, In-Reply-To -> inbound); inbound message_id never overwritten;
maild compose adds the first-contact path; _match_proposal falls back to
inbound chains.

Critical 3 (duplicate sends): per-message transactions in send path —
SMTP failure on message N no longer resurrects 1..N-1; failures audited
(send_failed) and the row stays queued.

Critical 4 (classifier): negated approvals (cannot accept / not approved /
not accepting) classify REJECTION at 0.95 before the bare-keyword rule;
LLM prompt braces escaped (.format no longer KeyError into silent fallback).

Critical 5 (systemd): every daemon has a run subcommand
(maild run = poll+send, publisher run = publish-due, monitor run = build);
deploy README documents the separate daily publisher plan timer.

Mediums: approved_hash binds drafts/captions to the approved text (edited
text refuses to send/publish until re-approved); risk_score renamed
match_score (migration 0002) and auto-approve orders HIGHEST relevance
first; compose binds postgres to 127.0.0.1; IMAP marks \\Seen only after
commit (fetch returns (num, raw), mark post-commit); disabled channels are
terminal (ContentStatus.SKIPPED) and publish failures burn a bounded
attempt budget before abandonment; make hooks installs the pre-push gate.

tests: 12 new — 56 total, all green; ruff 0 findings; gitleaks clean.
 2026-10-19 23:06:29 +00:00
cayce 73ccdf7bdf scanner + executor: discovery files proposals; execution gated on approval
ci / lint-test-leaks (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Details 
scanner (read-only):
- sources from CAYCE_OPS_SCANNER_SOURCES JSON (rss + page types), stdlib only
- keyword scoring -> risk_score; kind via heuristics (affiliate/partnership/content_gap)
- idempotent: sha1 dedupe_key; repeated scans skip existing
- every proposal audited (actor daemon:scanner); source errors recorded, never fatal

executor (human gate):
- approve/reject audited with operator identity; only proposed -> approved
- AUTONOMOUS_MODE=true adds exactly one path: policy auto-approval
  (kinds allowlist + daily cap, actor auto:policy) — DECISIONS D5
- plugin registry by kind; unknown kinds fall back to log_action (D9)
- retries with max_attempts, then failed; every transition audited
- http_post plugin inert unless CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_HTTP_ACTIONS=true

tests: 13 new (dedupe, keyword filter, autonomy bounds, retry-then-fail,
blocked http_post, fallback plugin) — 20 total passing
 2026-10-19 21:42:34 +00:00