Merge PR #6: audit — AUDIT.md for operator review

AUDIT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# AUDIT — cayce-ops
+
+Audited commit: the merge of PR #6 on `main` (see *Audited commit* at the bottom).
+Gate that commit passed: `make check` — ruff (0 findings), 44 tests green,
+alembic smoke on sqlite, gitleaks full history (no leaks).
+
+## 1. Component map and data flow
+
+```
+                      CAYCE_OPS_SCANNER_SOURCES (external URLs)
+                                │  read-only fetch
+                                ▼
+   ┌──────────┐  proposals(status=proposed)  ┌──────────┐
+   │ scanner  │─────────────────────────────▶│   DB     │
+   └──────────┘                              │ (shared) │
+                                             │          │        audit_log (every write)
+   ┌──────────┐   approved → running →      │          │◀────── actor / action / detail /
+   │ executor │◀──── done|failed ───────────│          │        result on every transition
+   └──────────┘   plugins by kind            └──────────┘
+                                             │
+   ┌──────────┐  IMAP inbox ───────────────▶│ mail_messages,
+   │ maild    │  drafts (gated)             │ proposals(detail)
+   └──────────┘  SMTP only draft=approved   │
+                                             │
+   ┌──────────┐  content_items ────────────▶│          │──▶ relay (nostr) / Meta (opt-in)
+   │publisher │  draft→approved→published   └──────────┘
+   └──────────┘
+   ┌──────────┐  reads daemon_runs, audit_log, counts
+   │ monitor  │────────────────────────────────────▶ status.html (static)
+   └──────────┘
+```
+
+Shared schema (`cayceops/models.py`, migration `alembic/versions/0001_initial.py`):
+`proposals`, `audit_log`, `mail_messages`, `content_items`, `daemon_runs`.
+
+## 2. Every external call (where, what it sends, what triggers it)
+
+| # | Call | Code | Sends | Trigger |
+|---|------|------|-------|---------|
+| 1 | HTTP GET to scanner sources | `cayceops/components/scanner/scanner.py` → `_fetch` (urllib) | nothing but the request (+ `CAYCE_OPS_SCANNER_USER_AGENT` header) to URLs **configured by the operator** | `cayceops scanner run` (cron/systemd timer) |
+| 2 | IMAP fetch (IMAP4_SSL, UNSEEN) | `cayceops/components/maild/maild.py` → `connect_imap`, `_fetch_unread` | credentials from env; reads inbox | `cayceops maild poll` |
+| 3 | SMTP send | `maild.py` → `_smtp_send` (smtplib, STARTTLS) | a reply **draft a human approved** to the original sender's bare address | `cayceops maild send-approved`, and only rows with `draft_status=approved` |
+| 4 | LLM chat completion (openai-compatible) | `cayceops/llm.py` → `OpenAICompatProvider.complete` (urllib) | the email text (truncated 4000 chars) + system prompt; `Authorization: Bearer <env key>` | `maild poll` **only if** `CAYCE_OPS_LLM_PROVIDER != null` (default is null → never) |
+| 5 | Nostr relay publish (websocket) | `cayceops/components/publisher/nostr.py` → `relay_publish`/`publish` | a signed NIP-01 event whose content is the **human-approved** caption | `cayceops publisher publish-due`, channel=nostr, only if key+relays configured |
+| 6 | Meta Graph API | `cayceops/components/publisher/adapters.py` | caption (+optional hosted image URL) + page token | **refuses to run** unless `CAYCE_OPS_ENABLE_FACEBOOK/INSTAGRAM=true` (default false). Currently unreachable from `publish_due`. |
+
+No other network code exists. Grep guards: `urllib.request`, `imaplib`, `smtplib`,
+`websockets` appear only in the files above (verified by review; CI could add a
+lint rule — see *Known risks*).
+
+## 3. What each component can do without a human / with AUTONOMOUS_MODE=true
+
+| Component | Without any human (default) | With `CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_MODE=true` |
+|---|---|---|
+| scanner | fetch sources, file proposals, write audit | identical (scanner never executes) |
+| executor | nothing executes by itself; it acts only on rows a human set to `approved` (via `executor approve --actor …`) | **one added path**: auto-approves `proposed` items whose `kind` ∈ `CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_KINDS`, capped at `CAYCE_OPS_AUTONOMOUS_DAILY_CAP`/day, actor `auto:policy`, fully audited. Then executes those. |
+| maild | polls IMAP, classifies, writes drafts. **Never sends.** | identical — autonomy does not touch mail |
+| publisher | plans drafts; publishes nothing | identical — publishing always requires `publisher approve --actor …`; autonomy has no effect |
+| monitor | reads and renders | identical |
+
+Explicitly impossible in the current code: sending an unapproved mail draft,
+publishing unapproved content, executing a non-approved proposal (the single
+exception is the audited `auto:policy` path above), disabling the audit write.
+
+## 4. Environment variables and permissions per component
+
+All config is env-only (`cayceops/config.py`), prefix `CAYCE_OPS_`. Full list
+with placeholders: `.env.example`.
