cayce/cayce-ops
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decouple-operator-key
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4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
cayce 903c591a06 audit-2 (critical 4): approval-veto classifier — any negation vetoes approval 
Replaces per-pattern negation lists: if ANY negation token (not, no, never,
cannot, cannot, will not, has not, is not, no longer, unable, decline,
regret, unfortunately) appears anywhere in the mail, an approval
classification downgrades to needs_review. Approval requires a mail with
zero negations. The LLM prompt braces stay escaped (round-1 fix retained).

tests: the six mandated sentences all classify non-approval.
 2026-10-20 02:20:26 +00:00
cayce 90e6cfcc19 fix: address external audit — criticals 1-5 + mediums 
Critical 1 (approval forgery): audit_log is now hash-chained
(prev_hash/entry_hash, verify_audit_chain); executor approve REQUIRES a
BIP-340 signature over sha256(cayce-ops:approve:<id>) when
CAYCE_OPS_OPERATOR_PUBKEY is set; deploy/roles.sql ships least-privilege
per-daemon DB roles.

Critical 2 (threading dead): sends create real OUTBOUND rows (own
Message-ID, In-Reply-To -> inbound); inbound message_id never overwritten;
maild compose adds the first-contact path; _match_proposal falls back to
inbound chains.

Critical 3 (duplicate sends): per-message transactions in send path —
SMTP failure on message N no longer resurrects 1..N-1; failures audited
(send_failed) and the row stays queued.

Critical 4 (classifier): negated approvals (cannot accept / not approved /
not accepting) classify REJECTION at 0.95 before the bare-keyword rule;
LLM prompt braces escaped (.format no longer KeyError into silent fallback).

Critical 5 (systemd): every daemon has a run subcommand
(maild run = poll+send, publisher run = publish-due, monitor run = build);
deploy README documents the separate daily publisher plan timer.

Mediums: approved_hash binds drafts/captions to the approved text (edited
text refuses to send/publish until re-approved); risk_score renamed
match_score (migration 0002) and auto-approve orders HIGHEST relevance
first; compose binds postgres to 127.0.0.1; IMAP marks \\Seen only after
commit (fetch returns (num, raw), mark post-commit); disabled channels are
terminal (ContentStatus.SKIPPED) and publish failures burn a bounded
attempt budget before abandonment; make hooks installs the pre-push gate.

tests: 12 new — 56 total, all green; ruff 0 findings; gitleaks clean.
 2026-10-19 23:06:29 +00:00
cayce a282aedb94 lint: wrap long lines (E501), fix F841/F821/E731 — make check fully green 
All 32 findings resolved: regex literals kept single-line with noqa
(pattern IS the reviewed artifact), HTML rows string-concatenated for
line length, walrus tuple in BIP-340 verify split into named generator,
unused pytest import dropped. No behavior changes; 44/44 tests pass.
Full-gate discipline restored: ruff exit 0.
 2026-10-19 22:03:53 +00:00
cayce 5b259bc663 mail-negotiator: classify merchant replies, draft gated, audited sends
ci / lint-test-leaks (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Details 
- IMAP poll (UNSEEN, stdlib imaplib) -> parse (bare address via email.utils)
- threading: In-Reply-To -> outbound sent-draft message-id -> proposal
- classify: deterministic rules; optional LLM behind provider interface;
  below-threshold confidence -> needs_review (never guessed)
- unthreadable approvals flagged needs_review (suspicious by definition)
- merchant_status recorded on proposal detail; proposal lifecycle untouched
- reply drafts generated from templates (drafted), NEVER auto-sent
- SMTP sends only draft_status=approved (human approve_draft, audited);
  sent drafts store their Message-ID for future threading
- idempotent on Message-ID; DaemonRun wrapper for monitor

tests: 9 new (classification rules, threshold->review, threading, idempotence,
blocked send without approval, approve->send->audit chain, double approve)
— 29 total passing
 2026-10-19 21:47:18 +00:00