+
+| Component | Requires | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| core | `DATABASE_URL` (postgres or sqlite), `LOG_LEVEL`, `STATE_DIR`, `MEDIA_DIR` | DB user needs SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE on the five tables |
+| scanner | `SCANNER_SOURCES` (JSON), `SCANNER_KEYWORDS`, `SCANNER_USER_AGENT` | outbound GET only |
+| executor | `AUTONOMOUS_MODE`, `AUTONOMOUS_KINDS`, `AUTONOMOUS_DAILY_CAP`, `MAX_ATTEMPTS`, `ENABLE_HTTP_ACTIONS` | `http_post` plugin stays inert unless enabled |
+| maild | `IMAP_HOST/PORT/USER/PASSWORD/MAILBOX`, `SMTP_HOST/PORT/USER/PASSWORD`, `MAIL_FROM`, `LLM_PROVIDER/MODEL/BASE_URL/API_KEY/REVIEW_THRESHOLD` | IMAP user is read+mark-seen; SMTP login can send only as `MAIL_FROM` |
+| publisher | `NOSTR_PRIVATE_KEY` (32-byte hex), `NOSTR_RELAYS`, `ENABLE_FACEBOOK`, `FACEBOOK_PAGE_TOKEN`, `ENABLE_INSTAGRAM`, `INSTAGRAM_USER_ID` | nostr key = signing authority; treat as secret |
+| monitor | `MONITOR_OUTPUT` (writable path) | needs read on DB, write on output only |
+
+Filesystem permissions: default deployment is the `cayce` user owning
+`/srv/cayce-ops` with systemd hardening (`NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem=strict`,
+`ProtectHome=yes`) — see `deploy/systemd/cayce-ops@.service`.
+
+## 5. Dependencies (pinned in `pyproject.toml` + `uv.lock`)
+
+| Package | Version | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| sqlalchemy | 2.0.44 | ORM + engine for the shared schema |
+| alembic | 1.17.0 | production migrations |
+| typer | 0.20.0 | CLI (all five daemons are CLI commands) |
+| psycopg[binary] | 3.2.13 | Postgres driver (production stack) |
+| pillow | 12.0.0 | brand image templates (publisher) |
+| coincurve | 21.0.0 | libsecp256k1 binding: NIP-01 event signing (publisher) |
+| websockets | 15.0.1 | nostr relay publish (sync client) |
+| pytest | 9.0.2 (dev) | test suite |
+| ruff | 0.15.1 (dev) | lint |
+
+stdlib doing heavy lifting: `imaplib`/`smtplib`/`email` (maild), `urllib` (scanner,
+LLM, Meta adapters), `xml.etree`/`html.parser` (scanner), `hashlib`/`json` (nostr ids).
+
+## 6. Known risks and open items
+
+1. **No live Gitea Actions runner on the current host** (DECISIONS D6). CI files
+   ship for GitHub/Gitea Actions, and the same gate runs locally pre-push
+   (`scripts/pre-push`), but until a runner exists there is no third-party
+   enforcement of the gate on every push.
+2. **`auto:policy` path is real autonomy** — bounded (kind allowlist + daily cap +
+   audit) but it does execute without a human in the loop when enabled. The cap
+   counter is DB-based; wiping `audit_log` resets it.Mitigation: only the
+   operator can set the env flags, and the audit log is append-only by convention.
+3. **Executor plugins are in-process Python** (D9): no sandboxing. A malicious
+   plugin = arbitrary code. Mitigation: plugins are repo code, reviewed in PRs;
+   the registry starts with `log_action` fallbacks only.
+4. **Mail classification is heuristic** (rules; LLM optional). Conservative by
+   design (low confidence → `needs_review`, unthreaded approvals → review), but
+   a sophisticated phishing email could still be misclassified `other`. Human
+   gate on sends bounds the damage to drafting wrong replies (never sending them).
+5. **Nostr relays are plaintext-config endpoints**: a hostile relay sees the
+   note content (public by design) and could replay it; event ids make duplication
+   detectable. No NIP-05, no retries across relay pools yet.
+6. **`detail` JSON columns are schemaless** — writers evolve payloads without
+   migrations. Monitor intentionally renders none of it.
+7. **gitleaks allowlist covers `tests/`** (D7): a real secret pasted under
+   `tests/` would not trip the scanner. Compensating control: PR review; no
+   fixture reads the environment.
+8. **Open:** provision an act_runner for Gitea Actions; wire `posts_log`-style
+   engagement back into publisher planning; add NIP-05 identifier; retries for
+   relay publish.
+
+## 7. Running tests and the local stack
+
+```bash
+uv sync --frozen                 # python 3.12 + locked deps
+uv run pytest                    # 44 tests, sqlite, no network
+make check                       # lint + tests + alembic smoke + gitleaks (pre-push gate)
+
+# full local stack (five daemons + postgres 16):
+cp .env.example .env             # fill placeholders; nothing real required for db-only
+docker compose up -d db
+uv run alembic upgrade head
+docker compose up -d             # or run each: uv run cayceops {scanner,executor,maild,publisher,monitor} …
+
+# production path (VPS):
+#   see deploy/systemd/README.md (hardened units + timers)
+```
+
+## Audited commit
+
+- Repository: `cayce/cayce-ops` (branch `main`)
+- Audited: merge of PR #6 (`audit: AUDIT.md for operator review`) — hash printed
+  in the "Ready for audit" issue that links this file.
+- Gate at that commit: ruff clean · 44/44 tests · alembic 0001 smoke OK ·
+  gitleaks `--all` no leaks.